NUPI’s Russia conference 2024: Wartime Russia – weak or strong?
Join us on 22 October for the annual Russia conference.
Even as war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine
Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent. It is time for NATO to get smarter about its Ukraine strategy, including the messaging that articulates that strategy. At the moment, NATO and its constituent members are attempting to walk the line between reassuring Ukraine of NATO countries’ commitments to its security and seeking to avoid escalation into a nuclear confrontation with Russia. Avoiding such escalation is a legitimate concern, but it is not enough to constitute a strategy. What NATO should do instead is steadily build defense and deterrence against Russian aggression in Ukraine by integrating it into its structures step by step. This will mean some degree of Ukrainian integration with NATO, even while Russia’s invasion is ongoing, writes Karsten Friis in this op-ed.
The Evolution of US Military Presence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Russia, and Managing Escalation
Concurrent with increasing Russian revanchism and aggression from 2014, the US approach to military presence on NATO’s Eastern flank has evolved. Overall, the development could be perceived as change in rationale from reassurance of allies to deterrence of Russia by punishment and, in recent years, deterrence by denial. This has resulted in altered structures for presence, resulting in changes of dispositions on the ground that has contributed to increasing the credibility of NATO’s deterrence doctrine. The rhetorical offensiveness of U.S. strategic communication has also become more powerful and exercise activity scaled up. This indicates a change in US perception of escalating activity. There is persistent bipartisan agreement on the continuation of US deep-engagement in Europe, with similar perceptions in the US military-leadership. This underpins the theory of an “institutionalized practice” of military presence and Great Power Persistence. The enhanced credibility of US-NATO deterrence on the Eastern flank lowers the likelihood of fait accompli-scenarios. This has security implications for countries located elsewhere that Russia may wish to challenge, both conventionally and through Hybrid means.
Militærmaktens plass etter Ukraina
(This op-ed is in Norwegian only): Et nytt Europa som formes etter Ukrainas seier, krever politisk mot og vilje hos europeiske ledere – samt betydelig militærmakt, skriver Karsten Friis.
The South Caucasus after 2022: Domestic developments and geopolitical challenges
Armenia now appears to be turning away from Russia and towards the EU and the USA, while Georgia seems to be heading in the opposite direction and and drawing closer to countries such as China, Turkey and Iran. How are shifts in the South Caucasus redefining the region's future?
Everyday nationalism amidst Russia’s war against
On 12 June Russia celebrated its national day, “Russia day”. This day is marked with concerts and celebrations in all the regions in the Russian F...
Everyday nationalism amidst Russia’s war against Ukraine
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Caught in the liberal pragmatic trap? How political parties viewed energy dependence on Russia in three European countries 2012–2022
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and its subsequent decision to stop its gas export to Europe, Europe’s energy dependence on Russia was put on full display. In this paper, we map energy relations with Russia in three European countries that in the period of analysis between 2012 and 2022 were among the most important energy customers of Russia: Poland, Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, we examine how this issue has been addressed – if at all – in party programs in elections in the same period. Examining party programs, we argue, brings new insights and a better understanding of how energy policies and relations with Russia were viewed in the three countries – and in the EU in general in that period. The paper identifies two ideal types – the ‘liberal pragmatists’, who treated strong energy interdependence as a possible conflict-mitigating measure, and the ‘hard core realists’, who viewed strong energy dependence on Russia as a possible source of strategic threat. The paper is written as part of the research project "Russian Policies of Influence in the Populist-Pragmatic Nexus" (PRORUSS), funded by the Research Council of Norway (RCN).