Climate change and peacebuilding: sub-themes of an emerging research agenda
Climate change is having profound effects on global security and peacebuilding efforts. While existing research has mainly focused on the link between climate change and conflict, it has largely overlooked the complex interplay between climate change, conflict-affected states and peacebuilding. Climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities in conflict-affected societies by adding stress to livelihoods and negatively impacting food, water and energy security. This is particularly concerning as climate change is often felt most acutely in settings where public institutions are already failing to meet the population's needs. Consequently, climate change can contribute to exacerbating grievances and hinder the ability to maintain, reinforce and build peace. Although practitioners in the peacebuilding field are beginning to respond to the effects of climate change, academic research has not adequately addressed the question of how climate change affects peacebuilding and how peacebuilding strategies can respond effectively. To fill this gap, a multidisciplinary approach drawing from climate security, environmental peacebuilding, environmental studies, and peace and conflict studies is needed in order to develop a research agenda that encompasses the intersections of climate change and peacebuilding. By recognizing the importance of climate change in peacebuilding efforts, this research agenda aims to provide critical insights and guide future studies.
The Impact of the Ukraine Conflict on Norwegian Energy Dynamics
Building peace through a sustainable environment
Why should we connect the environment to issues of peace and conflict? And in a world of dramatically increased geopolitical tensions, is it possi...
The Political Economy of Global Climate Action: Where Does the West Go Next After COP28?
This report offers a critical, candid examination of the landscape of global climate action. Current efforts are lacking even amid consecutive UN climate conferences that build upon the successes of the 2015 Paris Agreement. It argues that the incremental progress achieved thus far is insufficient to address the escalating climate crisis. Challenges of domestic political economy and lacking global governance are substantively at fault. We identify several related barriers to effective climate action, including mismatched time horizons, shared public and private responsibility, the complexity of global challenges, and problems of global collective action and burden distribution. The report explores the distributional costs of climate policies, emphasizing the impacts of populism on climate action (and vice versa), and the need for a fair transition. Global governance challenges are attributable to the limits of existing multilateral institutions and the persistently difficult geopolitical and macroeconomic outlook. We conclude by offering a set of specific policy recommendations, spanning corporate taxation, public investment, long-term commitment mechanisms, the climate action-energy security interface, corporate responsibility, and the imperative of a just, equitable, and participatory transition. The proposed strategies can contribute to achieving time-consistent, decisive and systemic action that tackles the urgent climate crisis, building on political incentives and disincentives. This systematic lens – focused on political economy and global governance constraints - needs to be applied to all climate action policies to get ahead of the curve in the global and domestic political environment in which we find ourselves.
The failure to decarbonize the global energy education system: Carbon lock-in and stranded skill sets
The energy transition involves the transformation of professions and labour markets, which in turn depend on the availability of a workforce with the right education and competence. This study assesses how quickly global higher education is transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy in terms of educational content. The article is based on a review of 18,400 universities and the creation of a dataset of 6,142 universities that provide energy-specific education in 196 countries. The study compares the prevalence of educational programmes oriented towards fossil fuels and renewable energy. The findings show that the rapid adoption of renewable energy worldwide is not matched by changes in higher education, since universities continue to prioritise coal and petroleum studies. In 2019, 546 universities had faculties and/or degrees dedicated to fossil fuels whereas only 247 universities had faculties and/or degrees in renewable energy. As many as 68% of the world’s energy-focused educational degrees were oriented towards fossil fuels, and only 32% focused on renewable energy. This means that universities are failing to meet the growing demand for a clean energy workforce. At the current rate of change, energy-focused university degrees would be 100% dedicated to renewable energy only by the year 2107. Since a career may last 30-40 years, this creates a risk of long-term carbon lock-in and stranded skill sets through (mis)education. The results also indicate that developing countries lag behind developed ones in this area, even though the need for professionals trained in renewable energy is greater in developing countries. Along with lack of capital, underdeveloped regulatory frameworks for renewable energy, and entrenched fossil-fuel business interests, the mismatch between energy education and the needs of the renewable energy industry may hold back the energy transition in many developing countries.
Russian media downplays Arctic freeze
Climate and Russia - Does the world need nuclear power?
The rising global temperature must be restricted to well below a two-degree increase. It’s crucial to make electricity production carbon neutral as quickly as possible. Is nuclear power the new game changer for achieving this ambitious goal? In this documentary from DW, NUPI Research Professor Kacper Szulecki is interviewed about nuclear energy.
Norway’s Climate Policy: Don’t Think of the Elephant!
All Norwegian governments in the twenty-first century, left and right, have made climate action an important element of their diplomacy and domestic policy, while recently some political parties have even made climate neutrality and decarbonisation the core of their electoral campaign messages. Norway has played the role of an advocate for international climate action, for instance of rainforest protection. Moreover, government incentives such as tax levies have been instrumental in the spectacular expansion of electric vehicles. However, despite the self-promoted image of a climate policy champion abroad, Norway’s efforts to cut domestic greenhouse gas emissions have been modest since signing the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Norway is exporting oil and gas that cause massive emissions, but the significance of the fossil fuel sector for the country makes it difficult to find alternatives and seriously consider rapid phase out. That said, a debate on the future of the oil and gas sector is ongoing. Whilst Norway’s point of departure in an imminent transition is rather favourable, the lack of progress is due to insufficient political leadership and vision. Norwegian decision makers need to be bold in their choice of whether the transition’s main goal should be managing decline in the oil and gas sector or managing climate-related economic risks. Meanwhile, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the EU’s decision for a drastic reduction in dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the lifetime of Norway’s oil and gas production could well be extended by a decade or more. It is not unreasonable to expect that the last molecule of fossil methane burned in Europe before it switches to hydrogen and biogas—is going to come from Norway.
Handbook on European Union Climate Change Policy and Politics
Through detailed and wide-ranging analysis, the Handbook on European Union Climate Change Policy and Politics provides a critical assessment of current and emerging challenges facing the EU in committing to and delivering increasingly ambitious climate policy objectives. Highlighting the importance of topics such as finance and investment, litigation, ‘hard to abate’ sectors and negative emissions, it offers an up-to-date exploration of the complexities of climate politics and policy making.
Semi-peripheries in the world-system? The Visegrad group countries in the geopolitical order of energy and raw materials after the war in Ukraine
What are the geopolitical risk implications related to the war in Ukraine for the raw material and energy policies of countries highly dependent on Russia? This paper looks at the Visegrad Group (V4) states – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – as some of the most impacted countries and assesses their position in the emerging new geopolitical and energy order. V4 countries display a semi-peripheral position in the world-system, as defined by Immanuel Wallerstein. On the geopolitical level, they were balancing between dependence on Russia in energy and raw materials (a result of Cold War legacies) and economic integration with Western countries. However, after the Cold War, dependence on raw materials from the East went hand in hand with dependence on technology and investment from the West, as the V4 region saw the emergence of ‘dependent capitalism.’ The war in Ukraine may reshuffle these dependencies by changing the meaning of the ‘centre,’ for which such actors as the United States, Western Europe or China will strive after Russia's importance has weakened in the V4 countries. It may also create an opportunity to redefine the V4's semi-peripheral status. Drawing on an analysis of recent documents and governmental strategies that emerged in the aftermath of Russia's invasion in 2022, we offer a structured comparative analysis of the way V4 states responded to the crisis along four dimensions (positioning in the international political economy of energy and technology, role of the state, visions of energy futures, geopolitical and geoeconomic course). In the conclusions, we outline the main changes in the import of raw materials, fuels and technologies in individual V4 countries and consider the possible position of the region in the future energy geopolitical order.