The report is underpinned by two working hypotheses. The first is that prevention is better than cure. Prevention is cheaper in all respects, almost always easier, and morally more defensible. This argument is particularly strong when it comes to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which is the scope of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The second hypothesis is that in order for R2P to maintain its political clout, it is crucial that it is not invoked inappropriately. There is a tension between these two hypotheses, which is linked to the multifaceted character and time perspective of preventive action. The report suggests a solution that seeks to maintain the primacy of prevention while at the same time safeguarding the integrity and political utility of R2P.
There is a strong case for prioritising prevention in the context of R2P. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) defined the responsibility to prevent as one of R2P’s three constitutive elements, arguing that it was ‘the single most important dimension’. In this way it sought to alleviate fears that humanitarian action may be used with neo-imperialist or neo-colonialist motives. In today’s international political climate, with the renewed support for absolute state sovereignty in the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, the preventive component of R2P is even more important. It may also constitute a practical necessity due to the current overstretch of troops and resources and the assumed difficulty of achieving a Security Council mandate for more coercive action.
One problem with preventive action in the context of R2P is connected to the breadth of measures involved. These measures are typically divided into two categories – ‘direct’ and ‘root cause’ prevention – which both consist of a broad range of political, economic, legal and military measures, the distinction being drawn by ‘the time available to make a difference’. The danger is that if one is to invoke R2P in connection to everything from ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘preventive deployment’, to the ‘promot[ion] of membership in international organisations’ and the ‘support for education for tolerance’, the R2P label could become meaningless and lose its political clout. Another problem relates to the timeframe involved in ‘root cause’ prevention. Such capacity building measures take so long to implement that it is simply too late to begin to initiate them when it can credibly be established that a society is at risk. It is therefore futile to invoke R2P in order to muster commitment and resources for such measures, even if they are assumed to be crucial for the prevention of mass atrocities.
On this basis, the report suggests a two-fold solution. First, direct references to R2P should be limited to situations in which mass atrocity crises are looming. In other words, R2P should only be invoked in connection to the use of ‘direct prevention’ measures. Secondly, and relatedly, work on the implementation of ‘root cause’ prevention should take place without direct appeals to the concept of R2P.
‘Direct’ R2P prevention could involve instruments such as economic inducements, fact-finding missions, arbitration, etc., or a more comprehensive response in the form of the deployment of a multifaceted preventive operation. Relevant lessons for the latter could be learnt from the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (1992–1999) and various EU and OSCE initiatives, but it is emphasised that the preventive deployment should be tailored to the particular case at hand and focus specifically on the prevention of mass atrocities.
‘Root cause’ prevention would entail the promotion of a ‘culture of prevention’ of mass atrocities, or the mainstreaming of prevention into the day-to-day workings of international politics. Crucial here would be ‘a habit of preventive investment’.
The report also identifies areas in which further research is required.
These are:
• the difference between conflict prevention and the prevention of mass atrocities, and the implications for ‘direct prevention’ as well as ‘root cause prevention’.
• the role of identity construction, gender and gender-based violence in the occurrence and prevention of mass atrocities.
• how a multifaceted preventive deployment might be tailored to address a looming mass atrocity crisis.
• the role that regional organisations might play in connection to such deployments.
• how the UN might best deal with the tension between maintaining the consent of the host government to the deployment and the need to adequately address minority and other identityrelated issues.
• how coherent ‘root cause prevention’ policies might be devised, and who should be responsible for their execution. How is coordination and coherence best achieved between different actors and initiatives.
• the conceptual and practical links between ‘root cause prevention’ and peacebuilding.
• the normative implications of ‘root cause prevention’.
