28.10.08 Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. Old Players, New Game - New Players, Old Game

Introduction

By Magnus Eriksson

According to Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, never before has the risk of a nuclear weapon actually being used been greater than now. On 17 January 2007, the board of the renowned Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the doomsday clock forward, to five minutes to twelve. How could this happen while our attention was on the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and when we thought the nuclear era was over?

During the Cold War deterrence did work, because the actors were predictable to each other. Today, with new weapon types being developed, and with additional, less predictable players, the role of nuclear weapons may change from a means of deterrence to weapons for actual use.

Thus far, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has proven an effective instrument to constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, there are now indications that both nuclear and non-nuclear states have come to ignore the NPT [1]. Nuclear states are upgrading their arsenals and incorporating them in strategies with conventional weapons, which can lower the threshold for actually using the nuclear option [2].

Moreover, states that have hitherto shown little interest in developing nuclear weapons or nuclear programmes have started to do so. The 2006 North Korean nuclear test created great concern, not the least in the region, and in both Japan and South Korea voices were raised in favour of developing own nuclear weapons. North Korea has used its nuclear capability to gain political advantages, and has agreed to stop further development in return of promises of economic aid and energy supply: Nuclear weapons, or threat to develop such, used to gain political advantages that hardly could be achieved otherwise are a tempting strategy for many states.

Iran claims that its nuclear programme has only civilian and commercial purposes, but many, including the UN Security Council, are in doubt. What does Iran want to achieve? A card to play at the negotiation table like North Korea, or do they have other ambitions?
A nuclear weapon in the hands of a non-state actor is by many described as the ultimate nightmare scenario. The ambition among these actors is definitely not lacking, but do they have the material, the facilities and the knowledge? Many observers say they already do – or will so in a near future.

Thus the world finds itself in a situation where the nuclear states upgrade their arsenal and incorporate them in strategies with conventional weapons, which can lower the threshold for actually using them. In addition, states that up to now have showed little interest in developing nuclear weapons or nuclear programmes have started to do so. And finally, the vast supply of fissile material and the link between weak states and terrorist organisations make it far too plausible that a nuclear weapon can come into the hands of a non-state actor. The observations and questions described above led us to the seminar title: Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century: Old Players, New Game – New Players, Old Game.

The seminar was divided into four sessions and these conference proceedings follow the same structure [3].

The first part provides the contextual and technological background for the ensuing discussions.

Sverre Lodgaard gives a broad historical overview and addresses the legacies of the first and second nuclear age and the political conditions under which the international non-proliferation regime may be effective. He concludes by proposing a high-level UN meeting to be convened in the autumn of 2009 to confirm the validity of the NPT and to seek agreement on approaches to the implementation of art. VI of the treaty.

Dieter Röhrich explains some of the technical aspects of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. After a thorough elaboration on the requirements needed to produce a nuclear weapon or a crude bomb he concludes by stating that several factors indicate that the risk of an intended or accidental nuclear explosion will increase in the near future; and that the only way to avoid this is a total disarmament.

Morten Bremer Mærli elaborates on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and calls it «the single most important international legal barrier standing between states and nuclear weapon capabilities». He stresses that the continued success of the NPT is by no means guaranteed and concludes by stating the need for a revitalised NPT and calls the US attitude towards the NPT, in the light of their war on terror, «the greatest security paradox in our time».

In the second part the nuclear postures of the U.S. and Russia are discussed. [4]

Hans M. Kristensen describes that the present US security strategy makes nuclear weapons an integrated part of an overall strategy countering weapons of mass destruction, stating that, if necessary, the United States will use nuclear weapons – even pre-emptively. He makes an extensive review of official documents and shows that Russia remains the focus of the day-to-day planning but that China has been elevated to a near-peer category and that regional states pursuing weapons of mass destruction have risen to the status of full strategic adversaries. Official statements continue to reaffirm the importance of nuclear weapons to U.S. national security and although there is a strong push in the U.S. Congress to review the nuclear policy, there will also be significant resistance against changing too much.

Sergey Oznobishchev elaborates on Russia’s nuclear posture and describes how the perception of the US as a hegemon and NATO’s enlargement process and nuclear strategy are major concerns in Moscow, hampering Russo-Western relations and leaving Russia permanently in its traditional nuclear strategy. He refers to official documents showing that Russia is abandoning the former Soviet posture not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and now opens for a first strike option. Oznobishchev concludes by calling for a true «partnership-like» behaviour between Washington and Moscow: «An idea that should never hang in the air, but be fixed in national security documents and military doctrines.»

In the third part, «new» state and non-state nuclear players are discussed.

Harald Müller describes South Asia, the Middle East, and East Asia as the three main nuclear trouble spots in the world. In South Asia, a lot of concern is directed against Pakistan and the risk of that country becoming a failed state with nuclear weapons. And since Islamist sympathizers are spread across the Pakistani administration, the risk of nuclear materials (or even weapons) falling into the hands of non-state actors cannot be excluded. In the Middle East, Israel’s nuclear superiority is a strong incentive for Arab governments to pursue weapons of mass destruction, entailing the risk of a rampant arms race with severely destabilizing and dangerous effects in the region cannot be excluded. In East Asia, several states are concerned with the threat emerging from a nuclear North Korea, whose endeavours to further develop its nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery vehicles may increase the risk of a regional arms race.

Jalil Roshandel provides a thorough exploration of Iran’s security concerns and self-image, and describes why nuclear energy and technology remain a high priority that will be very difficult for Iran to abandon.

He argues that the West by political pressure and threat of military action has escorted Iran into its present position. He sees, however, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate published in December 2007 as a possible start of a constructive approach where the international community realizes that it can gain much more through the inclusion of Iran rather than by ostracizing the country.
Anne Stenersen5 examines the threat of nuclear terrorism and describes how terrorist attacks of today statistically have become fewer but more deadly, without necessarily becoming more high-tech or meaning that the actors will seek to use CBRN6 materials. Her extensive overview comprises examples of various terrorist organisations, among them militant Islamists. Stenersen concludes by remarking that al-Qaida’s own publications and practices reveal little evidence that their interest in CBRN weapons has increased since 2001. And since obtaining militarily effective CBRN weapons is extremely difficult, al-Qaida will most probably continue to carry out attacks with car bombs or conventional explosives and by exploiting the built-in vulnerabilities of modern society.

In the fourth part, Kjetil Skogrand discusses the consequences for Norway and the Norwegian Defence by a possible stronger emphasis on nuclear weapons in world affairs in the coming years. He elaborates on three themes: consequences of possible nuclear terrorism in Norway or in connection with international operations in which Norway participates; consequences of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by aspiring nuclear states, and consequences of possible nuclear rearmament in Norway’s adjacent areas. He establishes that nuclear proliferation can affect Norway militarily and politically in a number of ways. Skogrand concludes by voicing the view that the renaissance of attention on nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing and that the most important action that Norway can take is at the diplomatic level.

During the seminar there were extensive discussions and the panels set up after each session had a challenging task in answering the questions from the floor. One of the more testing ones that came was: «When we see how the old nuclear players renew their arsenals and how they interpret the NPT to fit their own purposes; and when we se how the status of a state increases in the world community when it declares itself ‘nuclear’: What reasons are there for states that see globalisation as a threat or in other ways see themselves threatened, NOT to pursue nuclear weapons?» After long elaborations and discussions, involving the panel and the floor, most speakers agreed on the observations and regretted that today there are far too many incentives for this type of states to pursue nuclear weapons or nuclear programmes.

Many speakers returned to the same observation that had been the starting point for us in the committee when we were preparing for the seminar: During the Cold War the threat of a nuclear war – with the potential to end mankind – was so overwhelming that all other issues were more or less deported into the shadows. With the end of the Cold War we got new problems, and with the perceived shade of nuclear threat lifted, we were able to see problems that had existed for a long time; and our focus shifted to intrastate conflicts, terrorism, effects of climate change and humanitarian disasters. Today, it is possible that we are so occupied managing these issues; and that the thought of a nuclear disaster is so frightening, that we haven’t realised or deny to realise that the nuclear shade once again is rising; this time in a new and more unpredictable form. Norske Leger mot Atomvåpen, the Norwegian affiliate of IPPNW,7 has stated that: «Twenty five years ago, hundreds of thousands of people were marching the streets in protest of the arms race. It had an effect on the policy makers. If people realised what is happening today, they would be out in the streets again!»[8]

The non-nuclear security challenges will not disappear by themselves, and obviously neither will the threat of nuclear weapons or problems related to nuclear issues.

This observation was also reflected in the opening respectively closing remarks of Jan Egeland , Director of NUPI and Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for conflict resolution, and Rear Admiral Louise Bastviken , Commandant of the Norwegian Education Command. They both concluded with the acknowledgement that we cannot concentrate on either nuclear related problems or other problems: we have to put efforts to manage them all.

On behalf of the organizing committee, I would like to take the opportunity to express our gratitude to or speakers, our participants and everybody else that have helped us making the 2007 Military Power Seminar a great success. I also hope that anyone reading these conference proceedings will find interesting fruits for thought.

Magnus Eriksson, Oslo, May 2008.

Notes
[1] The NPT defines nuclear states as states that possessed nuclear weapons before 1967; USA, Soviet Union, China, France and United Kingdom. Israel, India and Pakistan are states that possess nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT.
[2] The United States have in their latest Nuclear Posture Review declared a strategy where nuclear weapons are integrated with other defence means to achieve so-called Flexible Attrition against a broad spectrum of potential adversaries. In early March 2007 the British Parliament decided to launch a modernization programme for its nuclear arsenal at an estimated cost of £ 20 billion. China, Russia and France have also decided to modernize their nuclear arsenals.
[3] The seminar programme is described in appendix A. At the seminar, Old and New Players were merged into one session. In these proceedings they are split into two parts. It should also be noted that most, but not all lecturers have contributed to these proceedings. The consequence of this is most obvious concerning the third and forth sessions, where the debates in the seminar were extensive, but where only one of the lecturers contributes in writing. The main reason for this is that this part of the seminar was held in Norwegian.
[4] At the seminar, the nuclear postures of China, United Kingdom, France and NATO were also discussed.
[5] Anne Stenersen’s text was presented by Brynjar Lia from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).
[6] Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
[7] International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
[8] Mæland, John Gunnar and Fossgard Sandøy, Ingvild, «Fem på tolv», Dagbladet