Åsmund Weltzien
Kontaktinfo og filer
Sammendrag
Åsmund Weltzien er kommunikasjonssjef på NUPI. Han har hovedfag i sosialantropologi fra Universitetet i Oslo, og har tidligere jobbet som forsker og forskningsleder i Telenor R&D og som diplomat og saksbehandler i Utenriksdepartementet.
Weltzien jobber for å fremme NUPIs forskning til et bredt publikum og til brukerne av forskningen vår. Han er spesielt opptatt av å bidra til at NUPIs forskere skaper sosial og vitenskapelig impact, å forbedre vår digitale kommunikasjon gjennom utvikling og eksperimentering, og å bygge nettverk blant fagpersoner, brukere og interessenter der kunnskap og innsikt deles på tvers av institusjoner og sektorer.
I Telenor var Weltziens egen forskning fokusert på utviklingen av nye digitale teknologier og hvordan informasjon og påvirkning spres i sosiale nettverk. I Utenriksdepartementet har han jobbet med ulike felt som norsk klimapolitikk, sikkerhetspolitikk, og europapolitikk. Fra 2011 var Weltzien en del av UDs Refleksprosjekt, som skulle bidra til utvikling av utenrikspolitikken gjennom offentlig debatt om sentrale utenrikspolitiske temaer.
Weltzien har vært kommunikasjonssjef på NUPI siden 2013.
Ekspertise
Aktivitet
Filter
Tøm alle filtreHow The Joint Strike Fighter Seeks To Preserve Air Supremacy For Decades To Come
Since its inception in 2001, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has cleared several technical and political hurdles as it is nearing the end of its development stage, formally known as System Development and Demonstration (SDD), which is expected to be completed in the spring of 2018. The JSF is designed to be a game changer – with the combined air-to- air and air-to-surface capabilities – which means that it can both support ground troops and naval forces – when it comes to targeting enemy strategic targets during warfare. The JSF, also known as the F-35 Lightning II Program, can also operate in areas where the F-16 cannot. Furthermore, the JSF program has established comprehensive planning processes that seek to identify and analyze technological advances by adversaries such as North Korea, Russia, China and Iran as they seek to respectively close their military gaps with Washington.
Building Bridges for Success:Rethinking Peace Operations Training for Complex Environments
Witnessing the changes in armed conflict since the 1990s, several global political-level agendas have emerged, recognizing the growing human suffering from armed conflict and the long-term consequences on societies. These high-level agendas, such as Protection of Civilians (POC), Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Children in Armed Conflict (CAAC), address crucial issues that fall under a broader human security approach, and are to be addressed by peace operations. As such, they have at an increasing rate been included in strategic level doctrine and policy. The three global UN peace and security reviews published in 2015 stress the need for a shift to more people-centered, inclusive processes, establishing better context awareness, and investing in cooperation with external counterparts significantly. If peace operations are to remain relevant and effective in achieving international peace and security, this needs to be taken into account. This shift within peace operations requires that the preparation and training of peacekeepers follow suit in order to meet the challenges faced in increasingly complex environments. This policy brief therefore advocates for the adoption of an integrated approach to peace operations training, putting greater emphasis on comprehensive, people-centered approaches and contextual analysis.
Public opinion in Putin’s Russia. The public sphere, opinion climate and ‘authoritarian bias’
Russian public opinion polls regularly report approval ratings of 84% to 86% for President Vladimir Putin – but can we trust those figures? This question has come to the fore after the events of 2014. Although Putin’s decision to annex Crimea, with the subsequent broad confrontation with the West, was seen by many as extremely damaging for the country’s long-term development, Putin’s approval ratings have shown almost unquestioning support for his policies. Does this support reveal deep-rooted anti-Westernism in Russian society, or an imperialistic mood? Or is it the result of intense propaganda campaigns and polling fabrications?
Iceland’s Relations with its Regional Powers: Alignment with the EU-US sanctions on Russia
The paper examines the Icelandic government’s consideration to withdraw its support for the sanctions against Russia over Ukraine in 2015. The consideration came as a surprise to many since Iceland in the past has habitually aligned itself closely with the United States and the European Union in such matters. The Icelandic fishing industry lobbied hard for the sanctions to be lifted to avoid Russian counter-sanctions on Iceland. After considerable internal debate, the government decided to uphold the sanctions, but settled on a policy of not taking part in EU´s foreign policy declarations about the sanctions. This move is interesting given Iceland’s traditional positioning between two gravitational centres in world politics: the EU and the US. The paper discusses what this case tells us about Icelandic policymakers’ room for maneuvering in the formulation and enactment of its foreign policy, and about Iceland’s foreign policy bonds to the US and the EU.
Iceland’s Relations with its Regional Powers: Alignment with the EU-US sanctions
The paper examines the Icelandic government’s consideration to withdraw its support for the sanctions against Russia over Ukraine in 2015. The consideration came as a surprise to many since Iceland in the past has habitually aligned itself closely with the United States and the European Union in such matters. The Icelandic fishing industry lobbied hard for the sanctions to be lifted to avoid Russian counter-sanctions on Iceland. After considerable internal debate, the government decided to uphold the sanctions, but settled on a policy of not taking part in EU´s foreign policy declarations about the sanctions. This move is interesting given Iceland’s traditional positioning between two gravitational centres in world politics: the EU and the US. The paper discusses what this case tells us about Icelandic policymakers’ room for maneuvering in the formulation and enactment of its foreign policy, and about Iceland’s foreign policy bonds to the US and the EU.
New Momentum for European Defence Cooperation
For better or for worse, the politics of Brexit, in combination with the implementation of the new EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, have generated renewed momentum for European defence cooperation. EU member states have tabled a range of proposals. Some consolidation will be necessary, especially if effective defence integration is the aim – and that is the way to overcome current fragmentation. National forces can cooperate and be made interoperable with other forces in various formats simultaneously, but they can be integrated only once. Two levels of defence cooperation and integration must be addressed. At the level of the EU as such, and using EU incentives such as Commission funding for R&T, largescale projects for the development and acquisition of strategic enablers can be mounted, with the European Defence Agency acting as manager. At the level of state clusters, large deployable multinational formations can be created (such as army corps and air wings), with fully integrated maintenance, logistics and other structures in support of the national manoeuvre units that each participant can contribute. By pooling all-too-limited national military sovereignty in this way, defence cooperation and integration can revive sovereignty, understood as the capacity for action, at a higher level.