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
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The EU as a Security Actor: The development of political and administrative capabilities

Pernille Rieker

[Abstract] With its special character in relation to both institutional design and policy content, the EU is often classified as a 'post-modern' security actor. What does this actually mean? What kind of capabilities does a post-modern actor have? This article focuses on the development of political and administrative capabilities in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. If it is true that the EU is becoming an increasingly important security actor, we should expect an increase in these kinds of capabilities as well. According to March & Olsen (1995) little can be accomplished without capabilities such as rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills. This should also be true of a presumably 'post-modern' actor like the EU. This paper examines the extent to which the EU has established these kinds of capabilities in relation to its security policy, how they can be characterized and whether they have increased over time.

1. Introduction

This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of how the EU functions as a security actor, by focusing on political capacities and modes of governance. Many scholars have argued that the EU has developed into an *international actor* (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Ginsberg, 2001; Manners, 2002; Peterson and Sjørnsen, 1998; Sjørnsen, 2006; Smith, 2002; Smith, 2003; Smith, 2004; White, 2001; Whitmann, 1998). This literature is characterized by a broad approach to the EU's role in international politics, and typically concentrates on External Relations as well as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). There are also a few contributions that narrow in on the extent to which the EU has developed into a *security actor* (Howorth, 2007; Rieker, 2006; Wæver, 2000). Whether or not the two can be said to differ depends of course on how broadly one defines the concept of 'security'.

There is also a large literature dealing specifically with the security- and defence-related aspects of the CFSP and the ESDP (Deighton, 2002; Duke, 2000; Hoffmann, 2000; Howorth, 2007; Sjørnsen, 2003). This is a somewhat more narrow focus, but is no less important. Indeed, precisely because the CFSP/ESDP is a specific policy area with a separate set of rules, budgets, institutions and capabilities, it is an interesting case to study. Surprisingly, however, nothing in the literature has concentrated on the development and existence of *political and administrative capabilities* – the administrative, budgetary and institutional capacities that the EU has at its disposal in relation to the CFSP and ESDP. Instead, the emphasis has typically been either on the aspirations and ambitions of the EU in this area, or the development of (or the lack of) civilian and military capabilities under the ESDP. This article seeks to fill that gap.

That said, this paper has a more limited scope than much of the literature on EU security policy. It does not attempt to discuss all facets of the EU's security and defence policy, but is meant as a modest contribution on a topic that seems to have been accorded little attention. The main argument runs thus: *If the EU is to be perceived as a credible security actor, it also needs a certain degree of political and administrative capabilities.* The following analysis will examine the extent to which this is the case.

In the next section I present the overall theoretical approach, as well as a typology of capabilities based on the work of March and Olsen (1995). The ensuing four sections examine the development of such political and administrative capacities within the CFSP. In the final part I sum up the main findings, and offer some conclusions on what this may tell us about the functioning of the EU as a security actor.

2. What kind of security actor?

2.1 A system of multi-level governance

It is not immediately apparent whether the EU *is* an actor, and there is in European integration theory a sizeable literature that discusses precisely that question. For a long time the main dividing line stood between those who perceived European integration as solely an arena for intergovernmental bargaining (Hoffmann, 1965; Moravcsik, 1998), and those who saw it as a continuous process towards a supranational state (Haas, 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Sæter, 1998).¹ Today, this debate has become less dominant in the integration literature, with most scholars agreeing that the EU should be characterized as something in-between an international organization and a federal state. The consequence of this compromise has been that ‘the study of the EU has, to a large extent, shifted from the study of integration to the study of governance (...) defined as being about the exercise of authority with or without the formal institutions of government’ (Rosamond, 2000: 109). Rather than explaining the EU and European integration, their existence is taken as a fact, and the attention is shifted from process to polity.

The EU may be characterized as a system of multi-level governance, since it is a ‘polity-creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national and supranational’ (Marks and Hooghe, 2001: 2). According to the multi-level governance model, decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by national governments. This becomes particularly evident in the sphere of foreign and security policy – a policy area that is intergovernmental in character, but where there

¹ For an introduction to this debate see Rosamond, B. (2000) *Theories of European Integration* (London: Macmillan).

are fuzzy borders between the competencies of the Commission, the Council and the member states of the EU.

Multi-level governance thus eradicates the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics. Even though most of the literature on multi-level governance takes for granted the existence of sovereign statehood, AAlberts argues that this perspective provides a challenging picture of the dispersal of authority. In a multi-level governance system, she argues, the authority structures seem far more complex and flexible than in a conventional understanding of statehood (AAlberts, 2004: 29). This means that it bears a resemblance to what in IR theory has been called ‘post-modern statehood’ or ‘neo-medievalism’. Indeed, Ruggie has claimed that the EU might constitute the first truly post-modern political form (Ruggie, 1998: 173). Similarly, Robert Cooper has argued that the EU must be considered as the most developed post-modern system, because the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is being erased, states are giving up their traditional monopoly on violence, and internal borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant (Cooper, 2003: 36–37).

Thus, it is the special character of the EU that makes it ‘post-modern’. Its uniqueness is linked to institutional factors, such as the circumstance that the EU is an institutional hybrid between an international organization and a federal state. In addition, the fact that the EU lacks a clearly defined and institutionalized security policy from the Cold War period is also an important special feature. While the first opens up for other forms of governance than those we have become accustomed to (such as multi-level governance), the second makes it easier to develop an innovative security approach (such as comprehensive security). In the following, I will look primarily at the former, focusing on governance and polity rather than on the content of policy.²

² For an analysis of the content of policy, see Rieker Rieker, P. (2006) *Europeanization of National Security Identity. The EU and the changing Security Identities of the Nordic States* (London and New York: Routledge).

2.2 The importance of political and administrative capabilities

There are various ways of understanding actorness in international politics. In both international law and conventional international relations, statehood has traditionally been seen as a requirement for being treated as an actor in the international system. More recently, however, other criteria have been emphasized – such as autonomy and the ability to perform. This makes it possible for multilateral institutions in general and the EU in particular to be considered as ‘actors’.

Gunnar Sjöstedt defined actor capability as a ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt, 1977: 16). While he viewed this capacity primarily as a function of internal resources and internal cohesion, Bretherton and Vogler have argued that actorness is constructed through the interplay of both internal and external factors (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 2). They hold that an actor is an entity capable of formulating and acting upon decisions, but also that the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external opportunities. Their focus is on interaction of three types: the interaction between *opportunity*, in terms of the external context of ideas, events and expectations – the context which shapes and frames EU action or inaction; *presence*, in terms of structural power – the ability to exert influence externally; and *internal capability* – those aspects of EU policy process which constrain or enable external action and hence govern its ability to capitalize on presence or respond to opportunity. With regard to the latter, namely capability, Bretherton and Vogler focus on four aspects: shared commitment to a set of overarching values; domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy; the ability to identify priorities and formulate policies; finally, the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments such as diplomacy, economic tools and military means (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 29–35).

While this is an impressive and comprehensive approach, it lacks a focus on governance. This means that it does not provide an assessment of the actual political and administrative capabilities the EU has at its disposal and how they are used. It is important to focus on governance, because of the argument that certain basic political and administrative capabilities are required in order to be considered as an actor. This argument is based on the work of March and Olsen on democratic governance (1995). Even though the EU cannot be characterized as a democratic state, it is possible to apply some of their insights to a unity like the EU – especially as regards the development of political capabilities. March and Olsen start that particular chapter of their book by arguing that ‘developing appropriate identities and acting accordance with them require resources and capabilities’. They further maintain that ‘the tending of capabilities – creating, sustaining, mobilizing, and regulating them – is the task of governance [and that without] such a structure of capabilities, little in the way of individual or collective purpose can be accomplished’ (March and Olsen, 1995: 91). According to this understanding, it can be argued that if the EU is to be characterized as an actor, it needs to have certain political and administrative capabilities. This means that Sjöstedt’s focus on internal factors still is important. By using a typology developed by March and Olsen (1995), we may single out precisely what kinds of internal factors are required.

2.2.1 Four types of political and administrative capabilities

March and Olsen distinguish between four broad types of capabilities that are particularly relevant to governance (March and Olsen, 1995: 92–95):

The first type of capability that is required is what they refer to as *rights and authorities*. Rights and authorities are capabilities enshrined in formal rules. These are protected, interpreted, and enforced by a structure of norms and institutions. By exercising valid authority and having that exercise certified by political institutions and culture, officials establish their existence as officials.

Second, March and Olsen emphasize the need for *resources*. By resources, they mean the assets that make it possible to do things or to make others do things. Such assets

may include money, property, time, information, facilities and equipment, and have both individual and institutional attributes.

The third type of capability is, according to March and Olsen, *competencies and knowledge* on the part of individuals, professions and institutions. Individuals have competencies from their education and training. Institutions encode knowledge in traditions and rules.

Finally, March and Olsen point to the need for *organizing capacity*. Such capacity is important because it allows effective utilization of formal rights and authority, resources, and competencies. ‘Without organizational talents, experience, and understanding, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control, logistics, scheduling, allocation and mobilization of effort, division of labour and specialization, motivation, planning, and the mundane world of meeting deadlines, budgets, and collective expectations. Attention must be focused; activities must be meshed to produce combined effects; people must be consulted and involved; resources must be conserved and expended in a timely fashion’ (March and Olsen 1995: 95). Still, this capacity is also dependent on the availability of other capabilities and especially resources, competencies and knowledge.

These four types of capabilities differ in the sense that some are limited resources that will come to an end (money, time etc.), whereas others can be said to be unlimited and may even increase if applied properly (competence/expertise and skills).

2.2.2 Measuring and operationalization

If it is true that the EU has developed into a stronger and more autonomous security actor, we should also expect it to have developed and strengthened the kinds of capacities presented above. Taking as our point of departure March and Olsen’s four types of political and administrative capabilities, let us now examine the functioning of the EU as a security actor.

If the EU is indeed a security actor, we would expect to find (1) that rights and authorities have been developed for the CFSP and ESDP; (2) that resources in terms of budget, staff and equipment are allocated to the CFSP and ESDP; (3) that the CFSP/ESDP staff possess the necessary expertise and experience in this field; and (4) that the EU has the organizing capacity to make effective use of its formal rights, resources and competencies. In addition, if it is true that the EU is becoming *an increasingly important* security actor, we would also expect an increase in these resources over time. The following four sections of this article will systematically examine the validity of these claims.

Both primary and secondary sources will be applied here. The primary sources are official documents as well as interviews. Regarding formal rights, I look primarily at the treaties that establish the rights and competencies of the various institutions in this policy area. When examining the resources that the EU has at its disposal in this policy area, I will look at the evolution in budgets and staffs in the period between 2002 and 2007 as well as the development of civilian and military capacities.³ Finally I will discuss the expertise and knowledge the EU has in the sphere of security and defence as well as the level of organizational skills. While primary data can be obtained about the first three capabilities, the last two will be subjected to a more qualitative discussion based on secondary sources and interviews with EU officials.

3. An increase in formal rights and authorities

How and to what extent has the EU developed a legal framework to regulate the competencies of its various institutions? Here I will examine both the general legal framework of the CFSP that regulates the competencies of the various institutions, and also the rules and framework regulates the financing system, since this is important for the ability to implement decisions (concerning joint actions in particular). The actual size of the budgets will be discussed in section 4.1

³ The time period is linked to the fact that the information about the budgets is available on-line as from 2002. However, this also makes sense since the ESDP was declared operational in December 2001.

A multi-level legal framework for the CFSP

While the competencies of the EU are more limited in the area of foreign and security policy than in other Community matters,⁴ there exists a legal framework that regulates the competencies of the CFSP institutions at the EU level, and between the EU and its member states. This legal framework for the CFSP is clarified under Title V in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), established in 1992 (Maastricht) and later revised in 1999 (Amsterdam) and in 2001 (Nice). The Constitutional Treaty also proposed some important new elements, several of which are included in the Reform Treaty that was finally agreed at the informal European Council in Lisbon on 19 October 2007.⁵

The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the new office of a High Representative (HR) for the CFSP, fusing it with that of the Council Secretary General. The Treaty stipulates that the HR ‘shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties’ (TEU, Title V, Article 26). But even though the Amsterdam Treaty indicated a relatively modest role for the HR/CFSP, the appointment of Javier Solana to this post came to shape the office in ways that have given him a unique stature in the diplomatic world. For many, he has become the face of the EU’s external relations (Duke, 2006b: 12).

If the Reform Treaty is ratified, this position will become even more important, and will include the position as Commissioner for External Relations as well as (one of) the Vice Presidents of the Commission. The title will be changed to *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*. Other relevant changes in the new Reform Treaty include the appointment of a permanent Council Presidency to chair EU summits for a two-and-a-half-year renewable term instead of a six-month rotation; and the introduction of a single legal personality of the EU. However, this

4 Community matters means “first pillar issues” or those issues that fall under the so-called European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community.

5 Following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and a two year period of reflection, the EU leaders have recently agreed on a new Reform Treaty (2007).

single legal personality will not authorize the EU to act beyond the competence conferred on it by its member states, so EU declarations are still to be considered as statements of political intent. In any case, before the Reform Treaty can enter into force, it will have to be ratified by all member states.⁶

As it stands now, the Treaty on the European Union identifies four CFSP instruments: *general guidelines and common strategies*, *joint actions* and *common positions*. General guidelines and Common strategies are both adopted by the European Council. While the former sets out priorities and broad guidelines for this policy area as a whole, the latter provides overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries.⁷ Joint actions and common positions are somewhat more specific in scope and are both adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). While the former addresses specific situations where operational action by the EU is required and which therefore often translate into common administrative and operational expenditures, the latter merely defines the approach of the EU to given matters of a geographical or thematic nature.

Formally, the various institutional actors therefore play a specific role in the decision-making process for the various CFSP instruments. Table 1 presents the four instruments and the role of the various levels or institutions.

Table 1: CFSP instruments

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Who proposes?</i>	<i>Who decides?</i>	<i>Who implements?</i>
General guidelines	Member states and Commission	European Council	Presidency (assisted by the HR CFSP)
Common strategies	Member states and Commission	European Council	Presidency (assisted by the HR CFSP)
Joint actions	Member states and Commission (The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals to ensure implementation)	Council (GAERC)	Commission (financial implementation) and Presidency (actual implementation)
Common positions	Member states and Commission	Council (GAERC)	Member states

Source: The European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/fin/index.htm)

⁶ “A closer look at the Reform Treaty”, *BBC News* 3. August 2007 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6928737.stm>)

⁷ Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the member States. So far the EU has adopted Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraina, Mediterranean and the Middle East Process

Since the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy area, the legal competencies of the Commission are more limited compared to the policy areas under the Community. Still, Article 27 of the Treaty confirms that ‘the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security field’. This means that Commission officials are involved at every level of the CFSP, with the overall objective of ensuring consistency in the external relations of the EU as a whole, safeguarding the *acquis communautaire* and the EC Treaties. Under Article 22 of the TEU, the Commission shares the right, alongside the member states, to refer to the Council any questions relating to the CFSP and to submit proposals. In the case of CFSP Joint Actions, for instance, the involvement of Community funding would normally give the Commission a role in implementation of the instrument (Duke, 2006b:8). This means that the Commission plays a central role in long-term conflict prevention and civilian crisis management. The Council and the Commission are thus jointly responsible for ensuring consistency in the EU’s external activities as a whole, in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies.

A complex financing framework

The multi-level governance structure of the CFSP/ESDP has led to a rather complicated financing system. Some parts of the CFSP are financed by the Commission, some by the Council and some by *ad hoc* contributions from the member states and/or participating states (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele, 2006; Missiroli, 2006).

Originally, CFSP operations were financed either from the Community budget or by the member states. The Maastricht Treaty (Article J.11) specified that ‘administrative’ expenditures would be charged to the EU budget, while ‘operating’ expenditures would either be charged to the EU budget or to the member states on a scale ‘to be decided’. The key problem has been how to interpret ‘operating’ as distinct from ‘administrative’ expenditures. The fact that the EU has a growing role in the military sphere also adds to this complexity. Until recently, military operations were to be funded by contributions from the member states, following the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle – meaning that costs are covered by the contributing member states and only them. The disadvantage of such a system is that it creates uneven burden-sharing (Missiroli, 2006: 50).

In order to make the EU a more unitary security actor, the General Affairs Council of 17 May 2002 reached a preliminary agreement on the funding of military operations.⁸ A distinction was introduced between ‘common’ costs (headquarters, infrastructure and medical care), and individual costs (troops, arms, equipment) to be borne by each member state involved. The agreement was to be revised by June 2004 in light of operational experience. This eventually led to the approval of the ‘ATHENA’ mechanism ‘to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications’, finalized through successive revisions between February 2004 and January 2005. This mechanism creates an overall framework of reference as well as rules for ensuring timely down-payments from member states, thereby making the planning and launching of military operations much easier (Missiroli, 2006: 50).

There are various different ways of allocating funds to the EU’s external policy, and this complex funding system highlights the multi-level (or post-modern) character of this policy area. For civilian missions, there are at least four ways of funding. While the main way of financing these missions is over the CFSP budget⁹, some are funded through the European Development Fund¹⁰, the Instrument for Stability or by national contributions directly (this is typically the case for *ad hoc* missions). There are also two channels of financing operations that have a defence or military component. ESDP operations may be funded through the ATHENA mechanism or through national contributions based on the above-mentioned ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle. The ESDP agencies, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), have their own budgets made up of national contributions.

8 This agreement translated into the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council of 20 June 2002.

9 According to Title V Treaty on the EU, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism is also covered by the CFSP budget.

10 This Fund is not in the general budget, but can be used to support civilian crisis management operations in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries that are run by organisations working in close cooperation with the EU, as well as external aspects of certain community policies such as international fisheries agreements, environment policy etc. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2003_v4/EN/AALNT_rec.htm

An ongoing process towards more rights and authorities

Given the multi-level and post-modern character of the CFSP/ESDP, the legal and financial framework for this policy area is characterized by complexity. In addition, it is under constant revision. Still, since establishment in 1992, the CFSP and ESDP can be said to have gradually gained increased rights and authorities. And as noted, with the recently adopted Reform Treaty, the EU may even get a legal personality.

4. Limited but increasing resources

This section will examine the extent to which the EU has resources – budget, staff and equipment – in the sphere of common foreign and security policy. In focus here are the size and the composition of the budget, the number of staff working in the Commission and in the Council, as well as the military and the civilian capabilities available to the EU.


4.1 A small but growing CFSP Budget

Funds available for the CFSP are covered in a special chapter (ch.3) under the ‘External Relations’ title of the general budget (title 19). Commonly known as the ‘CFSP budget’, this chapter of the Community budget is subject to the regulations that apply to the general budget and therefore follows standard budgetary rules. It is determined on an annual basis by the Council and the European Parliament acting on proposals made by the Commission. In this section I will present the numbers of the budget from 2002 until 2008 as well as the prospects for the future (until 2013).

The CFSP budget from 2002 to 2008

As Figure 1 indicates, there has been a significant increase in the CFSP budget in the period from 2002 to 2008. While the budget for 2002 amounts to €30 million, the preliminary draft budget for 2008 was close to €200 million. While this increase is important, it should also be seen in relation to the enlargement of the EU, from 15 to 27 member states, that has taken place in this period.

Figure 1: Total annual budget for the CFSP (2002–2008), in million Euros.



Still, the CFSP budget represents only a relatively small part of the External Relations budget. As we see from Table 2 below, it has varied between 0.4% in 2002 and 5.4% in 2008. It is important to note, however, that the budgets for 2002 and 2003 operate with figures for ‘External Action’, which covers far more than the ‘External Relations’ title in the budgets as from 2004. In fact, the 2002 and 2003 budgets include the pre-accession strategy for candidate countries, the European development fund, humanitarian and food aid, in addition to other aspects of External Relations. This explain why the size of the budgets for 2002 and 2003 is more than the double that of the following years.

Table 2: External Relations and the CFSP budget, in million Euros


	<i>External Action/ External Relations</i>	CFSP	CFSP in % of External Relations
2002	8466.2	30	0.4
2003	8469.4	47.5	0.6
2004	3525.7	62.6	1.8
2005	3562.1	62.2	1.8
2006	3469.8	102.4	3
2007	3378	159.2	4.7
2008	3709	199.9	5.4

This does not influence the increase in the CFSP budget, however, and, as can be seen from Table 2, it is particularly important as from 2005. A closer look at the subsec-

tions of the budgets reveals that it was especially the conflict resolution section that stood for the increase from 2005 to 2006, in addition to non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2007, a new budget line for police mission was introduced, which stood for 35% of the CFSP budget. For 2008 this is expected to represent 30% of the CFSP budget. The EU has undertaken police missions before 2007, but these have been funded under some of the other budget lines for crisis management and conflict resolution.

While our focus here is primarily on the CFSP and the ESDP, it is important to note that the role of the Commission in civilian crisis management and conflict prevention sometimes goes beyond the CFSP/ESDP. Thus, in order to cover all the activities of the EU in this policy area, we should include a larger part of the External Relations budget and in some cases even smaller parts of the budget for the Directorate General (DG) of Humanitarian Aid and Development, EuropAid and ECHO. This is particularly true as from 2007. Since the 2007 budget is part of the new financial framework, it has, in addition to the CFSP chapter, some new chapters of particular relevance for this policy area. Despite these changes, the evolution in the CFSP budget can still give a good indication of most activities linked to civilian crisis management and conflict prevention.

Figure 2: The CFSP budget from 2002–2008



As we see from Figure 2, there is no specific budget line for civilian crisis management in the CFSP budget. According to the head of unit for the CFSP and Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) in the Directorate A (DG Relex), however, civilian crisis management is still the largest single field, consuming roughly three-quarters of the CFSP budget.¹¹ This means that it must be an important part of most budget lines.¹²

One of the new chapters under the External Relations title in the 2007 budget is ‘Crisis response and global threats to security’ (ch. 6). This chapter includes the new *Instrument for Stability* – a financial instrument that replaces the old Rapid Reaction Mechanism and makes it possible for the Commission to respond quickly to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability. The total

¹¹ Interview per e-mail in July 2007.

¹² The following civilian ESDP operations were/are financed under the Community budget line: EUPM (EU police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina), Proxima (EU police mission in Macedonia), EUPAT (EU police advisory team in Macedonia), EUPOL Kinshasa (EU police mission in Congo), EUJUST Lex (EU rule of law mission in Iraq), EUJUST Themis (EU rule of law mission in Georgia), EUSEC Congo (EU security sector reform mission in Congo), AMISII (EU support to Amis II in Darfour), AMM (EU Monitoring mission in Aceh), EUPOL COPPS (EU police mission for the Palestinian Territories), EU MAM Rafah (EU border Assistance mission for the Rafah crossing point), EUPOL Afghanistan /EU police mission to Afghanistan.

budget for this chapter was €198.8 million for 2007 and 249.6 million for 2008. In 2007, € 100 million was earmarked for the Instrument for Stability.¹³

Prospects for the future

The new financial framework for the period 2007–2013 was adopted in May 2003 by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the form of an ‘Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary discipline and sound financial management’. One of the main priorities of this agreement was ‘to establish a coherent role for the EU as a global player’.


In the new financial perspective, the old ‘External Action’ heading has been re-labelled ‘The EU as a global player’. Its overall endowment amounts to approximately € 50 billion over seven years, which is 5% of the overall EU budget and represents an average annual increase of 29% (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele, 2006: 1).

‘The EU as a global player’ covers such diverse activities as pre-accession funding (€10.2 million), neighbourhood and partnership relations (10.6 million) and development cooperation and economic cooperation instrument (15.1 million), the instrument for stability (€2.5 million); the CFSP (€1.7 million); and emergency aid reserve and other *ad hoc* envelopes like humanitarian aid (€8.1 million). The CFSP chapter is expected to cover crisis management operations (civilian only); conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization; monitoring and implementation of peace and security processes; non-proliferation and disarmament; emergency measures; preparatory and follow-up measures; and EU Special Representatives (Bendiek and Whitney-Steele, 2006: 7).

Thus, there are other parts of the budget than the CFSP chapter that are of relevance to civilian crisis management and conflict prevention – the *Instrument for Stability* not least. However, the CFSP budget still gives a good indication of the prospects for this particular policy area. Here we can note that the CFSP budget is expected to increase from €150 million in 2007 to 340 million by 2013 (see Figure 3).

13 Information from the European Commission: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/ COL22007_VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN188CA/nmc-chapterN60591451817-26/index.html#N60591451817-26

Figure 3: CFSP budget (2007–2013)



Source: Bendiek, 2006: 7

The funding of military operations

As mentioned, military operations are funded by the EU member states through the ATHENA mechanism and national contributions. The national contributions of the member states to the ATHENA financing mechanism for military operations are determined according to a GNP scale.¹⁴ The ATHENA mechanism has a permanent structure and legal capacity.¹⁵ From 2005 to 2006 its budget increased from €60 to €68 million, but was reduced to 35 million in 2007 due to the termination of the military operation in DR Congo in 2006.

Here it should be noted that the ATHENA mechanism provides funding for common costs only – and these represent less than 10% of the total cost of EU military operations. This means that more than 90% of costs continue to be covered by the states participating in a given operation.¹⁶

This system makes it highly unlikely that the EU can implement a significant operation without the participation of one or several of its bigger members. This means that those member states whose armed forces have the necessary capabilities, in particular strategic airlift and rapid-reaction capabilities, still carry the heaviest financial burden.

14 The only country that does not participate is Denmark. Third countries may participate as well

15 This means that it may hold a bank account, acquire, hold or dispose of property, enter into contracts and administrative arrangements and be a party to legal proceedings. It is managed under the authority of a Special Committee and manages the common costs.

16 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june-2007.pdf

Until now it is France that has been the major contributing country in terms of personnel and equipment to EU military operations (Haugevik, 2006: 13).

ATHENA currently administers the financing of the common costs of EUFOR-Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina) with €33 million in 2007 and AMIS (Sudan/Darfur) with 1.3 million in 2007. In 2006 ATHENA administered the financing of the common costs of EUFOR in DR Congo to the tune of €23 million (EU Council Secretariat Fact Sheet, June 2007). In 2005 it was responsible for the financing of specific common costs during the first two months of a civilian project in Congo (EUSEC-RD Congo) until the mission could be accommodated under the CFSP budget (€0.9 million).¹⁷

Limited, but increasing budgets

Even though the EU budget for the CFSP is limited compared to other policy areas, there has been a considerable increase in the period from 2002 to 2008, and according to the new financial framework this increase will continue until 2013. Thus, in terms of budget, the EU has become a more important actor in the area of civilian crisis management, and this becomes even more pronounced if we include other parts of the External Relations budget that are of relevance for civilian crisis management.

Regarding military operations, the picture is somewhat different, since funding here depends largely on national contributions. The establishment of the ATHENA mechanism is important for providing the EU with the necessary means to cover the common costs related to a military mission – but, as noted, these represent only 10% of the total cost of a military operation; moreover, there are no emergency funds for tackling unforeseen crises. Funding for military operations can be made available only on the basis of a joint action establishing an operation, and there is, for instance, no provision for covering the crucial stage of preliminary fact-finding. Lengthy procurement procedures also undermine the rapid deployment of ESDP operations.

17 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june-2007.pdf

4.2 Many institutions and few people

The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of EU external activities as a whole. These activities cover all aspects of external relations, security, economic and developments policies. In this section, we will take a closer look at the institutions and staffs working with security-related issues in the Commission and the Council as well as agencies such as the EDA, EUISS and EUSC.

Commission

The Commission implements its external action through five Directorates General: the DG for External Relations (DG Relex), DG for Trade, DG for Enlargement, DG for Development and DG for Humanitarian Aid. The Commissioners for these DGs constitute the Group of Commissioners for External Relations, which is chaired by the President of the Commission. While the DG for External Relations is subdivided into 12 directorates and has a staff of 661 people out of 23,608 (in 2007)¹⁸, the staff in Directorate A¹⁹ (dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues) numbers only about 60. This means that while only 3% of the staff in the Commission as a whole is working in DG Relex, 9% of the staff within DG Relex is working with issues related to the CFSP and ESDP.

As noted, the Commission's role in civilian crisis management cannot be reduced to these activities alone. As Gourlay argues, 'although the term civilian crisis management was first used in the context of the development of the non-military capacities to be used in the framework of ESDP, the Community has long engaged in a range of

18 The largest DG being the DG for translation and the DG for research who has a staff of 2,222 and 1,173 respectively. Source: Statistical Bulletin of Commission staff (October 2007) http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm

19 Directorate A is dealing with CFSP and ESDP-related issues, the European Correspondent's office, Commission coordination and contribution, as well as the Community aspects of CFSP Joint Actions, sanctions, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, disarmament, conflict prevention, Community contributions to crisis management and any CFSP/ESDP aspects stemming from relations with the seventy eight African, Pacific and Caribbean countries. It also follows any CFSP aspects of the efforts to stem the flow of "conflict" diamonds (the Kimberly process) and any relevant matters arising in the G8 context (Duke 2006: 12). The others are; Directorate CP (Principal Advisor), Directorate B (Multilateral relations and human rights); Directorate C (North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco); Directorate D (European Neighbourhood Policy); Directorate E (Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, Central Asian Republics); Directorate F (Middle East, South Mediterranean); Directorate G (Latin America); Directorate H (Asia); Directorate I (Headquarters resources, Information, Interinstitutional relations); Directorate K (External service); Directorate L (Strategy, Coordination and analysis). (http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=idea_hierarchy&nodeID=994)

activities that provide assistance to third countries in crisis' (Gourlay, 2006b: 49). Since these efforts go beyond the CFSP and ESDP, it makes sense to add to our calculations some of the staff working in the DG for Humanitarian Aid and Development (263), the EuropAid Cooperation Office (589) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) (158).²⁰ But even if we assume that all of them contribute to this policy area, that still means that only about 6% of the total staff of the Commission are involved in work with civilian crisis management and conflict prevention.

Council

The Council is made up of the ministers of the member states and meets in nine different configurations, depending on the matters under discussion. The General Affairs Council²¹ is one of the oldest configurations of the Council. Since June 2002 it has held separate meetings on General Affairs and External Relations. The latter meet once a month and deal with the whole of the EU's external action, including Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, foreign trade and development cooperation. A priority in recent years for the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, has been to ensure coherence in the EU's external action across the range of instruments at the EU's disposal. These meetings bring together the member states' foreign ministers; ministers responsible for European affairs, defence, development or trade also participate, depending on the items on agenda. Their discussions are prepared by the Council Secretariat and its committees and working groups.

The Council Secretariat assists the Council and the Presidency. It plays a particularly important role in relations to the CFSP and ESDP through the High Representative for the CFSP (HR/CFSP), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (the Policy Unit) as well as the Military Staff. The total number of staff working with the CFSP and ESDP at the General Secretariat of the European Union is 322²² out of a total of

20 http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm

21 At its sessions on General Affairs, the Council deals with dossiers that affect more than one of the Union's policies, such as negotiations on EU enlargement, preparation of the Union's multi-annual budgetary perspective or institutional and administrative issues. It co-ordinates preparation for and follow-up to meetings of the European Council. It also exercises a role in co-ordinating work on different policy areas carried out by the Council's other configurations, and handles any dossier entrusted to it by the European Council.

22 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – "information to the public".

3,461²³ (in 2007). Of the total staff, 200 are employed at the EU military staff, 94 in the CFSP and ESDP policy units at the DG for External Relations and 28 at the HR/CFSP's private office.²⁴ This means that 9.5% of the total staff in the Council is working with CFSP- and ESDP-related issues.

As shown in Fig. 4, there has been an increase in the number of personnel working in the CFSP/ESDP policy units in the Council from 2002 and 2007, especially since 2005.

*Figure 4: Council staff working with foreign and security policy (2002–2007).*²⁵

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total Council^a	2,866	2,640	3,140	3,234	3,393	3,461
<i>CFSP/ESDP policy units^b</i>	41	43	45	62	76	94

a Figures from the annual budget, available on line²⁶

b Figures provided by the Council's information service

Despite the increase in personnel working with the CFSP and ESDP in the Council, human resources are still limited compared to the total number of staff. As the Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the Council, Robert Cooper, has remarked: '[the]Brussels staff of 200 effectively do ESDP, whereas there appear to be many thousands of academics and students all over the world who engage in the study of the subject' (quoted in Howorth, 2007: 4).²⁷

The agencies

In addition to the staff working in the Commission and the Council, we must add the people working in agencies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC). The EDA was established in 2004 in order to support the member states and the Council in their efforts to improve European defence capabilities in crisis management. The other two were originally part of the Western European Union, but were integrated into the EU in 2001 and 2002, respectively. The EUISS provides research and policy

23 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/D2006_VOL1/EN/nmc-grseqAP2000182/index.html

24 Information by e-mail from the General Secretariat of the Council – “information to the public”.

25 The numbers do not include the Military Staff.

26 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-en.htm>

27 Since the total number of staff working with CFSP and ESDP is somewhat higher, he probably refers to the military staff only.

analysis on the CFSP and ESDP, while the EUSC supports the EU's decision-making in the sphere of the CFSP and ESDP by providing products from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data, including aerial imagery and related services.

Many institutions, few people

The growth of the CFSP has led to the development of new and significant institutions under the Council. The creation of the post of High Representative for the CFSP, the Situation Centre and the Policy Unit, followed soon after by Special Representatives and Personal Representatives, alongside early steps towards an ESDP, might appear to indicate that the Commission's role has been reduced to merely the administrative and practical aspects of running sizeable aid and assistance programmes and negotiating framework and association agreements with neighbours. However, the influence of the budget means that the Commission still is in a position to play an important role in those aspects of the CFSP that deal with civilian crisis management (Duke, 2006b: 17). But even if we include all the staff working with security-relevant issues in the Commission (somewhere between 3 and 6%), the Council (9,5%) as well as the agencies, the overall conclusion is that there are many institutions but relatively few people dealing with this policy area at the EU level.

4.3 Still a civilian power?

In addition to budget and staff, it is also important to have the necessary equipment in order to be able to implement policy. March and Olsen use the example of the governance of hospitals and libraries, arguing that 'hospitals without bandages cannot function as proper hospitals [and] libraries without books cannot function as proper libraries' (March and Olsen, 1995: 93). Likewise, a security actor cannot function properly without civilian and military capabilities.

Much has happened in this area since the beginning of the decade. Headline Goals have been identified and capability commitment conferences have been organized. The former has established some specific objectives and the latter have forced the member states to identify civilian and military capabilities that can be made available for future EU operations. The European Council at Laeken 14–15 December 2001

adopted a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognizing that the EU is now capable of conducting at least *some* crisis management operations. The first ESDP operations were launched in 2003; currently there are eleven ongoing ESDP operations (nine civilian and two military). In addition, eight operations – six civilian, two military – undertaken by the EU have now come to an end.²⁸ This indicates that the EU still is primarily a civilian actor. Still, the EU has ambitions in the military field and there has been an important progress over the past ten years.

Military capabilities

At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid Response was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to member states the objective of being able to provide rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. It called for EU member states to be able to deploy up to 60,000 personnel within 60 days, to be sustainable for one year, in support of the Petersberg tasks.²⁹ The Helsinki Headline Goal was to be met by December 2003, and several capability commitment conferences were organized in order to identify EU member states contributions. Even though this goal has not been stressed later in the process, the ESDP was declared operational at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001. However, this only meant that the EU was capable of conducting *some* crisis management operations. The first operations were launched in 2003 (Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in the PR Congo), and today the EU is engaged in a stability operation in Bosnia (Althea) and a support operation in Darfur (Amis II).

June 2003 saw the launch of the first EU autonomous military crisis management operation, Operation Artemis in the PR Congo. It showed very successfully the EU's ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6,000 km from Brussels. Moreover, it demonstrated the need for further development of rapid response capabilities. Subsequently, 'Artemis' became a reference model for the development of a new Headline Goal. With the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the EU member states determined to set themselves a new goal

28 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g

29 Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (referred to as "peace enforcement" in some contexts).

reflecting the evolution of the strategic environment and technology. In May 2004, EU defence ministers adopted the Headline Goal 2010, later (in June) endorsed by the European Council. The new headline goal calls on EU member states ‘to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union’ (quoted Lindström, 2007: 3). Among the milestones identified in the 2010 horizon were establishing a civil–military cell within the EU Military Staff, establishing a European Defence Agency (EDA) and completing the development of the rapid-deployment EU battle groups,³⁰ including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets. This Headline Goal focused on developing qualitative rather than quantitative capabilities, emphasizing rapid-deployment, interoperable forces that can be sustained as needed through rotations.³¹ Since January 2007 the EU also has its own independent operations centre within the Military Staff, which enables the EU to command missions and operations of a limited size from Brussels.³²

Originally, the ambition was to have a total of thirteen battle groups at the disposal of the EU at any given time. However, in reality, the EU’s ambition for the battle group concept has been confined to being able to have two such groups on standby, capable of carrying out two missions concurrently. Usually, force generation for the battle groups will mean assigning units from national contingents and placing them at the disposal of the EU. Sometimes it will simply mean placing such contingents on a higher level of readiness. One notable exception is the Nordic battle group, whose Swedish core unit has been specifically built up for this purpose. In many respects, the battle group concept places main responsibility for the generation and deployment of a battle group firmly on the member states. Neither the EU military staff nor the EDA will play a central role during implementation of the concept. This places a heavy burden upon the framework nation responsible for the readiness of the battle group as

30 The ambition was to establish at least 13 battlegroups of 15000 troops each, capable of being deployed in 15 days for a period of 30 days. A battle group may be established by one state or of a lead nation with contributions from other states or as a multinational force.

31 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups_February_07-factsheet.pdf

32 The EU has now three options for commanding ESDP operations: 1. Make use of one of the five Operation Headquarters currently available in the EU member states. 2. Make use of SHAPE command and control options (under the “Berlin plus” agreement between EU and NATO). 3. Make use of the Union’s own operation centre within the Military Staff. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1211&lang=EN&mode=g

well as the command and control arrangements, the strategic lift and the strategic reserve that must be on call, ready to respond if unexpected problems should necessitate reinforcements (Mölling, 2006).

In May 2006, the EU published its sixth semestrial Capability Improvement Chart, listing progress towards meeting qualitative readiness targets. It was argued that the EU was now beginning to look like an increasingly credible potential military actor. According to Ståle Ulriksen (2007), however, the ongoing military integration in Europe is better understood as a decentralized process in the sense that it is not guided by a single political or military plan, or organized within a single institutional framework. In his view, today's situation is characterized by a complex, rather decentralized network of multinational cooperative projects, with the number of participants in each project varying from two to more than ten (Ulriksen, 2007). This means that it is difficult to get a full assessment of the civilian and military capabilities of the EU without taking into account all the civilian and military capabilities of its individual member states. And since the EU's own estimates of progress fail to take this into account, they often give the wrong impression. As Ulriksen argues, 'the Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006, for instance, shows no progress in carrier based air power, helicopter carriers or strategic Sealift since 2002. However, the fact is that Italy has built a new aircraft carrier/amphibious ship, France has built two helicopter carriers/command ships, and Britain has built two large assault ships and introduced a class of four large amphibious vessels. These ships also represent a large increase in strategic sealift capabilities for the EU' (Ulriksen, 2007: xx). But despite the progress made by some member states in relation to strategic lift capacity, important shortcomings still remain in connection with pre-determined headquarters for military operations, extraction forces, common training and interoperability (Howorth 2007: 112–115).

Civilian capabilities

At the June 2000 European Council in Feira, Portugal, EU leaders launched the civilian dimension of the ESDP. They established four priority fields of civilian action: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, and civil protection. They also undertook to provide, by 2003, up to 5,000 police officers for

international missions. EU member states further agreed to identify and be able to deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days when needed.

Specific targets in the rule of law (up to 200 experts), civilian administration and civilian protection (*i.a.*, civil protection intervention teams consisting of up to 2,000 persons) were identified at the European Council held in Gothenburg, Sweden, in June 2001 (Lindström, 2007). At the Brussels European Council in June 2004, two additional priority areas were added: monitoring and support to EU Special Representatives. In addition, a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was adopted, aimed at developing civilian ESDP capabilities deployable within 30 days. A Civilian Capability Commitment Conference was held in November 2004 to identify EU member-state contributions. The Conference confirmed that states had volunteered 5,761 police personnel, 621 rule-of-law experts, 562 civilian administration experts and 4,988 individuals for civil protection. In June 2005, modalities were outlined ‘for setting up and deploying multi-functional civilian crisis management resources in an integrated format including deployable Civilian Response Teams’ (quoted in Lindström, 2007: 6). Civilian Response Teams (CRT) are to have expertise in border policing, administration of justice, management of public administration services, civil protection, logistics and/or operations support. It is envisaged that, as a rapid-response tool, a CRT could be mobilized and deployed within five days of a request from the HR CFSP, the PSC or the Council. Achieving a CRT capacity of approximately 100 experts with CRT induction training was completed in December 2006 (Lindström, 2007).

In addition there are the instruments of the Commissions. Although the Council began to establish civilian crisis management capabilities in 2000, some crisis management capability already existed in the Commission. Some of these – like the new instrument for stability – were mentioned above, in relation to the discussion about the budget, but it is important to note that the Commission has long been active through its external assistance programmes in all phases of a crisis cycle (preventive strategies through mainstream assistance programme including institution-building and post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction), and that these programmes must be seen as an important part of the EU’s efforts in civilian crisis management. In order to deliver its assistance in a strategic timely and accountable way, the Commission has developed a range of geographic and specialized sectoral financial instruments (Gourlay, 2006b:

50). There is also political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as a main objective of the EU's external relations (European Council, 2001).

A civilian power with military ambitions

Since 2000, the EU has developed and improved both its military and civilian capabilities for crisis management. While important progress has been made in military crisis management, the EU remains primarily a civilian crisis management actor. Here it has initiated many activities – especially if we count those undertaken by the Commission. Moreover, the EU has undertaken/is currently undertaking as many as fifteen civilian ESDP operations, as against only four military operations. Still, it is evident that the EU has ambitions of becoming a more important military actor.

4.4 Limited, but increasing resources

Regarding the second capability, the overall conclusion is that the EU has limited but increasing resources in this policy area. It also seems valid to say that the EU has remained primarily a *civilian* crisis management actor.

The budgets are relatively limited compared to other policy areas in the EU, and it also lacks emergency funds to act efficiently in relation to possible crisis that might arise. On the other hand, the CFSP budget has grown considerably since 2002, and the financial framework for the period 2007–2013 stipulates a further important increase. Moreover, civilian crisis management is the largest single field, consuming roughly 75% of the CFSP budget. To this we may add other parts of the external relations budget, such as the Instrument for Stability, and in some cases also parts of the budget for development and humanitarian aid. Even though military operations are not funded over the Community budget, the Council has established a financing mechanism that administers the financing of the common costs (like headquarters and infrastructure) of EU military crisis management operations, and this has made the planning and launching of military operations easier. On the other hand, since such common costs represent less than 10% of the total cost of EU military operations, the EU is still highly dependent on the participation of one or several of its bigger member states.

While the budgets are increasing, the number of *staff* in this policy area is decreasing, at least in some institutions. The Commission must be said to have a rather limited staff in relation to the CFSP, even if we include the staff that work with security-related issues in other parts of the Commission (approx. 6%). The number of staff working with the CFSP in the Commission was halved in 2002, but has remained fairly stable since 2003. The picture is a bit different with the General Secretariat in the Council. Here the number of staff working with the CFSP and ESDP is also limited (about 10%), but in some units this has increased considerably since 2002.

With regard to *equipment or military and civilian capabilities*, several headline goals have been identified and also to some extent achieved. However, as noted above, shortcomings remain in connection with pre-determined headquarters for military operations, extraction forces, common training and interoperability. Until now the EU has undertaken only four military operations, as against a total of 15 civilian operations of various kinds. This indicates that the EU still is much more of a civilian crisis management actor even though it has the ambition and the potential to play an important role in military crisis management as well.

5. An ongoing learning process

Here we will examine the extent to which the EU has the necessary competencies and knowledge in the area of foreign and security policy. It is often argued that the EU is a young and inexperienced security actor (Hoffmann 2000; Kagan 2003). But even though the EU did not start developing a security policy until the end of the Cold War, it has proven surprisingly adaptive to the new security context. Moreover, its various member states have lengthy experience, both from their individual security policies and through participation in other multilateral frameworks such as NATO and the UN. Some of this expertise is also channelled through national participation in various expert groups (under the Commission) and working groups (under the Council).

Towards a comprehensive security approach

One reason why the EU can be characterized as a post-modern security actor is because it lacks a clearly defined security policy legacy from the past. Not having an

established, institutionalized and specific policy approach has made it easier to adapt to the new security context and to develop a *comprehensive security approach* (Rieker, 2006: ch.2). While the absence of a security policy legacy may be understood as resulting from a certain reluctance on the part of member states to relinquish national sovereignty in the traditional security area, it is precisely this reluctance that seems to have facilitated the post-modern security approach – an approach that stresses the value of combining different security policy tools. Ever since the early 1990s, it is a *comprehensive* approach to security that the EU has emphasized in official documents and speeches. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has also started to transform the ideas inherent in this discourse into concrete policy. However, in relation to the implementation phase, some important shortcomings remain (see section 6).

While the CFSP has had a broad approach from the outset, the development has been more gradual in relation to the security and defence policy. In the Maastricht Treaty, the long-term goal was still the development of a ‘common defence’. Then, with the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, the focus shifted towards developing a capacity for ‘international crisis management’. Then came the establishment of a civilian crisis management component in parallel to the military one as from 2000, and the focus on comprehensive security in the European Security Strategy in 2003 (Rieker, 2006: 46–47).

Learning from the member states

It can also be said that the EU actively draws on the competence available in its member states. One concrete example is the Commission’s use of ‘expert groups’, composed of members from national governments, academia and various interest groups. The main task of such groups is ‘to advise the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives as well as in its tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the member states. Expert groups do not formally make political decisions, but feed the decision-making processes by giving expert advice, providing scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information and well as being forums for exchange of information. The groups can be either permanent or temporary’ (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 6).

According to Gornitzska and Sverdrup (2007), these expert groups have become increasingly important in the EU. Since the role of expert groups is so central in the European multi-level governance system, it would appear relevant to examine the use of such groups in the sphere of External Relations and the CFSP. Oddly enough, there are very few expert groups in this policy area. While there were 1,237 expert groups organized by the European Commission as a whole as of January 2007, less than 5% of these relate to external relations policies (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 14). Moreover, since – as Gornitzska and Sverdrup show – the overall trend is for expert groups to increase over time, it seems particularly remarkable that the use of such groups in the sphere of External Relations has *decreased* considerably since 2000. While DG Relex had 35 expert groups in 2000, there were only 11 by 2007 (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 16). Of the current expert groups, only two are linked directly to the CFSP/ESDP (the group on ‘longer-term measures of the Instrument for Stability’ and on ‘conflict prevention and crisis management’). The others are linked to cooperation agreements with various regions and countries around the world.³³ There are only four DGs that have reduced the number of expert groups in this period – and three of these are External Relations DGs. In addition to DG Relex, this is also the case for EuropeAid Cooperation Office (Aidco), the DG for Enlargement, and finally, the DG for Information Society and Media (Infso) (Gornitzska and Sverdrup, 2007: 16: 22).

While the Commission’s use of expert groups varies according to the policy area in question, all the work of the Council is prepared or coordinated by the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), made up of the permanent representatives of the member states working in Brussels and their assistants. The work of this Committee is itself prepared by some 250 committees and working groups consisting of delegates from the member states.³⁴ Also here there are good opportunities to draw on the knowledge and experience of member states. Concerning the CFSP, the work is prepared in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This committee is composed of 27 permanent representatives with the rank of ambassadors, and meets twice or three times a week in Brussels. Since 2002 there has been a division of labour between COREPER and the PSC, in that the former prepares the Council meetings on

33 <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/search.cfm?l=all>

34 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=388&lang=en

General Affairs and the latter prepares the Council meetings on External Affairs and Security Policy. In turn, the PSC gets advice and recommendations from the Military Committee, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, and from various other CFSP working groups, depending on the issue. While the Military Committee is composed of Chiefs of the Defence Staff of the member states and meets only twice a year, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is a working group at expert level (or the permanent representatives in Brussels), and normally meets twice a week. All in all, there are 36 permanent CFSP Council working groups that have been set up following thematic or geographical lines. Meeting frequency may vary, but on average a CFSP working group meets twice a week at the level of permanent representatives and twice per Presidency at the level of senior officials from the foreign ministries of member states (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006: 5).

Education and exercises at the EU level

The EU has also taken several initiatives in order to upgrade its own expertise in security and defence. In 2005, for instance, the Council adopted a joint action which led to the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), organized as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues. ‘The ESDC provides training in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues.’³⁵ There are also two training programmes that deal with Civil Military Coordination – one that has been run by the Commission since 2001 and one led by the Council since 2004. Both have been directed towards diplomatic, civilian and military personnel from the member states (Khol, 2006: 132). Finally, the EU has undertaken four crisis management and military exercises – CME 02, CME/CMX 03, CME 04 and MILEX 07.³⁶ At the EU military exercise in June 2007, Javier Solana emphasized the importance of this learning process, and stated: ‘we will continue to test and learn each year [...]. we will also

35 http://www.ihedn.fr/cesd/index_en.php

36 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=283&lang=en&mode=g

continue to strengthen our capacity by learning from the actual operations we are running.³⁷

An ongoing learning process

As we have seen, the EU has gained a certain degree of competence and knowledge in this area. It has even developed its own approach to security, which may be termed *comprehensive security*. The EU also actively draws on the expertise found in its member states through various expert and working groups. The establishment of institutions and practices like the European Defence College and civilian and military exercises also serve to increase the Union's expertise in this sphere. On the other hand, the use of expert groups in the field of the CFSP has decreased considerably since 2000 – and this is striking, since the trend is exactly the opposite in other policy areas, and the Commission's role in civilian crisis management is increasing. One explanation might be that few countries have more experience than the Commission in the sphere of comprehensive security and civilian crisis management, so that in this particular area it is the member states that learn from the EU (Rieker, 2006).

6. Lack of Organizational Skills

Perhaps the main challenge for the EU is to find a way to overcome some institutional challenges. As we have seen, there are many levels and institutions that have a role to play in this particular policy area.

With no less than four DGs responsible for external relations and development, there is a coordination challenge for external relations within the Commission itself. Internal communication problems have also prevented the Commission from acting as a coherent force, and the result has sometimes been contradictory politics towards third parties (Duke, 2006b: 10). The adoption of an intergovernmental CFSP in 1992 only added to this complexity. Competition between four Commissioners in defining the Community's profile in EU external relations made it difficult to shape the substance

37 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/94678.pdf

of the Commission's 'full association' with the CFSP.³⁸ A further contributory factor has been the difference in bureaucratic culture between the Commission and the Council (Duke, 2006a: 22).

With the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission's external relations structures were simplified with the creation of DG Relex. This DG was given responsibility for the planning and policy aspects of Community external relations, working in close connection with the External Service (responsible for external delegations), Trade, Development, Enlargement, EuropAid, the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and various external aspects of Economic and Financial Affairs. However, the establishment of DG Relex did not really solve the coherence problem. The fact remains that there exist a broad range of instruments that contribute to civilian crisis management, that these are managed by several different DGs, and that there is no coordinating mechanism. There have been a few modest attempts at streamlining the Commission's efforts in international crisis management, notably the establishment of Civil Protection Structures and the Advanced Planning Teams. While the former aim at coordinating interventions of national civil protection teams inside and outside the EU in case of a natural or technical disaster, the latter are intended to coordinate the external crisis management missions of the Commission.

Within the ESDP structures, there has also been a need for structures to promote civil-military and inter-service coordination. This has led to the establishment of a Civil-Military Planning Cell and the Crisis Response Teams. The establishment of the *Civil-Military Planning Cell* is the EU's first institutional innovation designed to provide a more integrated response to crisis management planning, whereas the *Crisis Response Teams* are a Council procedural innovation intended to promote inter-service coordination.

The challenge of coordinating EU crisis management policies is a grave one, characterized by the broad range of activities involving various actors from the decision-making processes to the implementation of policies. The growing number of cross-

38 The Commission is represented at all levels in the CFSP decision making structures, from European Councils to working groups. It safeguards the EU Treaties and the *acquis communautaire* and ensures consistency of the action of the Union.

cutting issues, for instance, has increased the potential for disputes over competence between the Commission and Council. The question of competences involves many of the tools for crisis prevention, crisis management and resolution being developed by the Commission and within the CFSP/ESDP context. These challenges were identified in the European Security Strategy: ‘The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and that of third countries’ (European Council, 2003: 19). However, the question remains: *how* to combine the various instruments and capabilities?

It is in the area of civilian crisis management that the challenge of coordination is particularly acute since both Council and Commission instruments can be used for similar actions. According to Gourlay (2004), the EU’s approach to crisis management has been ‘a self-limiting one, largely conducted within the intergovernmental framework of the ESDP, and institutionally divorced from EU activities that use European Community instruments’. She argues that the development of short-term crisis management instruments has not built on the external relations *acquis* of the Commission, but instead followed a distinctly intergovernmental approach. The resultant shortfalls in relation to coordination between the Council and the Commission in crisis management have led to an inefficient and fragmented approach to planning, deployment, mission support, training and recruitment for civilian crisis management operations (Gourlay, 2004: 420).

In addition, the fact that there is no unified chain of command with regard to EU instruments for crisis response means that neither the Council nor the Commission has the necessary strategic oversight concerning all EU instruments (Gourlay, 2006a: 112). There have been some efforts to provide a more integrated and coherent responses to crisis. While the *Civil–Military Planning Cell* is staffed by 25 individuals from the Military Staff and five from the Council Secretariat, the Commission has agreed to appoint two liaison officers to the Cell. Their primary function will be to ‘promote coherence between the planning assumption of the EC and CFSP measures, and to identify practical arrangement for the use of military assets in support of civilian Community programmes and ensure that... the preservation of the “humanitarian

space” is properly taken into account’ (quoted in Gourlay, 2006a: 116). While the Civil–Military Cell is not a cross-pillar planning instrument, it has the potential to exert an important impact on the coherence of EU action. In addition, there are the *Crisis Response Teams* established by the Council. These *ad hoc* structures, composed of senior officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, have been established to discuss the development of Crisis Management Concepts. The idea is that their deliberations will form the basis for ESDP operations decided by the PSC. In practice, however, the teams have not much impact on the planning of ESDP operations since they are convened until a later stage in the planning process (Gourlay, 2006a: 115).

Otherwise, there have been few institutional innovations to promote coordination *between* the Council and the Commission. When such coordination has been achieved, this has often been in spite of rather than because of the EU’s structures. It has been characterized by informal working-level cooperation, and cross-representation of the Commission in CFSP structures and of member states in EC policy and programming processes (Gourlay, 2006a: 119).

Towards coherence?

With the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Reform Treaty has provided for an important institutional change that may improve the coherence of the EU’s external action and security policy. The new financial framework for 2007–2013 has also opened up for a more flexible system. The Instrument for Stability, for instance, is intended to deliver an effective, immediate and integrated response to crisis situations in third countries within a single legal instrument until normal cooperation under one of the other instruments for cooperation and assistance can resume. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes are sufficient to solve the problems related to the EU’s coherence as a security actor.

8. What does this tell us about the EU as a security actor?

In order to be considered an actor, the EU has to have a set of political and administrative capabilities. The fact that the EU is best characterized as a system of multi-level governance or as a post-modern security actor opens up for new forms of actor-

ness. However, this paper has argued that certain political and administrative capabilities are still necessary in order to be a coherent actor also in the field of security and defence. Based on a typology set forth by March and Olsen (1995), I have examined the development of four such capabilities: rights and authorities; resources (budget, staff, and equipment); competencies and knowledge and organizational skills. Let us now turn to the main conclusions of this study.

First, it can be argued that the EU has developed a set of *formal rights*, institutions and rules to regulate this policy area, and that these have increased over time. However, the post-modern or multi-level character of this field means that the legal framework is characterized by a high level of complexity, which puts certain limits to the coherence of the EU as a security actor. On the other hand, this framework is continuously under revision. The recent adoption of a Reform Treaty and the establishment of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as a single legal personality for the EU, will further strengthen the legal basis for this policy area.

With regard to *resources* (budgets, staff and equipment), the overall conclusion is that the EU has limited but increasing resources in this sphere. It also seems valid to maintain that the EU still is primarily a civilian power. However, the picture is a bit more complex when it comes to the various different resources. *Budgets* are relatively limited compared to other policy areas and also compared to the ambitions expressed by the EU in the European Security Strategy and elsewhere. Moreover, the EU lacks emergency funds to act efficiently in relation to potential crises. On the other hand, the CFSP budget has increased gradually since 2002, and considerably since 2005. The financial framework for the period 2007–2013 also stipulates a 2.3% increase in the CFSP budget. In addition, we may add on other parts of the External Relations budget that are of particular relevance for civilian crisis management. From 2002 to 2007 the actual CFSP budget soared, from €30 million to €200 million. But, while the budgets are increasing, the overall number of *staff* is decreasing. The Commission has a rather limited staff working with security policy (6–9% of the total). Moreover, the number of staff working on CFSP issues in the Commission was drastically halved in 2002, but has remained stable since 2003. As to the General Secretariat in the Council, the proportion of staff working with CFSP and ESDP issues is also modest (about

10%), but has increased considerably since 2002 in the policy units. As to *equipment* or military and civilian capabilities, several headline goals have been identified and partially achieved, even though some shortcomings remain in relation to pre-determined headquarters for military operations, extraction forces and joint training and interoperability. Finally, the fact that the EU has undertaken/is undertaking four military operations and 15 civilian operations of various kinds shows that it cannot be dismissed as an unimportant actor in international crisis management.³⁹ These figures also indicate that the EU is still primarily a *civilian* power, despite its ambition and potential to become an important military actor as well.

The third capability perceived as necessary for actorness is *competencies and knowledge*. The EU has developed a comprehensive approach to security, and has also established various structures intended to improve its performance in implementing such an approach. The EU may learn from its member states and their experience from national security policies and multilateral cooperation in other arenas. Some of this expertise may be channelled through the committees and the working groups under the Council and the expert groups under the Commission. However, we also note that the use of expert groups in this area has decreased considerably, contrary to the trend in other policy areas. One explanation might be that few countries have more experience than the Commission when it comes to comprehensive security and civilian crisis management, so that in this case it is the member states that learn from the EU. This may also explain why the EU has established its own instructional and training facilities at the EU level, including a defence college and the organization of crisis management exercises.

The most important shortcomings are to be found in relation to the EU's *organizing skills* or ability. The multi-level character of the EU makes it difficult to overcome some of the institutional barriers. For instance, there are overlapping competencies between the Council and the Commission in relation to civilian crisis management. Without a common chain of command, neither the Commission nor the Council has the necessary strategic oversight of all EU instruments. In addition, member states have their own individual activities in both civilian and military crisis management.

39 For a full overview of ongoing and completed operations: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g

Thus, there is a great potential for streamlining EU action in this field. Some of the problems might be solved by establishing a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to hold the position of both HR CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations, as proposed in the Reform Treaty. Still, there is reason to believe that the reluctance of member states to transfer sovereignty to the EU in this area will continue to be the biggest challenge that must be overcome if the EU is to become a coherent security actor.

The post-modern or multi-level character of the EU has important consequences for how it works as a security actor. While opening up for new, and perhaps more suitable, forms of security approaches (such as comprehensive security), the many levels (actors and institutions) as well as limited resources make it difficult for the EU to act as a coherent security actor. While this may not be impossible, it will certainly require a heightened focus on coordination among the many different institutions and levels of the European Union.

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