Morten Bøås

The limits of technocracy and local encounters: The European Union and peacebuilding

This article is the conclusion to a special issue that examines the European Union (EU), peacebuilding, and “the local.” It argues that technocracy—particularly EU technocracy—shapes the extent to which local actors can hope to achieve ownership of externally funded and directed peace support projects and programs. Although some actors within the EU have worked hard to push localization agendas, a number of technocracy linked factors come together to limit the extent to which the EU can truly connect with the local level in its peace support activities. While the EU and other international actors have invested heavily into capacity building in conflict-affected contexts, the EU’s own capacity has not necessarily been built to address the scalar problem of accessing the local in ways that are meaningful.

Working Paper: Comparing the EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali

This part of the overall report (Deliverable 7.1) on the EU’s crisis response in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali compares the findings of three comprehensive cases-studies. The analytical focus is on the output dimension of EU policy-making that is the output of decision-making of the policy-making machinery in Brussels. Thus, the analysis is confined to the choices and decisions made regarding the EU’s problem definitions, policy goals, strategies and instruments – both on a strategic and operational level; thus policy implementation or impact will be analysed as next steps in following project reports (D 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4).

Comparing the EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali

Working paper on implementation of EU crisis response in Mali

This paper offers a critical review of the EUTM and EUCAP in Mali, arguing that this is another example of international interventions that may be well-intended, but that end up producing very mixed results on the ground. One reason for this is the gaps between intentions and implementation and between implementation and local reception/perceptions. Whereas the first gap points to mismatches between EU policy intentions and what effect the implementation of these policies actually have (see for example Hill 1993), the latter gap reveals the inability of an international actor to both understand how key concepts such as ‘security sector reform’ and ‘border management’ are understood on the ground as well as translating its own policies and Brussels’ developed mandate into policies that makes sense for people on the ground (Cissé, Bøås, Kvamme and Dakouo 2017).

Working paper on implementation of EU crisis response in Afghanistan

Working paper on implementation of EU crisis response in Iraq

Implementation of the EU’s crisis response in Ukraine

The objective of this paper is to reflect on the received and perceived EU crisis response in Ukraine, paying specific attention to the security and humanitarian sectors, among the key areas for the EU since the beginning of the crisis/conflict. This research focus is in line with EUNPACK Task 2, aimed at analysing how the EU and its member states are implementing its crisis response on the ground throughout the conflict cycle. Three core assumptions underpin our research focus in this paper.

Working paper on implementation of EU crisis response in Libya

The EU and international actors in Kosovo: Competing institutional logics, constructive ambiguity and competing priorities

New war zones or evolving modes of insurgency warfare?

This chapter argues that new war zones are neither substantially new nor incomprehensible. It is only our approaches that all too often make us avoid seeing the obvious: people take up arms because they are angry, scared, poor, or short of other livelihood opportunities. On the one hand, regional ‘big men’ operate in a downward direction to capitalise on local grievances, largely for their own benefit. On the other hand, one can witness the evolution of local defence forces/militias moving upwards and becoming intertwined in larger networks and markets (and, in the process, producing new regional big men). A political anthropology of new war zones is therefore confronted by a field of constant flux and fragmentation, where the important dimension to keep track of is less the very agents of violence but the nodal points in these networks of governance and violence, and their ability to maintain networks across space and time.