Tine Gade

Limiting violent spill-over in civil wars. The paradoxes of Lebanese Sunni jihadism. 2011-2017

Research on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counter-example. Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in next-door Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable – despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover into Lebanon from the perspective of the country’s Sunni Islamists. Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon’s conflicting factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting to violence inside Lebanon to be too high. Even those Lebanese Sunnis who have crossed the borders to fight in Syria do so because of domestic reasons, that is, to fight against Hezbollah on Syria soil, where they can do so without risking an explosion of the Lebanese security situation. Sectarianism, in the sense of opposition to Hezbollah and the Lebanese Shia, is the main driver of radicalization for Lebanese Sunnis.

Liban : les paradoxes du salafisme jihadisme levantin

Le Liban est un contre-exemple des recherches sur la guerre civile, qui souvent surévaluent le potentiel de contagion transfrontalière des conflits. En dépit de nombreux facteurs qui aurait pu entraîner l’expansion au Liban de la crise en Syrie, les débordements restent limités, comparés à la violence de l’autre côté de la frontière. Malgré les liens historiques étroits entre les champs islamistes syrien et libanais, le nombre de Libanais sunnites ayant rejoint les djihadistes en Syrie est réduit (environ 1 000 personnes). C’est avant tout la surenchère confessionnelle et la rancune vis-à-vis du Hezbollah qui pourraient entraîner un nombre plus important de jeunes sunnites vers la prise d’armes. Si Daech ou Al-Qaïda misent sur cette option, et si les frustrations politiques et économiques d’une partie des sunnites ne s’atténuent pas sous le nouveau gouvernement, les risques de violence et de discorde civile, à long terme, demeurent plus que réels.

Situating (In-)Security: A United Army for a Divided Country?

This volume examines Lebanon’s post-2011 security dilemmas and the tenuous civil-military relations. The Syrian civil war has strained the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) cohesion and threatens its neutrality – its most valued assets in a divided society. The spill-over from the Syrian civil war and Hezbollah’s military engagement has magnified the security challenges facing the Army, making it a target. Massive foreign grants have sought to strengthen its military capability, stabilize the country and contain the Syria crisis. However, as this volume demonstrates, the real weakness of the LAF is not its lack of sophisticated armoury, but the fragile civil–military relations that compromise its fighting power, cripple its neutrality and expose it to accusations of partisanship and political bias. This testifies to both the importance of and the challenges facing multi-confessional armies in deeply divided countries.

The Lebanese army after the Syrian crisis: Alienating the Sunni community?

This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.

Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon. Conflict, Cohesion and Confessionalism in a Divided Society

This volume examines Lebanon’s post-2011 security dilemmas and the tenuous civil-military relations. The Syrian civil war has strained the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) cohesion and threatens its neutrality – its most valued assets in a divided society. The spill-over from the Syrian civil war and Hezbollah’s military engagement has magnified the security challenges facing the Army, making it a target. Massive foreign grants have sought to strengthen its military capability, stabilize the country and contain the Syria crisis. However, as this volume demonstrates, the real weakness of the LAF is not its lack of sophisticated armoury, but the fragile civil–military relations that compromise its fighting power, cripple its neutrality and expose it to accusations of partisanship and political bias. This testifies to both the importance of and the challenges facing multi-confessional armies in deeply divided countries.

Pathways to reconciliation in divided societies: Islamist groups in Lebanon and Mali

Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the state and opt for violence, while other groups that may be equally frustrated with the state remain engaged with the existing polity? This question has become particularly salient and complex in the last five years following the Arab revolutions and counter-revolutions. In a number of states, Salafi groups had to choose between standing outside the domestic political game or participating in formal and informal ways in national and local politics. We approach Sunni and Shi’I Islamism not as monolithic blocks, but as ideological arenas of dispute between competing and evolving social movements, operating in specific local contexts. Thus, focusing on cases from Tripoli, Lebanon and Bamako, Mali we show that religious actors are positioned in multiple fields at the same time. No position or pattern of allegiance should therefore be seen as permanent, but rather possible flexible and shifting. We analyse how such actors navigate such situational fields, what factors that determine their strategies’ potential for contributing to peaceful reconciliation, the sustainability of such reconciliation, and what lessons learned from the divided societies of Lebanon and Mali that are relevant for the case of Syria.

Liban : les paradoxes du salafisme djihadiste levantin

Le Liban est un contre-exemple des recherches sur la guerre civile, qui souvent surévaluent le potentiel de contagion transfrontalière des conflits. En dépit de nombreux facteurs qui aurait pu entraîner l’expansion au Liban de la crise en Syrie, les débordements restent limités, comparés à la violence de l’autre côté de la frontière. Malgré les liens historiques étroits entre les champs islamistes syrien et libanais, le nombre de Libanais sunnites ayant rejoint les djihadistes en Syrie est réduit (environ 1 000 personnes). C’est avant tout la surenchère confessionnelle et la rancune vis-à-vis du Hezbollah qui pourraient entraîner un nombre plus important de jeunes sunnites vers la prise d’armes. Si Daech ou Al-Qaïda misent sur cette option, et si les frustrations politiques et économiques d’une partie des sunnites ne s’atténuent pas sous le nouveau gouvernement, les risques de violence et de discorde civile, à long terme, demeurent plus que réels.

Lebanon poised at the brink

Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – despite the influx of some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and an internal political crisis involving supporters of opposing Syrian factions. Lebanon’s resilience can be explained by the high opportunity cost of state breakdown for domestic, regional and international political actors. Moreover, international economic assistance, diaspora remittances and informal networks established by refugees help to prevent outright economic breakdown. However, stability remains extremely precarious. Primary tipping points include (1) an IS strategy to spread the conflict to Lebanon, with consequent disintegration of the army along sectarian lines, (2) democratic decline and people’s dissatisfaction, (3) Hizbullah’s domestic ambitions and Israeli fears over the group’s growing military powers and (4) the potential that frustration between refugees and host communities may erupt into recurrent violence. The slow economic and sanitary decline in the country (5), however, is considered the biggest challenge.

Alawittene i Tripoli og Nord-Libanon: Krigerske problemskapere eller truet minoritet?

Lebanon on the brink

Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has managed to remain relatively stable against all odds – despite the influx of some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and internal political crisis involving actors who support opposing Syrian factions. Lebanon’s resilience can be explained by the high opportunity cost of state breakdown for domestic, regional and international political actors. Moreover, international economic assistance, diaspora remittances and informal networks established by refugees help to prevent outright economic breakdown. Yet, stability remains extremely precarious. Important tipping points include (1) the IS strategy of spreading the conflict to Lebanon, and the consequent disintegration of the army along sectarian lines, (2) democratic decline and popular dissatisfaction, (3) Hizbullah’s domestic ambitions and Israeli fears over the group’s growing military power and (4) the potential for frustration between refugees and host communities turning into recurrent violence. However, (5) the slow economic decline and the worsening sanitary conditions stand out as the greatest challenges.