Researcher
Kari M. Osland
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Summary
Kari Margrethe Osland (PhD) is the Director of NUPI.
Osland’s work has predominantly focused on conflict dynamics, insurgencies, peace operations and peace building. Osland wrote her PhD on the impact of international assistance to police reform in post-conflict countries, comparing Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and South Sudan. She wrote her MPhil on genocide, applying the securitization theory on the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
She has done consultancy work for the UN, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and for the Norwegian Police Directorate, in particular on international policing, rule of law and Security Sector Reform. She has field work experience from the Balkans (30+), Afghanistan (2) and a number of African countries (Niger, South Sudan, Sudan).
Expertise
Education
2014 PhD, Political Science, University of Oslo
2000 Cand. polit., (political science and social anthroplogy), University of Bergen
Work Experience
2023- Director, NUPI
2014-2023 Senior Research Fellow, NUPI
2014-2020 Head of the Research group for peace, conflict and development, NUPI
2008-2014 PhD candidate (incl. 33 months of maternity leave)
2004-2008 Research Fellow, UN Programme/Department of International Affairs, NUPI
2001-2002 Coordinator for the Nordic research group on Peace Support Operations
2000-2004 Researcher & head of UN Programme, Department of International Politics, NUPI
1998-2000 Coordinator and scientific assistant, UN Programme, NUPI
Aktivitet
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NUPIpodden #8: FN – Bare store ord, eller verdens viktigste fredsskaper?
«En diplomatenes lekegrind». «Et byråkratisk mareritt». FN får med jevne mellomrom kritikk for å være handlingslammet. Men ifølge NUPI-forsker Kar...
Kristin Haugevik appointed Research Professor
Africa in a time of global crisis: Some trends
Africa is facing major challenges. Poverty is increasing again after many years of decline, and many countries are experiencing an economic crisis as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, including rising inflation. Several countries are indirectly affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has led to high energy prices and reduced access to grain and fertiliser. Several countries and regions are also marked by terrorism and violent conflicts, and climate change is creating increased risks of floods, droughts and heatwaves. Parallel to this, the role of the great powers in Africa is changing rapidly. After a period of strong European and American dominance, other great powers, such as China and Russia, have stepped up their activities in Africa. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, trade and development aid, while Russia has gained an important role in a number of countries, particularly through military aid and arms supply. Other countries, such as India, Turkey and Qatar, have also invested heavily in Africa. These developments are taking place simultaneously as Africa’s global significance is set to increase. First, the region has important natural resources, such as oil and gas, as well as rare minerals and earth metals that are in high demand in the context of the green transition. Second, Africa is severely affected by climate change, which can lead to social unrest, violent conflicts and extensive migration. In a time of increasing geopolitical rivalries and instability, this means that developments in Africa will have considerable global ramifications. Although other countries have increased their interest in and become more important partners for African countries, the EU and Europe are still Africa’s largest trading partners and providers of development aid. The influence of the EU and Europe in Africa is not challenged in this respect, but rather in areas such as governance, infrastructure and energy, and specifically from the Russian side within what we can call a niche of security markets. Russia has been able to operate here by offering arms sales, military training and services from the Wagner Group (a private military company) to regimes that Europe and the United States are not willing to provide that type of support for. The struggle for political and economic influence in Africa is stronger and more intense than since the Cold War, and there is reason to believe this will continue. This also gives African countries more choice and autonomy vis-à-vis external actors. African states are not just objects to be acted upon by the international community, whether through development aid, investment or in international forums; they are also active agents who, with increased self-awareness, will seek to navigate the new landscape of global power rivalries and fragmentation. This is a development that must be taken seriously. Neither Norway nor Europe can afford to take Africa and African support for our positions in international politics for granted. This report provides a brief overview of the key trends in Africa, which form the basis for Norway’s development of a new strategy for Africa.
Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions (RE-ENGAGE)
RE-ENGAGE’s overarching ambition is to assist the EU in refining its foreign policy toolbox, including its enlargement and neighbourhood policies. This will enhance the Union’s geopolitical leverage a...
Working paper on the implementation of the EU’s policies
This working paper builds on earlier research in which we mapped and analysed the toolbox of the European Union (EU) and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It listed the institutional setup, the decision-making processes, and co-ordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of CT and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) was unpacked because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism. Overall, our research found that the PVE agenda is quite a recent phenomenon in most member states and principally aims at preventing violent Islamist extremism through community engagement. The UK has been a pioneer in developing a ‘prevent’ pillar as part of its 2003 CT strategy and has since then actively contributed to the development of an EUlevel PVE framework. This EU framework has in turn pushed other member states, such as Ireland and Spain, to develop their own national PVE strategies in recent years. While Germany has also over the past decade made significant strides in preventing involvement in extremism and has brought its national practices to the EU level, France has generally favoured a more securitized than preventive approach. The present working paper takes the research one step further by looking more closely at the implementation of adopted PVE measures and practices in the EU and the abovementioned key states, both domestically as well as vis-à-vis the Western Balkans and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As such, we present a more evaluative overview geared towards identifying best practices and lessons learned in this field. The paper not only focuses on how policy is implemented and followed up, but also assesses the EU’s experiences in co-operating with member states and vice versa. In doing so, the research tries to take on board key recent developments, in particular in France and at the EU level, in response to a new series of terrorist attacks that took place in Paris, Nice, and Vienna between the end of October and mid-November 2020. The research builds on a set of in-depth interviews with PVE officials and practitioners within the EU and national administrations.
Policy brief on the implementation of the EU’s policies
Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon and terrorism has a long history in Europe, often linked to separatist movements, anarchism, and far-right and far-left extremism. The trends, means, and patterns of radicalization have evolved rapidly since the Arab uprisings flared exactly a decade ago. Counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) strategies have developed alongside these trends at the national and supranational level. In the wake of a series of Jihad-inspired terror attacks in Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, the UK, and elsewhere, European Union (EU) member states ramped up their military campaigns against the Islamic State (ISIS, aka Daesh) and al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq. But since the fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), governments’ interest in fighting terrorism in the Middle East has decreased. Nevertheless, some European countries remain on the front foot in their securitized PVE approach. Although there is no apparent connection between the anti-jihad war waged by the French army in Mali and the radicalization in France, the government is calling for more support from European countries to fight against jihadi movements in the Sahel. But the appetite for costly expeditionary campaigns is decreasing. By and large, the phenomenon of violent extremism is perceived as homegrown. And whereas large differences remain in individual countries’ approaches to tackling the challenges posed by violent extremism, it has nevertheless become increasingly clear that today’s security challenges – whether it is terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, disinformation, or other evolving cyber-enabled threats – are shared threats that require a transnational approach. Indeed, Europe as a whole faces new security issues and specific challenges for preventive work that (lone) actors and (returning) foreign terrorist fighters raise, while the internet and social media give extremist and terrorist groups and their sympathisers new opportunities for spreading their propaganda, mobilization, and communication. It is against this changed backdrop that this policy brief asks what lessons the EU can learn from best practices identified at the national level, and in the co0ordination efforts with the supranational institutions.
Policy brief summarising the EU and other stakeholder’s prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the region, Middle East
The EU-Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Preventive Violent Extremism (PvE) co-operation is wide-ranging, and has been since a formalized partnership between the EU and MENA countries was outlined in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. It has nevertheless received added attention following numerous terrorist attacks within the EU during the last decade; and European foreign fighters have been linked to the attacks in Paris in 2015; in Brussels, Berlin, and Nice in 2016; and in Manchester, London, and Barcelona in 2017.
Policy brief summarizing the EU and other stakeholders’ prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the Maghreb and the Sahel
What is the European Union (EU) doing to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) in north-western Africa, specifically in the Maghreb and Sahel region? Building upon the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (EU Council 2005), the EU Strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism has increasingly emphasized the ‘internal-external security nexus’ and the need to strengthen co-operation with key third countries in the fields of counterterrorism, anti-radicalization, prevention, and countering of violent extremism (EU Parliament 2015; EU Parliament and EU Council 2017). The fight against violent extremism has thus become one of the most prominent objectives in EU external action, especially as far as the (enlarged) neighbourhood is concerned (Durac 2017). Yet scientific inquiry into the EU’s role in this
Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism
Why does violent extremism not occur in enabling environments? Based on recent field work in the Sahel and the Maghreb region this is the main question we seek to understand in this working paper. To understand non-occurrence and thereby the foundations of social and individual resilience, we also need to understand the drivers of violent extremism and why they gain traction among some populations while others show much higher degrees of resilience. To achieve this, we will zoom in on cases in Mali, Niger, Tunisia and Morocco, showcasing different trajectories of occurrence and non-occurrence.
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
How do EU initiatives that are geared to help prevent and counter violent extremism in North Africa and the Sahel match the underlying drivers of radicalisation? This PREVEX Policy Brief offers a reading of EU strategies in the backlight of our findings, which stem from fieldwork that was conducted in cases of both occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremist escalation across North Africa and the Sahel. As scholarly literature lays emphasis on how phenomena such as violent extremism are highly context-dependent, it is crucial to understand regional and local dynamics of social change and intermediation. This brief therefore provides an overall assessment of EU P/CVE policies and projects in North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on key contextual policy issues: democratic governance, rule of law, education, gender, reintegration. It argues that EU’s emphasis on rule of law is particularly appropriate, while there is room for greater engagement in the fields of education and reintegration – provided that conflict-sensitive lenses are carefully applied. In the fields of democratic governance and gender, instead, a mismatch between general strategies and on-the-ground implementation can be observed. Targeted research in these critical areas of intervention and assistance is highly needed. Overall, our analysis invites to consider radicalisation processes not as social pathology but as ongoing social phenomena that take place in a space where several actors rival for material and ideational resources, and therefore require careful assessment and multi-scalar prioritisation, including at the regional and transnational level.