

PROGRAMME & OUTCOMES

PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW WEEK,

05-07 November 2025, New York

On Peace Operations Review Week

Building on the positive synergies created through interdisciplinary, global collaborations, such as the Challenges Forum, the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, the Global Alliance for Peace Operations and other partners, Peace Operations Review Week brought together the expert community working on issues related to peace operations and global crisis management. This critical mass of expertise aimed to support and inform the Review on the Future of All Forms of Peace Operations – tasked in the 2024 Pact for the Future. Peace Operations Review Week consist of 16 events organised by over 30 organisations on a host of issues related to peace operations, with participation of the Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations (see full list in the annex). The insights gained during the week were also carried forward into the annual conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) taking place 10-14 November in Vicenza, Italy.

“We don’t have the luxury of despairing about how difficult this is.”

Ambassador Bob Rae during workshop on “Haiti and the Future of Peace Operations”

Overview of Events

04 November

- **Reception & Film Screening - Doves in Zero Gravity**
International Peace Institute, Contact: [Jenna Russo](#)

05 November

- **Outcome 01: Sustaining Effective UN Peace Operations in an Era of Geopolitical Turbulence**
Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, Contact: [Jair van der Lijn](#), [Cedric de Coning](#)
- **Outcome 02: Official opening of Peace Ops Review Week & Launch of the outcomes of the Challenges Annual Forum 2025**
United Nations Headquarters, Contact: [Jennifer Schmidt](#)
- **Outcome 03: Lunch discussion: Strengthening UN Peace Operations: Perspectives from the Global Alliance for Peace Operations**
Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, Contact: [Joachim Koops](#)

- **Outcome 04: The Future of WPS in UN Peace Operations – What is at Stake?**
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN, Contact: [Lotte Vermeij](#)
- **Outcome 05: The role of Unarmed Civilian Protection in the future of peace operations: An Integrative Approach**
Church Center, Contact: [Gay Rosenblum-Kumar](#)
- **Outcome 06: Peace operations responses to borderland challenges, past practice and future directions**
United Nations University, Contact: [Erica Gaston](#)

06 November

- **Outcome 07: Defining Pathways Forward: Enhancing the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in Peace Operations**
Permanent Observer Mission of the African Union to the UN, Contact: [Cedric de Coning](#)
- **Outcome 08: The Future of UN Peace Operations: Use of Force and the Protection of Civilians. An Operational Dialogue on the Challenges Facing Peacekeepers and Troop Contributing Countries**
Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, Contact: [Lotte Vermeij](#)
- **Outcome 09: UN Police and the Future of Peace Operations**
International Peace Institute, Contact: [Jenna Russo](#)

07 November

- **Outcome 10: Peace Operations and Peacebuilding – Matching potential with implementation**
Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, Contact: [Annika Hansen](#)
- **Outcome 11: Examining Protection Approaches in UN Peace Operations**
International Peace Institute, Contact: [Jenna Russo](#)
- **Outcome 12: Peace Operations and Climate, Peace and Security (CPS)**
Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, Contact: [Cedric de Coning](#)
- **Outcome 13: Peace Operations Review Week Findings: Implications for Future Education and Training**
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN, Contact: [Annika Hilding-Norberg](#)
- **Outcome 14: Haiti and the Future of Peace Operations**
Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, Contact: [Annika Hansen](#)
- **Closing Event: Comprehensive Review of Peace Operations: Status Update and Reflecting on Insights Gained during Review Week**
Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, Contact: [Cedric de Coning](#), [Annika Hansen](#)

For full list of partners and networks who organised events and list of Permanent Missions hosting/co-hosting events please see end.

Outcomes compiled on behalf of the co-organisers by Annika Hansen, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF).

Berlin, December 2025

Outcome 01: Sustaining Effective UN Peace Operations in the Future

05 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The event examined how UN peace operations can remain effective amid rising geopolitical fragmentation, declining multilateralism, and tightening resources. Drawing on the new EPON meta-study synthesising 20 mission and thematic reviews, discussions centred on sustaining political support, adapting mandates to complex conflict realities, and ensuring people-centred and rights-based approaches. Participants debated how multilateral conflict management is being reshaped by regionalisation, militarisation, and disunity in the Security Council, underscoring the urgent need for innovation, learning from past missions, and redefining partnerships to maintain UN relevance and credibility in volatile geopolitical environments.

2. What is being done/to do about them

The EPON meta-study identified concrete ways to adapt peace operations: developing modular, scalable mission models; enhancing partnerships with regional organisations; integrating climate, digital and disinformation dimensions; and deepening host-state and community engagement. Participants stressed reinforcing political primacy, institutional learning, and the role of human rights. They called for sustained collaboration between the UN, research networks, and field practitioners to inform policy reforms. Strengthening planning, mobility, and rapid-response capacities, and aligning mandates with resources and local needs were highlighted as practical steps to enhance the agility and sustainability of future peace operations.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

Participants called for greater use of flexible mandating tools, integrated risk analysis, and joint compacts with host states to reinforce accountability. The Secretariat was encouraged to enable adaptive, data-driven planning, decentralise decision-making, and improve coordination with regional and financial institutions. Both UNSC and UN HQ were urged to institutionalise learning from past missions and strengthen collaboration with think-tanks and partners to shape realistic, politically viable, and context-responsive peace operation strategies.

In the context of the geopolitical and financial pressure on UN peace operations, future operations are likely to be trimmed down to essential functions to save costs, and this means that many of the multidimensional elements that used to be associated with UN peace operations, such as DDR, human rights, ROL, etc. will have to be undertaken by other parts of the UN system with voluntary funding. One implication is that there will need to be a special focus on coordination processes and mechanisms to ensure that such fragmented tasks are integrated into one overall strategy. There is also likely to be **greater reliance on partnerships and parallel missions** will thus become the norm, which will also further increase the need for robust coordination mechanisms.

Outcome 02: Launch of the Challenges Annual Forum 2025 Key Takeaways and Official Opening of the Peace Operations Review Week

05 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

Based on the backdrop of the current challenges facing the UN, both the liquidity crisis and geopolitical divides, the session focused on how the UN can do differently with less to ensure, adaptive, effective and fit-for purpose peace operations.

- **Peacemaking:** It is crucial to restore the UN's political engagement to ensure a more central role in peacemaking and for peace operations to provide space for political dialogue.
- **Host Countries:** A more constructive engagement between the UNSC, UN missions and host countries is needed.
- **Flexible Toolbox:** To ensure that the full range of the peace and security toolbox can be mobilised flexibly, mandates must be designed with built-in adaptability so peace operations can deploy different instruments as contexts and needs change.
- **Partnerships:** The value of genuine, inclusive and complementary partnerships with regional and subregional organisations was highlighted, with not only coordination but mutual accountability at its core.

2. What is being done/to do about them

- **Peacemaking:** The Secretary-General with the UN Secretariat should reengage in political issues taking a more active role in promoting political coherence and leveraging good offices.
- **Host Countries:** The UNSC, UN missions, and host countries should share the responsibility for mandate implementation, potentially through a formal compact. Host countries should be involved early in the process as partners and co-architects to ensure legitimacy.
- **Flexible Toolbox:** The UN Secretariat should be more proactive in presenting needs-based and context-specific options to the UNSC. Ensuring the toolbox's operational readiness requires sustained and flexible financing from Member States.
- **Partnership:** Resolution 2719 should be tested and refined through practical implementation. The increasing demand for combatting violent extremism and counter-terrorism operations requires a recalibration of roles among relevant actors, with the UN safeguarding international standards and norms.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

- The UN Secretariat needs sustained political support from the UNSC to adapt effectively, yet gaining that support itself depends on **demonstrating adaptability**, which requires a higher degree of **mutual trust**.
- A **networked multidimensional and integrated approach** to peace operations would allow the use of the **full spectrum** of peace operations, including **partnerships** with regional and subregional organizations.

- There is a **gap** between what the peace operation can deliver and the demand on the ground, which the UN Secretariat and UNSC should try to **bridge through the mandating process**.
- A **standing coordination platform**, together with regional and subregional organisations for joint political, financial and operational planning and oversight would allow for more coherent responses.
- The **current budget and planning processes** reinforce **fragmentation and rigidity** in the system. The Secretariat and Member States can play a more active role in driving coherence.
- Member States, together with the expert community, need to organize and form coalitions to protect, sustain, and advance peace operations, matching their support with concrete action.

Outcome 03: Strengthening and Preserving UN Peace Operations: Perspectives from the Global Alliance for Peace Operations

05 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The event was organised as a follow-up to the Global Alliance for Peace Operations' findings and input to the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May 2025. The follow-up discussion in New York looked back at the achievements of the Ministerial meeting, reviewed increasing challenges and provided concrete recommendations for safeguarding and strengthening UN Peace Operations in a rapidly changing (and deteriorating) environment and space for the UN and peace operations in particular. Key issues and topics included:

- Take-aways from the Berlin Ministerial and assessment of current peacekeeping situation (Adam Smith)
- Hybrid Threats and Technology (Annika Hansen)
- Protection of Civilians (Lisa Sharland)
- Leadership in Peace Operations (Catharina Nickel)
- Partnerships in Peace Operations (Cedric de Coning)

Opening and closing input was also provided by representatives from Germany, Indonesia and Sierra Leone, all underlining the importance of strengthening global cooperation and incorporating civil society perspectives.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Even though all participants acknowledged the difficult headwinds (some even referred to a 'perfect storm') of fewer financial resources and more ad-hoc'ism, there is in the current context a pressing need to preserve (through lessons learned and best practice and contingency planning) and strengthen (by identifying missions that succeed against all the odds) peace operations in the above-mentioned fields. Speakers from India, Indonesia and Sierra Leone also underlined the continued importance of global dialogues (and mentioned explicitly GAPO) on knowledge exchange and for garnering wide-ranging support for UN peace operations at this critical moment.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

Participants agreed that since pledging in May 2025, more uncertainty marks the UN peace operations system. It required a careful **balancing act between maintaining preparedness** (including political support) and **not overdemanding resources and contributions** from member states that might then not be used, due to missions winding down or being adapted. However, it became clear that even new formats (such as the Haiti mission) **require the expertise and continued input and leadership** (formal and informal) from the Secretariat and professional peace operations community. Even if the political, financial and strategic landscape is shifting (towards ad hoc coalitions and proposals), the institutionalised expertise of the UNHQ is strongly needed.

Outcome 04: The Future of Women, Peace and Security in UN Peace Operations: What Is at Stake?

05 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The panel examined how UN reform and liquidity crisis threaten WPS implementation in peace operations. Key discussions covered: impacts of DPPA-DPO restructuring on gender programming; resource constraints affecting CRSV prevention in MINUSCA; cultural barriers facing women peacekeepers; and the role of networks like the Military Gender Alliance in advancing WPS commitments. Speakers emphasized risks of deprioritizing protection mandates during downsizing and budget cuts amid global rollback on gender equality.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Panellists identified corrective measures including: strengthening professional networks for knowledge-sharing and capacity-building; documenting operational realities to inform resource allocation; identifying enabling factors for WPS sustainability during institutional transitions; advancing research on meaningful participation of uniformed women; and developing strategies for maintaining participation, prevention, and protection commitments in constrained environments despite fiscal pressures and competing priorities.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

The discussion highlighted urgent need for UN leadership to demonstrate **commitment to WPS** within its own operations. Implications include: ensuring protection **commitments remain mandatory** rather than optional during mission transitions; **addressing capability and resource gaps** that undermine CRSV mandates; **integrating gender perspectives** systematically across reform processes; and maintaining **accountability for WPS implementation** as central to mission effectiveness and UN credibility during unprecedented challenges.

Outcome 05: The Role of Unarmed Civilian Protection in the Future of Peace Operations: An Integrative Approach

05 November 2025

This event had a twofold aim: to shed light on the relevance of UCP in current and future peace operations and to connect that with and amplify its importance at this seminal moment in Palestine (both Gaza and the West Bank). Civil society involvement in their own protection and the recognition of the knowledge, agency and power of civil society in protection needs to be elevated in principle and practice. We were very glad to see more openness to this during the week.

1. Which key issues were discussed

Unarmed civilian protection is a long-known and tested methodology of civilian-led protection methods that has a successful track-record working around the world in cooperation with traditional peace operations, SPMs, and non-mission settings.

Protection of civilians is an utmost need in all of Palestine. UCP is currently being applied in the West Bank by 20+ small NGOs and doing significant protection of Palestinians there, but it needs: (1) to be scaled up massively to be able to meet the immense and increasing protection needs and (2) given more structured international recognition to stop attacks on protectors and ensure compliance with the ceasefire and IHL. Additionally, and most relevant at this moment of attention on Palestine, it needs to be built into the planning of the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF). Many ideas on how to do this were shared with the key caveat that without civilian involvement, the ISF will not be stable or succeed because it will be seen by local society as nothing more than exchanging one occupation for another.

2. What is being done/can be done

UCP is going on in the West Bank right now by many small INGOs—faith-based, Israeli, joint Israeli/Palestinians, human rights groups, etc. for more than 20 years. It is not waiting for the ISF. The ISF can benefit from these organizations and their experience. We hope that Member States will pick up these essential elements, both policy and practice, and incorporate in the negotiations of the ISF and its eventual deployment.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

UCP could and should become a more **accepted and regular part of the toolbox** of the UN and other regional and multilateral actors in the planning and deployment of peace operations. UCP is especially relevant at this time because it is **cost-effective, flexible, and easier to scale up**.

This is relevant and applicable for what is being considered with regard to protection in all of Palestine and it is especially timely as the negotiations are underway in the International Stabilization Force. Such **planning MUST include civil society** in conception and for both the West Bank and Gaza. The discussion at our event made clear that there are concrete, actionable suggestions laid out in terms of timelines, commitments, checks and balances, consequences for non-compliance, etc. that should be taken forward.

Outcome 06: Participatory research workshop: Peace operations responses to borderland and cross-border challenges

05 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

UN peace operations face persistent challenges in addressing borderland and cross-border dynamics. Conflict drivers, armed group mobility, and political economies are concentrated in border regions, yet missions remain state- and capital-centric, often lacking presence or leverage at the periphery. Mandates and funding frameworks are territorially bounded, limiting responses to transnational networks of resource extraction, trafficking and recruitment. Consent and local ownership or partnership may also be an issue, as political elites may benefit from borderland informality, reducing incentives to extend governance. Ongoing funding cuts – not just in the peace operations field but in the humanitarian sector – may exacerbate these issues, with even less capacity available to address issues in the periphery. While some participants cited the promise of local and regional cooperative models (as opposed to UN or other externally-led peace interventions), others noted that these were equally prey to issues of political will, and that often the “cross-border” or regional components of these arrangements proved empty.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Few examples of UN missions effectively addressing cross-border issues were identified, however, several innovative regional and ad-hoc approaches were discussed.

In regions with multiple UN PKOs, participants noted that coordination was limited to monthly meetings of force commanders to deconflict operations, rather than to coordinate responses to cross-border threats. A positive counterexample was missions’ cross-border efforts to mitigate conflict which could arise from transhumance movements.

Participants identified the MNJTF Lake Chad Basin, the G5 Sahel, and other regional initiatives as innovative models, integrating political, security, and development approaches. Participants raised the question of how the UN can better support such initiatives.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

For UN HQ, implications include the need for **transnational analytical frameworks** and stronger **alignment between peacekeeping, political, and development** arms to address cross-border conflict dynamics. The discussion highlighted that UN and Member State policy shops are primarily organized around country desks, making efforts to identify and address transnational conflict dynamics more bureaucratically complex and therefore less common.

For the UNSC, **connecting mandates within a given region** could help **facilitate greater inter-mission coordination**. Additionally, greater support for regional organization or ad-hoc responses could help maximize their impact.

Outcome 07: Defining Pathways Forward: Enhancing the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in Peace Operations

06 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The discussion examined how the AU–UN partnership can adapt to Africa’s shifting peace and security landscape amid geopolitical competition, financial constraints, and the rise of ad-hoc and hybrid missions. Participants debated the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719 on UN-assessed contributions for AU-led peace operations, exploring how mandates, sequencing, and financing can better reflect African realities. Speakers emphasised rebuilding trust, strengthening coherence between AU, RECs, and UN frameworks, and clarifying the division of labour under comparative-advantage and subsidiarity logics. Dialogue also addressed innovative financing—including private-sector engagement—and the need for common political analysis and shared accountability mechanisms.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Both organisations committed to operationalising Resolution 2719 through joint planning, compliance (including PoC), financing (although all agreed that UN assessed contribution funding for AU-led operations is highly unlikely for the time being), and accountability frameworks. The AU is advancing its review of its governance and peace and security frameworks, as well as the ASF, and the AU is also organising a Lessons-Learned Forum to refine AU-led PSO models. The UN is completing its comprehensive peace operations review and deepening cooperation through the annual AU–UN leadership meeting. Next steps include socialising 2719 across African capitals and RECs (e.g. explaining that in order to access 2719 financing, operations have to be AU-led), developing a shared political-analysis framework, identifying “low-hanging-fruit” pilots to demonstrate readiness, and exploring private sector contributions to the Peace Fund and other financing options. The 2026 review of 2719 will be an important status check on the relevance of this mechanism for AU-UN partnership arrangements in the peace operations arena .

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

As the goal of securing financing for UNSC mandated AU-led peace operations from UN assessed contributions is highly unlikely due to the long-standing position of the US Congress and currently also the Trump Administration, the role of 2719 in the AU-UN partnership and the way it is being implementation will have to adapt. Currently, the UN partnership teams in DPPA/DPO and DOS is continuing to engage the AU to develop various SOPs and systems that will enable the implementation of 2719, despite the fact that **financing from assessed contributions is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future**. The AU on the other hand, in response to this reality, is focussing on exploring various forms of **self-financing** and voluntary contributions. As both organisations are under financial pressure, the **partnership need to pivot away from UN financial support** to AU peace operations and related modalities, and **re-focus on how they can support each other through joint planning, burden-sharing (e.g. division of tasks) and the coordination of parallel missions**.

Outcome 08: The Future of UN Peace Operations: Use of Force and the Protection of Civilians

06 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

Force Commanders and experts examined tactical-level challenges in balancing PoC mandates with force protection. Discussions covered: modernizing the principles of peacekeeping to align with current operational realities; ROE interpretation and its impact on the protection of civilians; operational reality when mandates conflict with force protection concerns; capability gaps in equipment, training, intelligence, and mobility preventing effective PoC; integration challenges across civilian, military, and police components; and how protecting civilians enhances peacekeeper safety. Unintended consequences including civilian casualties and mission impartiality were also addressed.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Panellists identified practical solutions: enhanced training of ROE for tactical implementation; addressing capability requirements including equipment and mobility; improving integrated planning across mission components; utilizing cultural humility to foster dialogue and safe environments; enhancing community engagement, including through prioritizing and investing in scenario-based training; and shifting from reactive to proactive protection approaches. Focus on mutually reinforcing effects where the protection of civilians enhances peacekeeper safety and mission success.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

The event generated concrete recommendations for policy and doctrine changes enabling proactive PoC. Implications for UNSC and UN HQ include: **need for clearer understanding of ROEs at tactical level** through scenario-based training; addressing **TCC concerns** regarding operational constraints, risk tolerance, and support requirements; ensuring adequate and verified **pre-deployment training** to meet mission requirements and enhance operational effectiveness; strengthening **integrated planning mechanisms** and **in-mission training**; and developing frameworks that **balance robust protection of civilians with peacekeeper safety** in high-threat environments.

Outcome 09: UN Police and the Future of Peace Operations

06 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The event focused on the unique value added of UN Police to peace operations environments and considered how UN police can help contribute to critical tasks like POC, community engagement, addressing transnational crime, and capacity building in future mission settings. Looking to the future, participants considered how more specialized capacity, including the deployment of specialized police teams, could be used to help meet needs in light footprint models. The role of UN Police in coordinating a range of actors contributing to tasks like crime was also discussed. Finally, participants reiterated the centrality of POC, which must not be compromised with budget cuts or in light footprint settings.

2. What is being done/to do about them

One impetus for the event was a recognition that there has not been much discussion on the role of UN Police amid a shifting peace operations landscape and that the UN Police Division is yet to articulate a clear vision for how it can uniquely contribute to the future of peace operations. Participants called for UN Police Division to develop a vision for the future of UN Police, similar to those of related institutions like UNODC or UNICRI, as well as an implementation strategy.

Some suggested that UN Police should take a lead role in coordination among entities involved in addressing areas like crime in order to leverage the capacities of the whole system. It will also be key to continue situating UN Police work within the criminal justice chain and other rule of law support.

There may be increased focus on urban settings, inter-communal violence or cyber security, all of which require Member states to become more involved in mobilizing specialized capabilities to address complex threats and specialized tasks.

As decisions about budget cuts are being made, the Secretariat and member states need to be strategic to not compromise priorities like POC. As one speaker noted, when making every decision we should ask “Will this make the UN more or less able to protect individuals from harm?”

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

Four main takeaways:

- UNPOL needs to develop a **vision and strategy** for the future of UN police
- For the review, it should be clearly reiterated that **POC must remain central** to all types of peace operations deployments. Communities will expect this, and it will undermine all other UN efforts if they are not able to respond to key threats to civilian safety and security
- Member states need to focus on **mobilizing more specialized capacity** that they can deploy to peace operation settings
- **Flexible, modular approaches** could help address the need for increased efficiencies and specialized capabilities; however, for this to work, the Council and Fifth Committee must be willing and able to **mandate and resource missions more flexibly**.

Outcome 10: Peace Operations and Peacebuilding – Matching potential with implementation

07 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

Current policy discussions point to a more prominent role for the tools of the peacebuilding architecture in addressing root causes of conflict and bridging different instruments. This includes strengthening the interface between peace operations and peacebuilding – all the more important in light of financial constraints and calls for efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, synergies can be unlocked when it comes to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) advice to the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the Peacebuilding Fund's (PBF) support to peace operations, especially during transitions and to strengthen preventive and localised approaches to peacebuilding.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Today, the notion that peacebuilding can supply the organising principle in a broader ecosystem of tools is well-established. As the PBC agenda unites issues of security, development and finance, it is well-placed to serve as a platform for dialogue, learning and system-wide coherence. Similarly, its advisory role to the UNSC is an opportunity to share perspectives from the whole UN system. Still, the PBC may be equally plagued by divisions that in turn make delivering strong and coherent advice difficult. The upcoming Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) will reinforce peacebuilding's bridging role and provide guidance on how to leverage prevention strategies.

The PBF has had a strategic focus on supporting transitions and a track record of engaging with peace operations. These activities appear to be most effective when they are timebound and aligned with national priorities. To further strengthen synergies, more could be done to avoid overlap and clarify eligibility process for access to funds.

People-centred peace operations still struggle with how and with whom to engage. Often, engagement with local leaders is simply used to validate pre-designed programmes rather than co-creating them with local representatives in true partnership. In fact, local-level analysis and partners are a precondition for successfully designing support that features suitable approaches, entry points, and timelines, and the PBF and other peacebuilding instruments can help peace operations achieve meaningful local partnerships.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

In its advice to the UNSC, the PBC should seek to be **more operational and evidenced-based to increase the relevance of its analysis**. The PBF plays a valuable role as a support mechanism, catalyst and strategic enabler of national ownership, including for peace operations. The focus of peacebuilding and peace operations **needs to shift to supporting national and local capacities** to sustain peace. However, financial pressures that constrain the scope and reach of peace operations and related capacities, such as Peace and Development Advisers, will reduce the role the UN can play in support of national conflict prevention strategies.

To cope with reduced funding and to make the most of future peace operations that are likely to have a narrower focus, the PBC, PBF and related peacebuilding efforts can contribute to bringing about a **whole-of-UN effort that maximise the combined effort that UN and other partners can offer** in support of national efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace.

Outcome 11: Examining Protection Approaches in UN Peace Operations

07 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The goal of the event was to bring to light a broad range of protection efforts that missions undertake across a range of settings. The first session focused on protection approaches in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, including in the DRC and Lebanon. The second session focused on protection activities in other types of missions, including smaller peacekeeping missions without an explicit POC mandate and special political missions. Explicit links were made with the Agenda for Protection and human rights capacities within missions.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Participants emphasized that protection needs to remain at the heart of all mission presences, which is currently challenged by the dichotomy between peacekeeping and special political missions. While acknowledging differences in approach between missions with explicit POC mandates and larger footprints with smaller missions and SPMs, protection is at the center of everything the UN does (as noted in the Agenda for Protection). More could be done to articulate how SPMs contribute to protection and to articulate approaches to protection across the full spectrum of missions, whether or not they have explicit POC mandates.

The discussion also focused on the effects of budget cuts, as peacekeeper presence plays an important role in protection. Participants emphasized the importance of prevention and for connecting with the human rights agenda, as much of the human rights work within a mission relates to protection, including early warning mechanisms, investigation and engagement with communities, and monitoring and evaluation. Given the global pushback on human rights, there was discussion about how, in some cases, to “do” human rights without calling it human rights.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

- Member states from across regions, as well as experts, have been clear that POC needs to be at the heart of all UN presences, including all UN missions across the full spectrum. Whether or not missions have an explicit POC mandate, they need to be able **to articulate how they contribute to the protection of civilians and how they will respond if civilians are targeted within the vicinity of UN presence**. In line with this, there is a need to grapple with how SPMs contribute to the protection of civilians. This will also affect peacekeeping operations that may be deployed in modular or light footprint approaches, that may not have the size or mandate of a large multidimensional mission, but must still take into account protection threats and responses.
- Even as missions work to do “differently with less,” there must be a **frank conversation about the effects of shrinking mission budgets and reduced numbers of people**. Protection is facilitated in part through presence and drastic reductions will affect the safety and security of civilians. This must be spoken about honestly.
- The best/**most effective approaches to protection are integrated** and involve a mix of military, police, and civilian capacity.
- The UN system will have to carefully grapple with the global pushback on **human rights; this work is essential to everything else that missions do**. There may be some cases where the UN

can accomplish the goals of human rights work without explicitly calling it human rights; however, this may also carry a normative cost.

Outcome 12: The impact of climate change on the ability of peace operations to fulfil core mandated tasks

07 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The discussion examined how climate change is reshaping the operational realities of UN peace operations, affecting mobility, logistics, and protection efforts in missions like UNMISS, UNISFA, and UNAMA. Extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, and heat are disrupting humanitarian access, intensifying intercommunal tensions, and undermining core mandates such as civilian protection, DDR, and governance support. Panellists emphasised that climate change-related evolving operational conditions requiring adaptive planning, anticipatory preparedness, and integration of climate risk analysis into mission strategies. Speakers also explored how environmental peacebuilding (eg community cooperation to manage a shared resource) can serve as an entry point for dialogue and reconciliation.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Missions are incorporating climate-security analysis into early-warning and operational planning, mapping flood-prone zones, identifying high-lying areas where relief can be provided during flooding, and redesigning mobility strategies with all-terrain and riverine assets. UNMISS's dedicated Climate, Peace and Security Advisor and UNISFA's adaptive deployment practices were highlighted as emerging models. The UN Secretariat, through DPO's Policy and Best Practice Service, is developing guidance for climate-sensitive mission planning and resource management. Participants called for stronger collaboration between missions, T/PCCs, and humanitarian actors to anticipate environmental shocks, integrate climate data into PoC and DDR work, and leverage partnerships with local and regional actors to turn disaster response into opportunities for peacebuilding and trust-building.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

The discussion underscored the need for the Security Council to integrate climate-security considerations systematically into mission mandates and reporting. Mandates should explicitly **recognise climate impacts on the ability of operations to achieve protection, sustain mobility, and maintain support for humanitarian access**, while allowing operational flexibility to adapt to environmental disruptions. At UN HQ, departments were urged to mainstream climate-risk assessment in planning and performance frameworks, deploy climate-security advisors across missions, and strengthen inter-agency coordination with UNEP, FAO, and OCHA. Participants stressed that **proactive adaptation**—rather than reactive crisis management—will determine mission effectiveness, making **climate resilience a core criterion for mandate design**, resourcing, and accountability going forward. It was also stressed that **integrating a climate-lens into mission planning and operations is not an additional task**, but adaptation of existing practices in response to the effects of climate change.

Outcome 13: Peace Operations Review Week Findings: Implications for Future Education and Training

07 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

The workshop provided an opportunity to pull together the implications for education and training emerging from the Peace Operations Review Week, to identify overlaps and gaps, draw on evidence from training needs assessments and mission feedback, and thus help shape a more comprehensive and coherent training framework. Key thematic considerations emerged, which have implications for the design and delivery of future training and capacity building for peace operations. These include:

- Leading with integrity through change – **strengthening leadership and building partnerships**.
- Increasing and strengthening the **adaptability** of systems and peacekeepers.
- **Reflective, learner-centred training** mechanisms requires broader application.
- Innovation areas with particular potential for development of training, include:
 - Embracing and operationalising **new technologies** to the advantage of missions,
 - More effectively addressing **mis- and disinformation and hate speech**,
 - Scaling up training for **mitigating climate risk** and its impact, and
 - Strengthening the **mental health and resilience** of peacekeepers.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Findings of the workshop were captured in an 8-page report, which was subsequently shared with the UNPOL Community as well as the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, and the UN DPO, including USG Lacroix, the UN Police Adviser, and the DPO Integrated Training Service. For further details, see the report (“2025 Peace Operations Review Week Findings: Implications for Future Education and Training”).

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

The workshop had a slightly different format from the other thematic workshops, focusing on requirement for education and training for future mission, but with less emphasis on what the UN SC or the UN HQs should do other than support below direction in principle and organise its structure relevant to the proposals identified under point 1 and in the accompanying paper.

Outcome 14: Haiti and the Future of Peace Operations

07 November 2025

1. Which key issues were discussed

Reflecting on past UN peace operations in Haiti, the goal was to identify lessons relevant not only to the immediate future of Haiti, including the operations of the new Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and UNSOH, but also to the future of UN peace operations more generally. While the humanitarian situation is dire, the security front in Port-au-Prince has been quieter at present with gangs – and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission – retrenching ahead of the GSF deployment. In the perception of Haitians, the MSS did not deliver and expectations of what the GSF – which has neither money nor troops – might accomplish are even lower. Still, the hope is that the GSF might contribute to stabilising the situation and prepare the ground for elections and a return to constitutional order. On the political side, the failure of the Haitian state remains the core of the problem. It is imperative that the Government take full responsibility for addressing the security, humanitarian and political situation. While some elements of international engagement in Haiti have yielded positive results (e.g. legal aid offices, support to police or community violence reduction programmes), they ultimately did not address core problems, such as corruption and the country's political economy, and were not sustainable without external funding and other support.

2. What is being done/to do about them

Even in the best case, the GSF can only deliver preliminary security gains. For lasting improvement, tools are needed that can engage Haitian society as a whole, including supporting courageous efforts to tackle links between crime and politics. UN Police's advisory role should be embedded in a networked multilateralism that draws on resources across the UN system and builds on valuable lessons in the areas of human rights, justice, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and engaging youth. Efforts to address the political situation must be led by a national strategy and linked to a compact, a framework for mutual accountability, including incentive structures that encourage the Government of Haiti – as well as the gangs – to tackle political issues. While peace operations can create political space, the Security Council needs to play a more active role – not least in addressing the political economy to shift the conflict dynamics and deal with root causes.

3. What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ

Responsibility and accountability must be shared more evenly among various international and national stakeholders in Haiti. In the coming months, it will be pivotal to **empower and hold the Government accountable** with a focus on elections in 2026, including clarifying concrete issues such as political party financing and re-establishing election authorities. Aligning strategies – i.e. ensuring that efforts are guided by a **common vision** and that BINUH and the GSF Special Representative speak with one political voice – is an important step to foster a political resolution. This also entails maintaining and expanding the sanctions regime in parallel to force deployment.

Beyond the Haitian context, non-UN missions and peace operations à la carte face challenges of **sustainability, accountability, coordination and impartiality**. Whether they are in fact a 'cheaper' or more cost-effective option, remains an open question. Instead, **staying the course until sufficient progress has been achieved is essential**, while recognising that the window for and trust in external engagement are finite.

Closing Reflections on the Future of Peace Operations

07 November 2025

- Safeguarding the valuable experiences and lessons of more than 75 years of peace operations and moving forward with new models requires courage, wisdom, trust and leadership among all stakeholders – international, regional, national and local.
- Shared responsibility and accountability are key. This applies to UN peace operations, the Security Council, Member States and host Governments and populations and requires deeper and more strategic engagement.
- In future configurations, especially when they involve ad hoc operations and coalitions, it will be essential to minimise fragmentation among different actors. This is especially true when it comes to protection, which requires a holistic approach. Here, the UN brings unmatched added value as a convener and coordinator of all stakeholders.
- Overall, decisions should be driven by political considerations and strategic cohesion. Partnerships are increasingly important. They are likely to entail a measure of division of labour but will be most effective when partners speak with one voice.
- Even though peace operations are contracting at present, future operations will also need to prepare as new or different mandated areas come into focus, such as in the areas of transnational organised crime, counterterrorism, climate and environmental security, and hybrid threats and cyber security.
- New models and shifts in mandated tasks require adaptable training systems, as well as training partnerships.

List of partners and networks who organised events:

1. ACCORD
2. Amani Africa
3. Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA)
4. Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)
5. Center on International Cooperations, New York University (CIC-NYU)
6. Centre for International Peace and Stability of Pakistan (CIPS)
7. Challenges Forum International Secretariat
8. Coventry University
9. Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON)
10. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)
11. Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
12. Global Alliance for Peace Operations
13. Global Governance Institute (GGI)
14. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)
15. Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
16. International Crisis Group
17. International Peace Institute (IPI)
18. Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAITPC)
19. Looking the Occupation in the Eye
20. Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University
21. Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP)
22. NORCAP, Norwegian Refugee Council
23. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
24. Pax Christi International
25. Rabbis for Human Rights
26. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
27. Tanenbaum
28. The Carter Center
29. The Stimson Center
30. Training for Peace (TfP)
31. Unarmed Civilian Protection in Palestine (UCPiP)
32. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR)

List of Permanent Missions hosting/co-hosting events:

African Union
Canada
Denmark
Germany
Ghana
Indonesia
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Sierra Leone
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom