European Actorness in a Shifting Geopolitical Order. European Strategic Autonomy Through Differentiated Integration
This is an open access book. Over the past decade, the global geopolitical context has changed significantly, with a geopolitical power shift and a more assertive Russia and China. With the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, European security has been put on high alert. The implications of the Russian military invasion are many and difficult to grasp in full. But the need for greater European strategic autonomy appears increasingly evident. But how can this be achieved in the short run? The answer to this question is often that it is impossible and that this can only be achieved in the long run. The aim of this book is to present a different perspective. It aims at showing that it should be possible to make the most out of the current European system if we adjust our understanding of how it works. The book argues that strategic autonomy may be reached—also in the short run—if differentiated integration is seen as an asset rather than a challenge. While the EU remains the core in such a system (together with NATO in the military domain), there is a multitude of other (bilateral and minilateral) regional and sub-regional integration processes that need to be taken into account to get the full idea of how European strategic autonomy can be achieved. This book starts by presenting a theoretical framework for how to study European actorness beyond the EU, then this framework will be applied both to the development towards the EU as a foreign policy actor through the mechanisms of enlargement.
Introduction. Focus: War and Research
Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24 came as a surprise to many observers. This triggered several debates in the media, where analysts and academics criticized each other for not having seen what was emerging; for showing too much understanding for the Putin regime positions; and to let their political attitudes colour their analyses. In this Fokus column we will try to elevate these discussions to an academic level. Not to allocate blame, but to learn professional lessons. In this introductory text I will, inter alia, point to the need for more analytical breadth, to focus on both language and materiality, and to be extra aware of your own attitudes when one moves into a normative political debate.
How can the EU promote democracy in Eastern Europe and Western Balkans in a time of war?
Opportunities Matter: The Evolution of Far-Right Protest in Georgia
What role do political opportunities play in far-right mobilisation? The case of Georgia indicates that modernisation in itself may be insufficient to trigger a far-right backlash. A systematised database of 154 far-right protest events in Georgia in the period 2003–2020 shows that the movement remained dormant for over two decades after post-Soviet independence and a decade after the 2003 Rose Revolution. After 2012, however, less severe repression of protest, divides within the political elite, and the sympathetic attitudes of mainstream political and societal actors enabled far-right mobilisation and violence. Thus, however deep-rooted anti-modernisation, a backlash may not erupt until mobilisation opportunities become available.
Noen har hevdet at mitt moralske kompass er gått i stykker
Jeg forsøker å skjønne hvorfor Kreml handler som det gjør. Er det virkelig det samme som å støtte disse handlingene?
Tale ved utdeling av Fritt Ords Pris 2023
Torsdag 11. mai 2023 fikk NUPI-forsker Julie Wilhelmsen Fritt Ords Pris 2023 for å ha bidratt med nyanserende faglig kunnskap i et opphetet offentlig ordskifte, før og etter Russlands fullskala-invasjon av Ukraina. Hun har gjennom dette vist betydningen av ytringsmot og utøvd akademisk ytringsfrihet i praksis, sa styreleder Grete Brochmann.
Myths in the Russian Collective Memory: The “Golden Era” of Pre-Revolutionary Russia and the “Disaster of 1917”
This paper examines shared ideas, values and interpretations of the past in the “collective memory” of the 1917 October Revolution. Employing a qualitative approach to examine collective memory “from below,” two age cohorts were interviewed in three Russian cities from a variety of social groups in 2014–2015. What was revealed was the existence of a strong positive myth about the pre-revolutionary era of 1900–1914, as well as positive references to the current Putin era. Both eras were “positive” in that Russia was/is a “normal European power,” “on the rise economically” and “respected by the other powers.” In terms of the definitive national trauma, an overwhelming majority viewed the 1917 October Revolution as a break or rupture in Russian history that caused appalling destruction. This view of 1917 as catastrophic leads to certain key “lessons”: that revolutionary change is inherently destructive and wasteful and that external forces had (and have) a vested interest in weakening Russia from without whenever she is at her most vulnerable. Overall, at the heart of myths over 1917 we find a central occupation with the threat of disintegration and a yearning for stability and normality, highlighting how collective memory interacts with political values and social identity.