28.09.09
Balancing Acts
Russian–Chinese Relations and Developments in the SCO and CSTO
NUPI-rapport | Oslo, NUPI | 52 sider
The report takes as its point of departure the assumption that the core game in Eurasia is based on realist practices of balance and counterbalance. In this analysis, the multilateral institutions of the CSTO, SCO and EAEC constitute a macro-structure of interstate cooperation that serves the purpose of professing a ‘value dimension’ in a context dominated by regional and sub-regional rivalries – existing and potential. This entails that the core components of multilateralism in Eurasia are based upon the pillars of Chinese–Russian rapprochement in energy and trade, and Russian sticks and carrots to regain a security foothold in Eurasia.
>> Summary
Under the impact of the global recession and in the aftermath of the Georgia–Russia war in August 2008, the complex structures of Eurasian politics have again risen to the surface. Chinese–Russian relations have become more manifest, while Russia has stepped up its efforts to revive the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). While the Chinese–Russian contract on constructing the East Siberian Pipeline has shown the Central Asian states that the Chinese–Russian relationship is a long-term one, this has also increased apprehension amongst them that Russia may hold a too dominant position on the Eurasian landmass. The subsequently reduced room for manoeuvring for the Central Asian states has brought some into a tighter, less comfortable bilateral relationship with Russia, while others have increased their regional counter-balancing efforts by opting out of Russian-dominated fora. While the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has remained as a Chinese–Russian umbrella over the region, the relevance of the organisation in the context of regional security has declined – if indeed it ever was significant. There is no clarity as to future members of the organisation, and attempts to give it a clearer profile in Afghanistan have failed to materialise. China seems to attach growing significance to the BRIC format, and Russia’s linking the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) with the CSTO reveals Moscow ambitions to bring security and economic cooperation together. The most unsettling factor in Eurasian politics remains the Georgia–Russian war. Russia’s attempts to convey this scenario into a template for future conflicts in the CSTO ‘zone of responsibility’ has opened a Pandora’s box of uncertainties. Russia is the only state in Eurasia that has recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and will most likely remain so. Even a traditional Moscow loyalist like Belarus has refrained from recognising these territories. Furthermore, Russia’s resolve has challenged the traditional state-centred approach to separatist phenomena in the CIS space, rendering the potential peacekeeping functions of the CSTO even less relevant. In sum, Eurasian politics is a solidly founded realist game, and not a process that reflects particularly high levels of coordination or multilateral integration.
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