Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity

The Case of Burkina Faso

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1. Introduction

In the past 10 years, Burkina Faso has become a regional diplomatic centre as involvement in peace and security became the core of its foreign policy. The most visible aspect of this implication is mediation and facilitation, as well as a growing implication in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. This active engagement for conflict prevention and resolution has mobilized the highest levels of government, including the Head of State, Blaise Compaore, and the minister of Foreign Affairs, Djibril Bassolé. Building on national experiences and close ties with regional actors, Burkina Faso’s first mediations and peacekeeping deployments gradually became an essential part of the country’s international efforts. As the complexity of managing a rising number of personnel and theatres of operations increased, an institutionalization process, still ongoing to this day, was put into place to further develop the country’s contribution to peacekeeping.

Similar efforts are now envisioned for civilian contributions, such as the creation of the Burkinabe Agency of Technical and Cultural Cooperation (Agence burkinabé de coopération technique et culturelle), since its management is still fragmentary and guided more by reaction than by proactivity. The combination of a strong political will for assistance in post-conflict environments, a clear expertise in mediation, the establishment of institutional structures and the crafting of policy instruments geared
towards greater contributions make Burkina Faso a good case study as the UN Civcap initiative is being developed\(^1\).

**About ROP:** Created in 2005, the Peace Operations Network (ROP) has become an essential reference for peace operations. Affiliated with the Centre for International Studies at the University of Montreal (CERIUM), ROP has the double mission of shedding as much light as possible on peace operations and works to reinforce African capacities for peace operations.

**Approach and methodology:** The ROP has been commissioned by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in July 2012 to create a case study on a country from Francophone Africa. Its content will help produce a global baseline study comparing the approaches of five selected countries concerning civilian assistance for post-conflict countries. Such an initiative will help support the Civcap initiative’s engagement of civilian contributors.

The global study has five main objectives: 1/ Situate Civcap within wider international cooperation frameworks 2/ Identify recipient countries/organizations 3/ Understand existing approach to providing Civcap 4/ Identify and analyze specific Civcap cases; and 5/ Understand future directions and interests towards Civcap.

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\(^1\) As started with the February 2011 review of Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict made by Senior Advisory Group chaired by former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (A/65/747-S/2011/85).
Although other countries had also been considered for this study, Burkina Faso has been chosen since its contribution to peace and security has been rapidly growing. In spite of limited resources, Burkina Faso has showed a clear political will to contribute on the international stage, especially in key niches of civilian expertise. It is hoped that the success it had in establishing specialized structures, as well as the challenges before it can get further involved, can be emulated by countries in similar situations.

The Burkina Faso study is mainly based on a series of interviews, made in person or by phone, with high-level national diplomats and civil servants, both in Ouagadougou and in New York. These interviews were made either specifically for this initiative or within other capacity-building projects carried out by ROP. Complementary information has also been collected through official documents, research papers, and includes data presented during some of ROP’s activities.

The Burkina Faso case study will place a particular focus on the five critical areas where chronic shortages have been identified by the report of the Senior Advisory Group on Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict and that are the focus of the Capmatch platform: basic safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality and economic revitalization processes. As information about deployments is fragmented within several ministries, the study will concentrate on the main areas of Burkina Faso’s assistance in post-conflict settings without necessarily identifying the whole scope of past civilian contributions. It will also focus on Burkinabe public servants in order to map out the country’s engagement, since most individuals get deployed on an individual basis without passing through official government channels. It is also important to note that there isn’t any existing
mechanism allowing the government to tap into civil society’s diverse expertise that could be of use.

With a growing emphasis of peacebuilding in post-conflict countries, military personnel have been more and more involved in civilian tasks such as building infrastructure and delivering humanitarian assistance. However, the study will only focus on civilian assistance delivered by non-uniformed personnel. There will nonetheless be a special case for correctional officers, because of the importance of prison and corrections reform for the Civcap approach. Burkinabe correctional officers come from the Garde de sécurité pénitentiaire (GSP). With a status similar to the gendarmerie, this specialized personnel is exclusively used in penitentiary systems, may it be at home or in peacekeeping missions. Even though participation in this domain has only started in 2006, Burkina Faso is now the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping for that type of personnel. A GSP specific training centre is also envisioned to further establish this national expertise.

1.3 Key findings
The case of Burkina Faso shows that civilian contribution in post-conflict settings can make quite an impact without necessarily involving huge numbers of personnel, as most of its civilians were deployed in small polyvalent teams of experienced civil servants mobilized for peacekeeping missions and international mediations. While this contribution was initially focalized in Western Africa, Burkina Faso’s actions are now further-reaching with its constant implication in the Sudanese crises, especially in Darfur but also in South Sudan and the Abyei border region.
This is a consequence of a clear engagement towards peace and stability, a central pillar of the country's foreign policy that is understood as the key of Burkina Faso’s prosperity and prestige on the international scene. This clear political choice has been facilitated by the personal involvement of the Head of State. As of now, Burkina Faso’s international engagement can be broadly separated into five fields: conflict management and inclusive political dialogues, the delivery of post-conflict assistance, humanitarian affairs, electoral assistance and vocational training.

In the past years, Burkina Faso has also become the most important contributor for UN correctional service officers while its high profile mediation efforts in Western Africa and in Darfur have become a Burkinabe trademark. On a strictly numerical level, the number of civilians deployed in post-conflict settings remains low, as most of the peacekeeping contribution is dependent on uniformed personnel while international collaboration has mostly focused on mediation. These achievements are nonetheless quite impressive for a country where almost half of its 17 million population lives below the poverty line, as stated by the CIA World Factbook. Even though it may very likely never reach the level of participation of major players such as Egypt and South Africa, Burkina Faso shows what can be done with political will.

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1 Burkinabe experience in international cooperation has frequently involved mediation and facilitation, broad-based dialogue and power sharing mechanisms, elections and public administration reform, while peacekeeping deployments have focused on prison and corrections reform, as well as judicial and legal system reform.
As Burkinabe uniformed personnel in UN missions increased eightfold since 2006, reaching almost 1100 in 2012, work is now underway to structure and expand civilian contributions. Such a case study can show how the growing international emphasis and visibility of civilian capacities can be harnessed to develop policies and guidance in countries that wish to increase their civilian contribution in post-conflict settings, but have yet to conceptualize this process.

The case of Burkina Faso is particularly interesting since specialized structures and agencies have been created to deal with international peace and security during the study’s time period (2006-2012). As civilian deployments grow more complex, the elaboration of a global strategy for international cooperation and peacekeeping, as well as common inter-ministerial policies and guidelines will need to continue. Even though progress has been made to harmonize what have mostly been informal practices\(^3\), these efforts must continue to allow a broader Burkinabe civilian engagements through a more proactive policy.

Underlining the need for a more structured approach to international cooperation is the fact that there isn’t a clear picture of available civilian expertise. Building upon what has been done for uniformed personnel, the administration wishes, in the coming years, to map out expertise by establishing a national database and reach out to other actors beyond the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice. A few years from now,\(^3\)

\(^3\) Notably through the elaboration of inter-ministerial decrees formalizing practical modalities such as deployments and training, as well as ministerial procedures and policy papers.
a similar exercise could also be envisioned to measure progresses and give a better view of the Civcap initiative’s repercussions on Burkina Faso’s civilian contribution.

2. General approach to international cooperation

2.1 Institutional frameworks

An engagement based on the Constitution: Burkina Faso’s sustained engagement towards international peace and cooperation can be traced back to its Constitution, approved by referendum on 2 June 1991. Underlining the importance of economical and political integration in Africa, it states that the country wishes to “promote peace, international cooperation, (and) peaceful settlement of disputes between states”.

Burkina Faso’s foreign policy is based on two main pillars: contribution to regional and continental integration and the promotion of peace and security in the world. Over the last decade, involvement in peace and stability, most notably through mediation and conflict prevention, has become a defining characteristic for Burkina Faso. This engagement has made it one of West Africa’s major players for mediation, getting involved in the management of high profile conflicts such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur and Mali. Burkina Faso has also presided on the first debate of the UN Security Council on mediation, in September 2008, an engagement that lead to the first presidential statement of the Council on that matter and to the creation of the UN Standby Team of Mediation Experts. It has also been praised for its deployments in UN peacekeeping operations, such as in the DRC, Sudan and Haiti.

On a strategic level, conflict prevention and management has become the core of Burkina Faso’s soft power politics. The fact that this implication assures “the
consolidation of Burkina Faso’s status in Africa and in the world arena” has been repeatedly stated by President Blaise Compaoré (2005), for whom the recognition of Burkina Faso, both in Africa and on the world stage, is closely linked with its active involvement in political and economic cooperation. Such policies have considerably improved Burkina Faso’s international reputation since the end of the 1990s, when the country was heavily criticized during the Liberia crisis and following the death of journalist Norbert Zongo. It has allowed the country to mend relations with countries as the United States, which now offers important development aid to Burkina Faso and makes it an important player in the ACOTA training program and the Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This shift towards a new identity on the world stage has also led to international prestige, as confirmed by a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (2008-2009) as well as in the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (2006-2007; 2008-2009). Furthermore, a Burkinabe national, Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, is at the head of the ECOWAS Commission since March 2012.

Such an engagement towards regional cooperation can also be explained by geographical and sociological factors. Indeed, Burkina Faso is a small landlocked country in the heart of Western Africa, sharing borders with six of the 15 countries of the region. As such, development is heavily dependent on regional stability and on good relations with neighbours, most notably those with sea ports. Regional interdependence is particularly important considering that most of the threats in Western Africa, especially in the Sahel-Sahara region, are transnational by nature, may they be natural catastrophes such as droughts, or threats related to terrorist activities, organized crime or criminal activities such as drug and arms trafficking.
A clear separation between international cooperation and peacekeeping: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (MAECR) is the main actor involved in the implementation of Burkina Faso’s foreign policy, as it coordinates between the national actors involved in international cooperation and peacekeeping. For the purpose of this study, only the MAECR structures for both purposes will be examined. It is important to note that structures dealing with international cooperation are distinct of those dealing with peacekeeping.

MAECR organisational structure

The Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations and Military Cooperation (DOMPCM), located within the General Direction of Multilateral Relations (DGRM), is the key focal point for most matters relating to peacekeeping, may it be within the MAECR or with the other involved actors through an inter-ministerial coordination structure.

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4 Source: MAECR website: http://www.mae.gov.bf/organisation.html
Division of labor isn’t so clear for international cooperation. The **Burkinabe Agency of Technical and Cultural Cooperation** has been envisioned in a 2008 presidential decree. Supposed to “promote and put forward national competencies and expertise on the regional and international level”, it has not been put in place yet. As of now, international cooperation can be managed through the Directorates for regional cooperation (DGCR), or for bilateral (DGRB) and multilateral relations (DGRM).

Once established, the Burkinabe Agency of Technical and Cultural Cooperation should be able to centralize matters regarding civilian cooperation and act as a driving force to facilitate a pan-governmental approach to civilian deployments. This structure will not only elaborate guidelines and identify existing expertise, but will also have its own budgets and management bodies. By giving visibility to such matters, it is also seen as a way to secure the funds needed for such projects. Furthermore, it is important to note that since October 2011, the Minister’s cabinet disposes of a Strategic Analysis Cell to assist its work relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crisis and conflicts, notably through mediation, conciliation and reconciliation. Decisions concerning international cooperation and peacekeeping are also highly centralized at the political level.

### 2.2 Type and volume of assistance

Burkina Faso’s international cooperation is closely linked to regional and continental integration on the political and socio-economic levels, leading researchers to qualify the country’s actions as being within a “diplomacy of development” (Sawadogo 2007: 11). Even though the priorities of foreign policy are clearly identified, the **type and volume of assistance** given will mostly depend on the requests received. Hence,
cooperation is mostly done in an ad hoc fashion. Each request is examined to see if Burkina Faso has the capacity to answer the specific needs it implies. If this cooperation cannot be based on an existing legal basis, the National Assembly will be invited to vote on a new decree or law.

**A flexible approach to international cooperation:** As for the rest of its foreign policy, Burkina Faso has clear priorities but is quite flexible when it relates to its institutional framework. With the rising regionalization of conflict management, Burkina Faso will act within the mandate of the organization that seems the most appropriate to handle a crisis. Indeed, Burkina Faso’s efforts in the fields of cooperation and conflict prevention are done on a bilateral (Togo, Guinea), regional (Côte d’Ivoire, Mali) or continental (Darfur) basis, while there has been a clear shift in the past ten years towards UN peacekeeping.

**An engagement focused around five areas:** Even though it is done in a reactive fashion, Burkina Faso’s engagement in post-conflict settings can be separated into five fields: conflict management and inclusive political dialogues, delivery of post-conflict assistance, humanitarian affairs, electoral assistance and vocational training.

Conflict management and inclusive political dialogue has been a staple of Burkina Faso’s foreign engagement, as showed by the importance of mediation during its last mandate as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. This engagement is mostly structured around mediation and facilitation of peace processes, as well as around the deployment of personnel in peacekeeping missions. Most of the civilians
are sent within international cooperation frameworks, most recently for ECOWAS and African Union mediations in Mali and Darfur.

Burkina Faso’s involvement in the delivery of post conflict assistance can also be observed through the deployments in UN peacekeeping operations and the recent ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau.

**Burkinabe military, police and prison service personnel in UN peacekeeping**

![Graph showing the number of military, police, and GSP personnel from 2006 to 2012.](image)

As such, personnel number have evolved from less than 150 staff to almost 1100 between 2006 and 2012. Although two thirds of the growth has involved military personnel, police and prison service personnel have steadily increased. While there are now about 250 police officers, prison service personnel amount to 77 in 2012. Apart from GSP staff, the number of other civil servants such as jurists and magistrates has varied between 31 and 33 personnel between 2009 and 2010. Therefore, a fair estimation of the total number of civilians deployed including prison personnel number have evolved from less than 150 staff to almost 1100 between 2006 and 2012. Although two thirds of the growth has involved military personnel, police and prison service personnel have steadily increased. While there are now about 250 police officers, prison service personnel amount to 77 in 2012. Apart from GSP staff, the number of other civil servants such as jurists and magistrates has varied between 31 and 33 personnel between 2009 and 2010. Therefore, a fair estimation of the total number of civilians deployed including prison

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5 Using UN figures for military and police (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/), completed by GSP data obtained through interviews.
service personnel would be about a hundred. Finally, it is to be noted that civil servants that have been deployed through bilateral agreements, such as doctors and engineers, are not factored in by lack of data.

Burkina Faso, originally a minor contributor to UN peacekeeping, has rapidly become one of the rising players in the region, with the likes of Benin and Niger. This evolution can be seen in the subsequent graph (also using UN figures), which does not take into account West African’s three main personnel contributors in order to facilitate comparisons. This has mainly been because of the Burkinabe contribution to UNAMID, where most of the uniformed personnel is present.

Humanitarian aid has also been part of Burkina Faso’s international action, notably through the National Commission on Refugees (CONAREF), an institution that has a significant expertise in managing complex situations, the latest being the arrival in the
last few months of 150,000 Malian refugees in a zone facing food shortages. Such humanitarian aid has mainly been given on a bilateral basis.

With the establishment in 1991 of one of the first Independent Electoral Commissions (CENI) in the region, elections have also been a priority for Burkina Faso, may it be the structuring and management of voter registries or the supervision of ballots and referendums. Such themes have been a key to most mediation and peacekeeping involvements. Personnel have also been sent to help secure electoral processes during these periods, as for the 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire under an ECOWAS mandate.

Finally, Burkina Faso is home to many specialized regional training institutions for Western and Central Africa, dealing notably with customs (END), public finances (ENRF), hydraulic engineering (2iE), police (ENP) and military matters (EMTO).\(^6\) While the number of foreign trainees remains low at the END (40 out of the 2152 students since 1970), the 2iE welcomed 870 students of 21 nationalities on site, 550 of 27 nationalities for distance learning and 1400 for continuing education in the 2009-2010 year. The EMTO, run with the support of France, indicates that it has welcomed 1070 interns from 19 countries since its creation in 2000. It offers 150 places each year, a quarter of which are dedicated to Burkinabe nationals.

There are also plans to create two other regional training institutions. The first one, dedicated to civil protection assistance, benefits from French bilateral assistance:

\(^6\) *Ecole nationale des douanes, Institut International d'ingénierie de l'eau et de l'environnement, Ecole Nationale de Police and Ecole militaire technique de Ouagadougou.* All the following data is taken from their websites and from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(Institut supérieur d'études de protection civile de Ouagadougou, ISEPC), while the other will be opened specifically for Correctional service officers.

**Financial and material support:** International cooperation is funded through national budgets dedicated to cooperation and regional integration. Unlike bilateral cooperation, the expenses can be partially or totally reimbursed if the work is done at the request of an organization, notably for peacekeeping. The financial engagement is quite important for Burkina Faso because of the importance of international stability and conflict prevention in its foreign policy. Such costs rise quickly during complex interventions, since the money not only covers the salaries and amenities of the public servants, but also includes the travel and administrative costs involved in their work, such as travels to engage local stakeholders and negotiation meetings in Ouagadougou, in the host country or elsewhere.

Although Burkina Faso is able to fund most of its initiatives, it could be expected that a growing implication could eventually require more outside financial support. Nonetheless, there seems to be a clear political will within the Burkinabe administration to make sure that outside funds are handled within existing official channels. This was the case in recent years, when Burkinabe administration turned down potential donors that wanted the creation of a national trust fund for international cooperation within the ministries of Finance or of Foreign Affairs.

The UN Country team or other institutional partners willing to support Burkinabe civilian experts are therefore encouraged to fund existing international cooperation programs, such as ECOWAS or UNDP mechanisms, and then solicit the
administration for specific projects. Burkina Faso has also assured of its willingness to examine any demand relating to peace and stability.

Burkina Faso has also used triangular cooperation for post-conflict settings, most of it dealing with logistical and in-nature support given to Burkinabe personnel. Among these institutional arrangements feature those attained during the Togo and Darfur mediations, where material and logistics support was given and financed by France and Qatar – notably for the travel of the mediators and the several delegations from Darfur to neighbouring countries and Doha.

This has also been visible for peacekeeping, as Canada has financed the equipment of a Formed Police Unit (FPU) sent to Darfur within UNAMID. The active participation of international partners such as France and the European Union is also particularly visible through the support of regional training institutions in Burkina Faso, notably to the I2E and EMTO engineering and military schools, as well as for the main regional peacekeeping training centres in West Africa (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Nigeria Defence College and Bamako Peacekeeping School). It is important to note of these three, the latter is only French speaking institution, which has limited the accessibility of courses for Burkinabe trainees.

Finally, although no formal policy exists, the strengthening of partnerships with NGOs is seen as a main vector to increase the country’s international contribution in post-conflict settings. An interesting model is occurring in Mali, where NGOs that had solicited Burkinabe officials to help support the mediation are now carrying out, with their own means, consultation among local stakeholders.
2.3 Recipient countries

Burkina Faso’s main involvements are traditionally regional in nature and have gradually grown in scope. Case studies on the main involvements of Burkina Faso since 2006 - in Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Guinea and Mali - can be consulted in the annexes. Several factors can explain how the recipient countries were chosen, apart from the country’s political will to play a role in conflict resolution.

Burkina Faso’s main international involvements (1993-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Peacekeeping involvement</th>
<th>Mediation and facilitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2008-2010 (MINURCAT)</td>
<td>1993: Peace agreement between the government and the MDJT rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1999-2010 (MONUC) 2010- (MONUSCO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2004 (MIOC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2004- (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/South-Sudan</td>
<td>2005-2011 (UNMIS) 2011 – (UNMISS) 2011 - (UNISFA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC Seat</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009-2010: National dialogue and political transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>2012 : Ongoing mediation for ECOWAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2012 – (ECOWAS mission to Guinea-Bissau)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Close knowledge of regional crises: Even though Burkina Faso has been involved in most of Western Africa’s mediation initiatives, two cases particularly stand out at the
start of the study’s target period in 2006, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire. Burkina Faso not only shares borders with both countries, but also has close social and economic ties dating back to before the independences (Sawadogo 2007:56), notably through student exchanges, in regional trade and migratory flows. Thus, any spill over of these conflicts would have had a direct effect on internal stability. In both cases, Burkina Faso, having already been politically involved in the two countries, had close contacts with local stakeholders and a deep knowledge of the crises’ challenges and issues. Indeed, Burkina Faso’s president had already facilitated the 1993 Togo Peace Agreement which lead to the 1994 elections and had became a stakeholder at the start of the Ivorian crisis, when rebels hiding in Burkina crossed the border and tried to topple Laurent Gbagbo’s government in 2002.

Burkina Faso also had experienced internal strife and turbulent political dialogue after Blaise Compaoré’s, that took power in the 1987 military coup, established multi-party elections, the first of which took place in 1991. Like other countries in the region such as Benin and Ghana, the start of the 1990s was a time of tension during the emergence of democracy and the transformation of national institutions to reflect the new social contracts. As such, Burkina Faso was familiar with some of the challenges faced in the two target countries, since it had created a new Constitution and national structures that could be put to use such as the independent electoral commission.

The need for francophone peacekeepers: It is also to be noted that the start of Burkina Faso’s participation in UN peacekeeping started as the number of blue helmets deployed in countries was a common or administrative language grew from about 6193 in 2000 to 52,078 in 2012. As such, they now represent about half of the
97,857 UN uniformed peacekeeping personnel. Burkina Faso’s first peacekeeping experiences therefore took place in francophone countries, where its personnel could easily communicate with the local population and administration, as three major missions in francophone countries had just been deployed in 2004 in Burundi, Haiti and the DRC. The need for francophone personnel continues to be an important issue since francophone participation in peacekeeping only reached 24% of UN personnel in 2011 (Morin et al., 2012).

**Similar institutions and procedures:** Apart from linguistic similarities, it is important to note the important similarities between most of the former French colonies in Africa. As such, Burkina Faso shares common policies, training and procedures for its gendarmerie with most host countries, which also mostly make use of the civil law legal system. That familiarity with the social contexts reinforces the main operational advantages of personnel, such as the flexibility of gendarmerie for security sector reform and the correctional service’s expertise.

**A recognition of international experiences:** The case of Sudan shows that post-conflict implication does not necessarily require cultural or socio-linguistic similarities. Notwithstanding Burkina Faso’s activism within the Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and security council, it could be argued that Burkina Faso’s international experiences in conflict management explains the involvement.

The experience of Djibril Bassolé shows the extent of hands-on experience of certain high level Burkinabe officials that may lack in other countries and that is difficulty

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7 Data compiled by ROP using public UN figures.
transferable through training institutions. When he was selected as the mediator for the Darfur crisis, he was an experienced diplomat that had been involved in the Burkina Faso Constitutional Commission in 1991. A member of the Togolese peace agreement monitoring team in 1993-1994, he had been one of the mediators for the Niger-Toureg conflict in 1994-1995 and had participated in the 2006 and 2007 internal dialogues in Togo and Côte d’Ivoire. He is now involved in the mediation in Mali.

3. National approach to providing specialized expertise/capacity

3.1 Frameworks

Burkina Faso’s frameworks to providing specialized civilian expertise and capacity are at the core of its general approach to international cooperation. As previously noted, civilian contributions mostly originate from the public service. Personnel may come from within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (MAECR), from its affiliated structures such as the National Commission for Refugees (CONAREF), or from elsewhere such as the ministry of Justice.

While the MAECR is the main interface between international requests and the individual structures, each actor selects and deploys personnel according to its own mechanisms and policies. As with the rest of international cooperation, requests are handled on a case-by-case basis: each request is examined and personnel and expertise are provided whenever possible. The length of engagement depends on the evolution of the crisis. While some can be resolved quite quickly, such as the involvement in Guinea, the mandate of the personnel employed can be regularly
renewed such as in Côte d’Ivoire by simple procedures. Burkinabe involvement is then quite open handed.

**An approach that could be structured:** Although this ad hoc system seems to work when used at a small scale, civilian deployments would gain from being institutionalized as to meet the growing number of requests. As of today, the Burkinabe Agency of Technical and Cultural Cooperation only exists on paper, even though it has the potential to serve as an administrative coordination centre for civilian cooperation and thus to become a driving force on these matters. There aren’t any centralized civilian database, common policies and directives focusing on civilian deployment, nor a strategy for engaging other actors such as civil society and the private sector.

Such an ad hoc approach can be relatively efficient when dealing with a small number of deployments, as it is currently the case. Nonetheless, if Burkina wants to live up to its own expectations in terms of international peace and security involvement, it is necessary for the country to develop a more robust architecture to fit with national priorities and international needs. Past experiences with the institutionalization of national peacekeeping deployments are an encouraging sign, as this process could benefit from the lessons learned in the recent years when military and police peacekeeping personnel passed from the dozens to the hundreds.

**The example of peacekeeping deployments:** Peacekeeping has involved three main ministries apart from the MAECR: the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Security,
and the Ministry of Justice, for magistrates and correctional service officers\(^8\). Since the start of the study’s time period in 2006, each ministry has set up specialized structures and focal points to deal with peacekeeping. The four ministries are also part of a Coordination Framework that promotes a multilateral approach to peace and security, notably to discuss guidelines and official documents and directives. To complement these efforts at the strategic level, a database for military and police/gendarmerie personnel has been set up in 2011.

While Burkina Faso has focused on the coordination of growing military and police deployments, there is now a growing recognition that civilian involvement, done in a relatively small scale, can be the main vector for growth. It can be expected that in the coming years, the strengthening of civilian deployments will be one of the administration’s main focuses, as administrative mechanisms will need to catch up with needs on the ground. Such efforts can also be supported by the establishment of a common peacekeeping policy, which would include the responsibilities of civilian personnel.

### 3.2 Analysis of type and number deployed

Even though Burkina Faso is known for its involvement as a mediator and facilitator, the country’s involvement in post-conflict settings goes beyond that specific aspect due to the complex nature of the crises, may it be during a controversial handover of power (Togo), during an open or protracted civil war (Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur), or

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\(^8\) Known as MDNAC (Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants), MATDS (Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et la Sécurité) and MJDH (Ministère de la Justice et des Droits de l’Homme). There is a sharing of responsibility between MDNAC and MATDS for gendarmerie personnel, depending on the nature of deployments (military observers or civilian police).
the delicate return to civilian power after a military coup (Guinea and Mali). Such crises require an in-depth knowledge of the conflict dynamics and an active involvement in a broad range of topics, as shown by this non-exhaustive chart.

### Burkinabe civilian involvement in key mediations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>RCI</th>
<th>Darfur</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Mali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons and corrections reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and government reform</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to elections and electoral processes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation and good offices</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad-based dialogue and power sharing mechanisms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral violence reduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**An identifiable set of expertise:** Even though decision-making has been done on an ad hoc basis, clear tangents have emerged for two of the main gaps identified by the UN in terms of civilian capacities in post-conflict settings. Through its experience in facilitation and mediation, Burkina Faso has now a clear expertise in support to inclusive political processes, while also bringing an added value in support to the justice and penitentiary systems in post-conflict countries.

Apart from mediation and facilitation, Burkinabe involvement has always included efforts relating to **broad-based dialogue and power sharing mechanisms**, central elements to all agreements brokered by the Burkina Faso diplomacy. Such agreements, except for Darfur, have also included the organization of elections, with a clear attention toward the mechanisms to implement to allow a transparent voting process. **Public administration reform** has also been a frequent focus of these situations. Civilian contribution to peacekeeping is a relatively new phenomenon for Burkina Faso and focus on two key areas under the responsibility of the ministry of Justice: **prison and corrections reform**, as well as **judicial and legal system reform**.
The use of small teams of experienced negotiators: Facilitation and mediation involves a relatively small number of personnel, between five and a dozen depending on the scope of the crisis. Mediator and facilitators are also supported by administrative staff. For the sake of efficiency, these small teams are composed of senior high level personnel who possess a wide range of contacts, a significant expertise with the issues at hand, and a credibility that enables them to engage the relevant stakeholders. Such personnel includes past Justice and Social Action ministers (Côte d’Ivoire), presidential advisors (Togo), experienced diplomats, magistrates, and other high level civil servants with many years of experience.

The case of correctional service officers: Apart from magistrates, one of the key aspects of the Burkinabe Ministry of Justice’s implication is the participation of members of the prison service through the Garde de sécurité pénitentiaire (GSP). Created in August 1984 under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, this institution aims to replace soldiers by specialized civil servants to better respond to internal penitentiary needs which includes not only prison security, but also the rehabilitation of prisoners. Its participation in peacekeeping started modestly in 2006, Burkina Faso having sent three officers to the DRC. Personnel numbers have been steadily growing since 2008, passing from 15 to 77 in 2012. Burkina Faso is now the largest contributor of correctional service officers in UN peacekeeping and its participation can still be expected to grow, as it is a sought-after expertise for peacebuilding.
Number of Correctional service officers deployed by Burkina Faso

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MONUC/MONUSCO (DRC)</th>
<th>UNOCI (RCI)</th>
<th>MINUSTAH (Haiti)</th>
<th>MINURCAT (CAR/Chad)</th>
<th>BINUCA (CAR)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the good reputation of GSP personnel and the generalization of personnel training have played a role, it can be argued that the centralized nature of correctional officers recruitment, with a clear interlocutor within the Ministry of Justice and established personnel requirements, have helped Burkina Faso achieve these impressive results. It can be hoped that other types of civilian deployments can follow the same path once clear national guidelines will have been established at the national level for sectors where Burkinabe civilians have a distinctive experience.

Main tasks of Burkinabe correctional service officers in MINUSTAH (Haiti)

- Evaluation of regional or provincial penitentiary system
- Plan and participate in quick impact projects to improve prison conditions
- Accompany, guide and provide technical assistance to national partners, to wardens and prison personnel
- Provide training based on international norms to prison personnel regarding penitential security and management, the treatment of detainees and human rights.

9 The data in this chart has been obtained during interviews.

10 As described by Burkinabe personnel on a ROP workshop held on 23-25 November 2011.
4. Future directions

4.1 National aspirations vis-à-vis civilian capacities

The Civcap initiative comes at a crucial time for Burkina Faso since the country has begun in the past six years, to structure its contributions in terms of international cooperation and peacekeeping. Although civilians are still deployed in an ad hoc fashion, Burkina Faso has the potential to transpose past lessons. Members of the Burkinabe administration have hopes that the Civcap approach, notably through the CAPMATCH platform, will allow the country to broaden its partnerships pertaining to peace and security issues, notably for funding and equipment, because of the increased visibility of national expertise and peacebuilding needs.

Perhaps the most important aspirations can be found at the national level as Burkina Faso wishes to continue its institutionalisation process, notably through the establishment of the Burkinabe Agency of Technical and Cultural Cooperation. Such initiatives will allow the country to tackle a clear problem: the lack of a comprehensive approach concerning the country’s past and existing civilian deployments since there hasn’t been any structured national capacity mapping. Federating all the current efforts in that regard would be a clear step forward as the country will need to deal with the growing demands for cooperation, especially considering the vulnerability of the Sahel region. At the very least, such a step could lead to the designation of specific focal points for the issue of civilian capacities.

There is also a clear political will - and need- for common policies and strategies regarding the deployment of civilians in post-conflict situations, while the administration has the opportunity to move forward with the identification of civilian
expertise though a national database. By establishing and publicizing the critical civilian needs, the Civcap approach can help to ensure that those efforts are focused and respond to existing gaps. This is particularly important since, at the national level, most of the identification efforts are made according to individual requests and not following an evaluation of the global needs. The identification of priority areas where civilian capacities can help achieve its foreign policy objectives are also welcome, since the country is, at the moment, open to all kind of civilian involvements. A more focused approach could also help the country to reach out to other actors involved such as civil society and the private sector. This latter point is particularly important since there is a general acknowledgement that some opportunities are missed out because of the focus on certain categories of civil servants.

4.2 Future challenges and opportunities

An opportunity to engagement: Although efforts have been taken at the national level to discuss the issue of civilian capacities, it would be worthwhile for the UN and other involved stakeholders to engage Burkina Faso using official channels, notably through the use of the CAPMATCH online platform. Such actions would facilitate contacts between the administration and the entities requiring capacities. Although there has been informal consultations with some members of the Burkinabe administration, there still seems to be much to do to raise awareness at the national level. There also is a certain need to further clarify the opportunities offered by the Civcap initiative and the first crucial steps to be taken to develop a coherent approach to civilian deployments. Such a subject could notably help the administration to sequence and identify key milestones to aim for.
The need to share best practices: The Civcap initiative comes at a moment when many countries in West Africa share the same challenges as Burkina Faso. The establishment of an informal network of key decision makers from a few select countries bringing together emerging and established civilian contributors could be a way to disseminate best practices and national experiences. Such initiatives have already had a clear effect on the elaboration of policies and the identification of national expertise for peacekeeping. It could also empower decision makers by giving them confidence about their own institutional progresses and about their understanding of the challenges faced by civilians in a post-conflict settings.

The importance of a national strategy: The Burkinabe administration could take advantage of the Civcap initiative to formalize short-term and long-term engagements towards civilian capacities, notably through official documents and a global strategy for civilian contributions. Such a document could allow Burkina Faso to build upon its traditional niches and by clarify key issues for each step of the staffing process, from training to post-assignment feedback. That strategy would not only allow the country to take a proactive stance regarding future contributions, but could also be an opportunity to broaden the number of governmental institutions that can be invited to deploy civilians, beyond the traditional actors that are the ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice.

The need to build bridges between cooperation and peacekeeping: On a more general level, it will be essential for the Burkinabe administration to clarify the conceptual overlap between international cooperation and peacekeeping, two issues
that are currently managed through two distinct processes. This could promote a common understanding between all the involved stakeholders which could have divergent interests and priorities. Such efforts can be inspired with what was done when peacekeeping, a traditional turf of the military, became a multidimensional issue within the Burkinabe government.

5. Conclusions

The case of Burkina Faso, similar to other countries in West Africa, shows that civilian contribution in post-conflict settings is more a question of priority then of population size or financial capacities. Such a case study always has its particularities, as not every developing country will have peace and security matters play such a significant role in their foreign policy or have the full support and engagement of their Head of State. Nonetheless, Burkina Faso shows that choosing specialized niches and building on existing expertise can allow small countries to play a significant role on the international scene. The country has also gradually gotten involved in situations where it wasn’t necessarily a major stakeholder, such as for its high profile involvement in Sudan. Indeed, comparatively to regional powers that can mobilize capacity for international interventions but that could be considered threatening, Burkina Faso’s small stature seems to facilitate its transformation as a “diplomatic powerhouse” in African conflicts.

On the national level, the efforts put in place to ensure that Burkina Faso can meet these international needs have also shown signs of organic evolution and now need to address the untapped potential towards greater civilian contribution as the Civcap initiative is now shaping up. Contrarily to case studies focusing on already established players of South-South cooperation, the case of Burkina Faso currently illustrates how
a country got gradually involved in post-conflict settings and how it envisions a gradual institutionalization to broaden its contributions. As such, it would be advantageous to closely follow Burkina Faso in the coming years, as its experiences could be the source of many lessons learned for most developing countries that could be potentially interested in sending civilian capacities to post-conflict settings but do not yet have Burkina Faso’s international experience.

Such an engagement will also be dependent on the domestic situation, as national resources could be mobilized by social and political challenges, such as the worsening of the drought and of the refugee situations. The danger of internal instability was particularly seen during the riots that took place between February and June 2011, affecting the whole administration and shedding the light on a latent governance crisis. As demonstrators took the streets to protest about the rise in the costs of living, personnel from the security forces mutinied in Ouagadougou because of their living conditions. As the list of grievances grew, the population took the street, asking for broad political reforms while the military revolt spread to numerous cities in the country. Offices of the party in power were notably burned down as looting and violence were reported. During these four months, as the social crisis started going out of control, a national dialogue lead to the creation of the Advisory Committee on Political Reforms (CCRP, Conseil consultatif sur les réformes politiques). This has lead to wide-reaching reforms, notably within the security forces and the ministries, that are still continuing at the national, regional and local levels. Even though such a crisis underlined a certain fragility of the social context, it is hoped that the lessons learned from the CCRP and comprehensive reforms could be a source of expertise for international cooperation.
Annex 1: The Togolese and Ivorian Crises

Burkina Faso’s mediation for both crisis included sending teams of senior officials having experience in the main issues at hand (security reform, political dialogue, electoral processes etc.), while also hosting national delegations in Ouagadougou for mediation sessions and organizing back and forth visits for the team of mediators. Burkinabe institutions such as the national electoral commission have been put into use as both crises involved broad political reforms followed by elections.

The case of Togo: Burkina Faso’s bilateral involvement in the Togo political crisis is revealing since it became the benchmark of the country’s recent conflict prevention initiatives. Following the sudden death of Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma after a rule of almost four decades, the Parliament approved the nomination of his son Faure Gnassingbé as his successor in what was seen as a military coup. As contested election were marked with irregularities, lethal clashes between government and opposition sympathizers took place. Burkina Faso, that had already been involved in the July 1993 Ouagadougou peace agreement signed between the Togolese government and opposition parties, was approached to facilitate an Inter-Togolese dialogue.

Held under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré, the dialogue reunited the major Togolese political stakeholders met from 7 to 16 August 2006, forming the basis of the Comprehensive Political Agreement signed in Lomé on 20 August of the same year. That agreement included transparent legislative elections with the help of a new Independent electoral commission (CENI), a series of political reforms and the
creation of a government of national unity. These elections took place on October 2007 in a calm and orderly manner and helped end Togo’s international isolation.

Burkina Faso, after having served as a mediator in the crisis, also got involved with the subsequent presidential elections, held on 4 March 2010. One of Compaoré’s experienced political advisors was deployed in a permanent basis in Togo before the voting period in order to help the Togolese authorities organize the process. Burkina Faso has also given assistance to Togo as the latter was preparing to occupy a non-permanent seat within the UN Security Council in 2012-13. A delegation of Burkinabe diplomats having occupied that position in 2008-2009 travelled to Lomé to brief their colleagues inter alia on the main themes on the agenda, on the P5 dynamics and on the structuring of the Togolese delegation to the UN.

The case of Côte d’Ivoire: In January 2007, a few months after the signature of the Togolese Comprehensive Political Agreement, President Compaoré once again was called upon to facilitate a Direct Inter-Ivorian Dialogue to solve the crisis resulting from the 2002 failed coup that split the country in half. The support to the dialogue required the full time work of a small team of experienced Burkinabe public servants. Within the Facilitator’s office were his representative, a former minister of Justice, a former minister for Social action, a military advisor, a magistrate, a political advisor, a logistics officer and an ex-director of studies and planning within the MAECR, all of them supported by a few local staff. All these efforts were made on a bilateral basis and their expenses, as well as the accommodation for Ivoirian delegates in Ouagadougou, were absorbed by the national budget.
The Ouagadougou Agreement, signed on 4 March 2007 by the government and the ex-rebels, and the four complimentary documents that followed, improved the overall political atmosphere by creating a transitional government but didn’t solve the crisis.

Burkina Faso continued to send experts for social, political, military and security matters to support the Ivoirian peace process, while contributing to UNOCI. Burkina Faso’s involvement also helped secure the November 2011 elections under an ECOWAS mandate. As tensions eased, Burkina Faso withdrew its contingents from UNOCI in 2011 and its diplomatic team in 2012.
Annex 2: A major actor in Sudan

Sudan has also been an important recipient of Burkina Faso’s attention in international cooperation, which has come a long way since the 2004 contribution to the first peacekeeping mission in Darfur that eventually became the hybrid UN/AU mission UNAMID, Burkina Faso’s main peacekeeping engagement. Following the 2005 peace agreement that eventually lead to the independence of South Sudan, Burkina Faso was involved in UNMIS/UNMISS and UNISFA.

Burkinabe Foreign Minister Djibril Bassolé was named as the joint UN-AU mediator for Darfur on 30 June 2008. Working closely within the Qatari peace initiative, Burkinabe mediators struggled to bring together the splintered rebel groups to rekindle the stalled dialogue process after the 2006 Abuja peace agreement. Building upon several themes that had been at the core of their previous facilitations, notably the question of political sharing, justice and reconciliation, the mediators’ efforts lead to the 2011 Doha Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the JLM movement. The Burkinabe mediation had also lead to a Goodwill and confidence-building agreement in February 2009 between Khartoum and the JEM rebels and, one year later, to a Framework agreement. Although neither documents managed to reduce the tensions between the belligerents, the mediation nonetheless managed to organize two conferences with Darfuri civil society representatives, as to give all relevant stakeholders a voice in the peace process. Bassolé’s mediation ended following the 2011 Burkinabe crisis.
Annex 3: Recent involvements in Guinea and Mali

The latest efforts of Burkina Faso for international cooperation, embedded within the ECOWAS framework, have followed the Guinea and Mali coups in 2010 and 2012, with mediations respectively handled by President Compaoré and Foreign Minister Bassolé. Motivated by same factors as the Togolese and Ivorian crisis, they further consolidated Burkina Faso’s diplomatic weight in the region. As for the other initiatives, it has built upon the experiences of Burkinabe personnel in that type of crisis. In the case of Mali, the existing experiences of Burkina in mediating with the Tuaregs, most notably the efforts that lead to the Ouagadougou Accords with the Niger government of 2007, were also a factor that came into play.

The case of Guinea: Burkina Faso’s involvement in the Guinea crisis focused on the management of a difficult transition from a military regime to a civilian government. On 22 December 2008, only a few hours after the death of Guinean president Lansana Conté, a group of military officers led by Captain Dadis Camara took power and proceeded to dissolve all institutions. After months of efforts during which the junta held on to power, notably following the September massacre of more than 150 opposition supporters inside a Conakry stadium, President Blaise Compaoré, became the ECOWAS facilitator on 2 October 2009.

As Burkina Faso facilitated the dialogue between the military junta, the opposition parties and civil society, the situation suddenly changed a few months later when Captain Camara was injured in a failed assassination attempt that lead to his loss of power and his exile in Burkina Faso. The framework of the political transition was established on 15 January 2010 in Ouagadougou and lead a few months later, on 27
June 2010 to presidential elections won by the historic opposition figure Alpha Condé, who became the country’s first democratically elected Head of State. There has also been, on a bilateral basis, civilian cooperation concerning budget implementation and the fight against corruption.

**The Case of Mali:** Heavily criticized for his handling of the Tuareg crisis, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted following a military coup on 22 March 2012 led by Captain Amadou Sanogo. Taking advantage of the political vacuum, Tuareg and islamist combatants quickly expelled the Malian army from the north of the country. As ECOWAS convened in Abidjan on 27 March, it nominated Blaise Compaore as the mediator of for the Malian crisis, tasking him to facilitate the return of the constitutional order in Bamako and to negotiate with the armed groups in the North. To support this mediation, the Burkinabe embassy staff in Bamako have been mobilized full time and puts forward a wide range of national expertise. The Burkinabe mediation also has formal ties with local and international NGOs that have offered their help. Some of the have notably been to Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu to interact with local stakeholders, then have shared the results with the relevant authorities in Ouagadougou.

At the time of writing, ECOWAS considers sending a military peacekeeping force to help solve the crisis. Even though it is still too early to judge the Burkinabe efforts in Mali, the country considers opening a cooperation office in Mali to offer civilian help on a wider level in case the situation improves.
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List of the main interviewees


Ibsèn Sifana KONE, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (MAECR)

Colonel Saïdou OUEDRAOGO, Peacekeeping Operations and Military Cooperation Director, General Direction of Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (MAECR)

Issa SOMA, Former Peacekeeping Operations and Military Cooperation Director, General Direction of Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (MAECR)