Publikasjoner
Analysis: The military's ambitions dash Sudan's hopes for democracy... Who is to blame, and will the conflict end?
Opinions are divided about who is to blame for the current conflict in Sudan. Is it Al-Bashir for his reliance on armed groups? Or is it the civilian-military structure of the former Sudanese government that concentrated power in the hands of the military? Mother of the West, who failed to impose sanctions on Al-Burhan and Hamidti when they staged a coup against the civilian government in October 2021.
African-Led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of new UN Peacekeeping Operations
The United Nations is known to be the preeminent body to authorize and oversee international peacekeeping missions; however, new forms of African-led Peace Sup- port Operations (PSOs) are increasingly common, innovative, and context-specific. This paper examines the evolution of African-led PSOs and argues that African-led PSOs are filling a vacuum and taking on responsibilities once assumed by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO). The paper posits that the rise of African- led PSOs is due to the growing need for security and respond to the changing nature of conflict, the spread of insecurity and terrorism, and cross-border violence. Finally, the paper explores the implications of these operations for future missions in Africa, arguing that the future of African-led PSOs may be the preferred choice, with Regional Economic Communities and Ad-hoc Security Initiatives leading the way.
Nomads and Warlords, Chadian Forces in African Peace Operations
Despite criticism of the United Nations (UN) as peacekeepers “hiding behind sandbags,” by the former president of Chad, the Chadian military has become a critical enabler of African-led and UN peace operations. This paper posits that the effectiveness of the Chadian forces stems from refined and modified nomad and warlord structures and attributes used during Chad’s various conflicts to build and improve its national army. This has allowed the Chadian regime to exercise and project power, thus, producing one of Africa’s most effective forces for current conflicts and challenges. Thus, Chad’s military leadership reflects a trend of states that use military prowess to project force, while maintaining international partnerships with permanent members of the unsc (the US and France), UN peacekeeping missions and African ad hoc security initiatives. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this trend for the evolving nature of African Peace and Security Architecture.
Why carbon border adjustment mechanisms will not save the planet but a climate club and subsidies for transformative green technologies may
We find that both empirical results and economic theory show that carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) will be ineffective at meeting global goals for carbon emissions reduction; but CBAMs will be effective at improving the competitiveness of the domestic industries by assuring that imports bear equal costs of carbon pricing. We elaborate two complementary proposals that hold greater promise for meeting climate goals: (i) a Climate Club, where member countries impose a minimum price for carbon emissions at home and a tariff surcharge on all imports from non-member countries; and (ii) a 0.2%-of-GDP subsidy by high-income countries for transformative research designed to make green energy cheaper than fossil fuels. We discuss multiple paths for a Climate Club to be accommodated within the rules of the World Trade Organization and recommend use of the exception clause under GATT Article XX.
Introduction to Climate Change in Central Asia
The Central Asian region has been and will continue to be significantly impacted by climate change and all the region’s countries have pledged nation- ally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris agreement. This chapter aims to assess how likely Central Asian countries are to fulfil these pledges. To answer this question, we compare the NDCs to their respective national development programmes and historical trends. The results show that the countries of Central Asia vary in their ability to fulfil their pledges and that doing so will require structural changes to their energy systems, substantial investments in infrastructure and, most importantly, the alignment of their development plans with their declared climate goals. None of the countries have thus far engaged in structural reforms aimed at large-scale climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Climate Change in Central Asia: Decarbonization, Energy Transition and Climate Policy
This chapter provides a broad introduction to the impact of climate change in Central Asia, a region that has been experiencing a greater rise in temperatures than other parts of the world. The chapter shows how climate change represents a significant threat to Central Asia, exacerbating existing economic and environmental challenges and fueling regional tensions over resource management. Inefficient water resource management at the national level and limited regional collaboration on the management of water resources, coupled with state capacities that remain insuffi- cient to tackle climate change impacts, compound water-related tensions between the countries in the region. The chapter also shows how decarbonisation efforts in Central Asia are still in their early stages, with coal remaining a primary source of energy. Although the Central Asian countries have announced decarbonisation targets and adopted green economy strategies and programmes to reduce green- house gas emissions, a large-scale clean energy transition remains unlikely in the short term. The chapter concludes by identifying a lack of scholarship on climate change in Central Asia, which limits the development of a coherent approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation and evidence-based decision-making in the region. The chapter argues that a more coordinated approach to tackling climate change across the region is needed, requiring closer collaboration and more effective joint management of natural resources by the five Central Asian states. Finally, the chapter presents the chapters in the rest of the book.
Central Asian Climate Policy Pledges Under the Paris Agreement: Can They Be Fulfilled?
The Central Asian region has been and will continue to be significantly impacted by climate change and all the region’s countries have pledged nation- ally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris agreement. This chapter aims to assess how likely Central Asian countries are to fulfil these pledges. To answer this question, we compare the NDCs to their respective national development programmes and historical trends. The results show that the countries of Central Asia vary in their ability to fulfil their pledges and that doing so will require structural changes to their energy systems, substantial investments in infrastructure and, most importantly, the alignment of their development plans with their declared climate goals. None of the countries have thus far engaged in structural reforms aimed at large-scale climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Energy Transition in Central Asia: A Systematic Literature Review
While there is abundant research on the expansion of renewable energy in developed countries, little attention has been paid to the decarbonisation of energy systems in Central Asia, despite the region’s vulnerability to climate change, its rapidly growing domestic energy demand and the abundance of natural resources essential for the energy transition. Based on a systematic review of the literature, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the profile and trajectory of research on energy in Central Asia between 1991 and 2022. It finds that there was a shift from focusing on fossil fuels to clean energy around 2019–2020. However, despite recent growth, research on renewables and their significance in Central Asia is still sparse. This review indicates that while American and European researchers took the lead in this field in 2012, China, Japan, Kazakhstan and Russia have emerged as the leading contributors since 2016.
Oppfattet risiko og beredskap: Misforhold mellom kompetanse og antatt kunnskap om potensielle risikoer?
Vellykket kriseforebygging er avhengig av at ansatte i selskapene kan forutse og vurdere potensielle risikoer. Det skal være en sammenheng mellom hvor god beredskap de ansatte oppfatter at bedriften har for å håndtere fremtidige risikoer, og hvor sofistikert risikostyringssystemet er. Regnskapsbransjen er særlig utsatt for effektene av digitalisering (se f.eks. Frey og Osborne 2013). Vi har derfor analysert små og mellomstore norske regnskapsbyråer for å finne ut hvilken sammenheng det er mellom de ansattes opplevelse av selskapets risikoberedskap og hvor sofistikert risikostyringen er. Resultatene fra en spørreundersøkelse med 81 respondenter viser at respondentene kan grupperes i fire klynger. Empirien viser at det for noen selskaper ser ut til at jo mer sofistikerte risikostyringssystemene er, jo mindre forberedt er selskapene på å håndtere disse risikoene (og motsatt). Vi diskuterer dette ut fra den såkalte Dunning-Kruger-effekten, dvs. at mennesker som mangler kompetanse på et område er uvitende om sin manglende kompetanse. Våre funn indikerer at respondentenes oppfatning av sitt eget selskaps risikosystem og beredskap ikke alltid stemmer overens med virkeligheten. I flere tilfeller viste det seg at beredskapen og risikosystemet var langt svakere, noe som kan lede til finansielle tap. Dette kan i seg selv medføre en risiko. For å redusere denne risikoen kan bedrifter ta i bruk scenariostyring som et supplement til tradisjonell virksomhetsstyring for å forbedre sin beredskap.
Critical Materials for Development: A New Trajectory for Norwegian Foreign Aid Policy
After over a year of war in Ukraine, the world experienced dramatic and negative ripple effects related to food, energy security and commodity markets. Global food and energy shortages are now leading to social instability, protests and conflict and putting increasing pressure on public finances. For instance, prices of basics such as oil and wheat are rising and resulting in severe food shortages in Egypt, Lebanon and Somalia. Low-income countries are likely to be hit hardest by increasing food and energy prices in the long run. As the war continues, various second- and third-order negative effects are likely to intensify.