Hybrid paths to resistance in the Muslim world: Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali (HYRES)
HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups purs...
Political economy analyses
This project provides political economy analyses of eleven countries deemed important to Norwegian development cooperation....
Lebanon: Political leadership confronted by Salafist ideology
Force est de constater que les débordements de la crise syrienne au Liban sur le plan sécuritaire sont restés relativement limités, comparé à la violence massive de l’autre côté de la frontière. Cette note de recherche fait l’hypothèse que si le calme au Liban est tout relatif, il est aussi le résultat de mécanismes de contrôle politique et social bien établis, et notamment les liens entretenus par les notables et leaders communautaires avec la population. Comme nous le savons, le modèle consociatif libanais fait de ces élites des « champions communautaires » et des médiateurs entre leurs communautés et l’État libanais : porte-paroles, responsables de négociations intercommunautaires et régulateurs de conflits intercommunautaires. Les leaders doivent en effet composer avec les radicaux de leurs communautés et « contrôler » leurs « rues politiques ». A travers le cas de la communauté sunnite libanaise, cette note de recherche analyse dans une première partie l’essor de l’extrémisme sunnite, le salafisme djihadiste. Dans une seconde partie, nous nous pencherons sur les mécanismes de contrôle et d’interaction entre la jeunesse urbaine pauvre et les notables sunnites, et plus particulièrement la question des mécanismes communautaires. Il s’agit là de comprendre dans quelle(s) mesure(s) ces mécanismes existant de manière similaire dans les communautés chiite, maronite et druze, expliquent l’adaptation de l’État libanais face à la crise syrienne. Nous démontrerons que contrairement aux études décrivant les islamistes comme constituant une menace à la stabilité libanaise et à la cohésion nationale, ces derniers s’adaptent et s’intègrent à la réalité locale. Les islamistes sont aussi pragmatiques : les intérêts privés, communautaires, politiques et familiaux peuvent aussi aisément prendre le pas sur l’élément religieux. Cela rend possible une position consensuelle vis-à-vis des élites politiques sunnites, et du phénomène de libanisation du salafisme, par leur entrée dans des réseaux clientélistes. Les militants de Daech ont quant à eux un ancrage international, ce qui les rendrait plus dangereux, car moins facilement contrôlables par les notables salafistes ou par les élites politiques. Ils sont jeunes et en rupture avec leurs parents et leur communauté. Toutefois, puisque les jeunes de Daech se réclament du salafisme, les notables salafistes jouissent encore d’un certain respect parmi eux. L’inclusion des cheikhs salafistes libanais dans des processus de négociation avec Daech continue donc d’être d’une grande importance. Finalement, le courant du Futur et Hariri sont de plus en plus contestés en interne par les électeurs sunnites. Le plus grand rival de Hariri n’est pas représenté par les salafistes mais par d’autres leaders sunnites plus en phase avec les positions de la communauté, tels qu’Achraf Rifi.
Limiting violent spill-over in civil wars. The paradoxes of Lebanese Sunni jihadism. 2011-2017
Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counter-example. Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in next-door Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable – despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover into Lebanon from the perspective of the country’s Sunni Islamists. Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon’s conflicting factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting to violence inside Lebanon to be too high. Even those Lebanese Sunnis who have crossed the borders to fight in Syria do so because of domestic reasons, that is, to fight against Hezbollah on Syria soil, where they can do so without risking an explosion of the Lebanese security situation. Sectarianism, in the sense of opposition to Hezbollah and the Lebanese Shia, is the main driver of radicalization for Lebanese Sunnis.
Situating (In-)Security: A United Army for a Divided Country?
This volume examines Lebanon’s post-2011 security dilemmas and the tenuous civil-military relations. The Syrian civil war has strained the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) cohesion and threatens its neutrality – its most valued assets in a divided society. The spill-over from the Syrian civil war and Hezbollah’s military engagement has magnified the security challenges facing the Army, making it a target. Massive foreign grants have sought to strengthen its military capability, stabilize the country and contain the Syria crisis. However, as this volume demonstrates, the real weakness of the LAF is not its lack of sophisticated armoury, but the fragile civil–military relations that compromise its fighting power, cripple its neutrality and expose it to accusations of partisanship and political bias. This testifies to both the importance of and the challenges facing multi-confessional armies in deeply divided countries.
The Lebanese army after the Syrian crisis: Alienating the Sunni community?
This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.
Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon. Conflict, Cohesion and Confessionalism in a Divided Society
This volume examines Lebanon’s post-2011 security dilemmas and the tenuous civil-military relations. The Syrian civil war has strained the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) cohesion and threatens its neutrality – its most valued assets in a divided society. The spill-over from the Syrian civil war and Hezbollah’s military engagement has magnified the security challenges facing the Army, making it a target. Massive foreign grants have sought to strengthen its military capability, stabilize the country and contain the Syria crisis. However, as this volume demonstrates, the real weakness of the LAF is not its lack of sophisticated armoury, but the fragile civil–military relations that compromise its fighting power, cripple its neutrality and expose it to accusations of partisanship and political bias. This testifies to both the importance of and the challenges facing multi-confessional armies in deeply divided countries.
The Mosul campaign: Winning the war, losing the peace?
After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, the military defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test case for both Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the region, such as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in Nineveh and Iraq, a new radical group may emerge, with far-reaching consequences. There are at least four essential reasons for concern. The first is the lack of a real Iraqi and regional coalition against ISIS. The reluctance of regional actors to work together against ISIS makes the ideological battle against it difficult. Governments in the Middle East do not consider ISIS their prime enemy; for instance, for Turks, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and not ISIS, is the main terrorist group. The Saudi-Iran rivalry takes priority over the regional battle against ISIS and fuels sectarianisation and extremism in both camps.
Turkey under Erdogan - a weaker state?
Emre Caliskan visits NUPI to talk about Turkeys thoughts on AKP and president Erdogan after much dissatisfaction, protests and a coup attempt in the country.
Societal Transformation in Conflict Contexts (TRANSFORM)
In times of radical uncertainty and flux: how do individual actions inspire collective action or lead to new institutional practices in ways that determine the direction of a society?...