

works by Marc Raeff (*Russia Abroad*), Amy Knight, John B. Dunlop, Mark Galeotti, Peter Pomarantsev, Serhii Plokyh (*The Man with the Golden Gun*), and Sergei Zhuk (*Soviet Americana*).

Despite these limitations, for someone who is not a specialist on the Russian and Soviet intelligence services, I learned much, especially how Russian money laundering started in the 1980s with the participation of well-placed members of the Russian diaspora who worked in New York's banking industry. Although written for a popular audience (not an academic one), this book is an excellent introduction to the evolution of the Soviet and Russian foreign intelligence services, their relationship with the Russian diaspora, and their recent successes in binding the diaspora, especially the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, to the state interests of the Russian Federation.

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SOCIAL SCIENCES, CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA, AND OTHER

Bennich-Björkman, Li, and Sergiy Kurbatov, eds. *When the Future Came: The Collapse of the USSR and the Emergence of National Memory in Post-Soviet History Textbooks*. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 211. Hanover: Ibidem-verlag, 2019. 195 pp. \$35.00. ISBN 978-3-8382-7335-8.

Perestroika—that fateful period when Mikhail Gorbachev's plans for reforming the Soviet structure ended with the Union's full collapse—is for many of us still a lived memory. But how is perestroika remembered today in the states that arose from the ashes of the USSR? And what can this tell us about national self-understanding in the Soviet successor states? That forms the starting point for Li Bennich-Björkman and Sergiy Kurbatov's edited volume *When the Future Came: The Collapse of the USSR and the Emergence of National Memory in Post-Soviet History Textbooks*. It presents four case studies of history textbooks currently in use in secondary schools and universities in four of the former Union republics—Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine—with close reading of how these cover perestroika as part of the new “national” history.

School history textbooks are often seen as representing the official voice of the state—or as the editors put it, “the officially sanctioned national gazes,” conveying the ideas and values that supposedly define the national “self” (p. 9). Such textbooks can therefore serve as a convenient proxy for studying nation-building projects. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 ushered in a period of intensive nation-building, transforming former Soviet “ethnic homelands” into aspiring nation states. The Soviet authorities had equipped these homelands with various Sovietized national paraphernalia, including national histories. After independence, these histories had to be “liberated” from not only the ideological grip of Marxism-Leninism, but also the shared Soviet master narrative.

From a nation-building perspective, history is always more about the present and the future than about the past. The national historical narrative should give answers to the questions “who are we” and “where are we headed.” The education system plays an instrumental role in popularizing and spreading this message. As the two editors note, “the education system has always been a cornerstone of the ideological socialization of society” (p. 14). Having a state-approved history curriculum gives the authorities unique possibilities of molding the image of the nation among the next generation.

Although perestroika represents a recent, shared past, the case studies on Russia (written by Natalia Tregubova, Liliya Erushkina, Alexander Gorylev, and Alexey Rusakov), Ukraine

(Alla Marchenko, Yuliya Yurchyk, and Andrey Kashin), Belarus (Marharyta Fabrykant and Andrei Dudchik), and Moldova (Diana Benchechi and Valerii Mosneagu) show that today's textbooks interpret this period in vastly different ways. From Kyiv, perestroika is depicted as releasing the inherent potential in the "Sleeping Beauty" Ukrainian nation. When the vantage point moves to Moscow, perestroika is portrayed as unleashing nationalist mobilization in the Union republics as well as in the autonomies within the RSFSR, whereas the Russians themselves are depicted as passive and reactive. And from Chisinau—at least according to the Romanian strand of national history-writing—perestroika is not even part of national history, being relegated to the course on world history. There is also disagreement about whether perestroika represents the beginning or the end: in Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine, perestroika is periodized as the final stage of the Soviet period, whereas in their chapter on Belarus, Fabrykant and Dudchik find that it represents not the end but a bridge, offering narrative continuity between the Belarusian SSR and contemporary Belarus.

The case studies share some thematic "hooks" that they all explore; for example, how the textbooks deal with the Chernobyl catastrophe. Once again there are clear national differences. In the Ukrainian narrative, Chernobyl serves as a social catalyst, "a tragedy comparable in its effect on the national consciousness to the exposure of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty in the Baltic countries" (p. 65). However, textbooks in Belarus—the country hardest hit by the radioactive contamination—largely neglect the nuclear disaster. Why? According to the chapter authors, the topic was "hijacked" by the Belarusian ethnonationalist movement during perestroika. As the latter group is marginalized in the official narrative, Chernobyl has had to be deemphasized despite its human tragedy and dire economic consequences for post-independence Belarus.

Likewise, the understanding of agency varies greatly. In Ukraine, the blame for the shortcomings of the Soviet system lies with Moscow, the textbooks "depicting Ukraine as a colonial republic not responsible for the decisions made about it" (p. 84). In the Belarusian case, the colonial aspect is totally absent. Here the textbooks convey an "imperial narrative" that "places specifically Belarusian events at the periphery and treats them as secondary effects of shared Soviet history" (p. 96).

The volume reminds us that how we remember the past is constantly being renegotiated. In Moldova, textbooks have shifted between propagating "Romanianism" and "Moldovanism," depending on who has been in power. Attempts by the Communists (in power 2001–9) to introduce an "integrated history," and of the pro-Western government of Vladimir Filat (2009–13) to refer to the subject simply as "history," both failed (p. 144)—thirty years after independence, there is still no agreement on what constitutes Moldova's "national" history. In Russia, on the contrary, Tregubova and colleagues describe how the multicentered history of the 1990s gradually gave way to a more unified understanding: from 2007 onward, ethnic autonomies may no longer decide for themselves what regional history is to be taught and for how long.

The individual case studies are of somewhat varying quality; the text would have benefitted from stricter editing to avoid mishaps like referring to "the Russian Republic" as the main constituent entity of the Russian Federation (p. 22). Overall, though, the volume offers a timely reminder of how our lived memory can be dismantled and reassembled to serve national needs. Textbook depictions of the Soviet past range from total renouncement to regret and mourning. But not even in Belarus is there a unified narrative of what perestroika meant. The final word has not yet been spoken: the memory and meaning of perestroika are still in the making.

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