A Postliberal Global Order? Challenge(r)s to the Liberal West
In a new report, NUPI’s senior researcher Minda Holm looks closer at which international order it is that is under pressure. What is the issue with seeing the world through the lens of a post-1945 Liberal International or Rules-Based Order? What do actors like Russia and China have in common with the populist radical right in their perspectives on global politics? And what does Donald Trump’s second term entail for the liberal West?
Topos of threat and metapolitics in Russia’s securitisation of NATO post-Crimea
This article makes a twofold contribution on the relationship between self/other securitisation, ambiguous threat constructions, and anxiety at the intersection of Securitisation Theory (ST) and Ontological Security Studies (OSS). First, we develop the concept topos of threat (TT) as a potent linguistic anchor in securitisation processes. TTs depict an entire self/other threat situation that warrants escape, serving identity needs while staying flexible and ambiguous. However, their frequent rhetorical deployment can blur the threat construction and increase anxiety: this challenges the classical scholarly assumption that antagonism necessarily alleviates anxiety. Second, we theorise metapolitics as an anxiety mediation strategy. Metapolitics is a mode of interpretation – a relentless analysis of surface clues to expose a deceptive, powerful adversary – which in the final event fails to alleviate anxiety. The dual practice of nurturing topoi of threat and metapolitics drives conflict because it sets in motion a vicious securitisation spiral that entrenches rigid patterns of self/other representation and fosters a bias of anticipating hostility. We employ abductive theorising: working with established theory alongside empirical discovery through a discourse analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on NATO and the use of the TT ‘colour revolution’ since the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014.
Trump II: A new trajectory in Russia relations for NATO Nordic states
• The incoming Trump administration will replace the policy of “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes” with “making a deal with Russia”. This might entail de-escalation with Russia as well as economic and security burden-sharing with Europe. Norway and its now NATO neighbours Sweden and Finland have a window of opportunity to develop new policy for the second Trump term. • An adjusted approach to relations with Russia in the North can be devised that draws on Norwegian traditions in its relations with Russia. This approach will differ from the UK, Poland and the Baltic States but can represent a fruitful model of NATO membership for the Nordic states. • Despite a significant decline in military tension in the North since 2022, the risk of a future security competition with Russia and Nordic NATO members should not be downplayed. Presuming Russia is a status quo power in the North, NATO should have a clear and predictable posture in the North that combines deterrence and reassurance. • Russia should not be treated as a monolithic entity; there are moderates that would welcome diplomacy with Nordic NATO neighbours. Backchannel contacts between Russia and the Nordic NATO states can develop the outlines of an adjusted security posture for the North that could be received favourably by the new Trump Administration as it attempts to open negotiations to end the war in Ukraine
Water and Conflict in Central Asia
This project examines the escalating water scarcity crisis in Central Asia, focusing on key hotspots like the Qosh Tepa Canal, to analyze how climate change, population growth, and unilateral water st...
Franske tilstander
Politisk drama har preget Frankrike i mange måneder, og fransk politikk er mer usikker enn vi har sett på mange tiår. Det kan kaste Europa ut i en...
Differentiating Hybrid Threats against the High North and Baltic Sea regions
Russia’s grey-zone threats and actions are a major concern for bordering countries who are on the receiving end of such actions, both physical and cyber. This policy brief examines how such hybrid threats affect countries in the High North and Baltic Sea regions and evaluates the challenges related to response and countermeasures. NATO's policy is that the member nations are responsible for building resilience and responding to hybrid threats or attacks. To avoid invalid interpretations or paralysis in assessment and response to such complex and diverse threats, they should be differentiated and dealt with separately rather than boxed into a wide cognitive basket. This Policy Brief is part of the project ‘Norway as an in-between for Russia: Ambivalent space, hybrid measures’ financed by the Norwegian MoD.
The morphology of Putinism: the arrangement of political concepts into a coherent ideology
Scholarly analysis has been divided as to whether Putinism is a coherent ideology. With the decision to invade Ukraine, this question requires reexamination. This article interprets the evolution of Putinism in morphological terms, tracing how political concepts developed into a distinctive ‘thin’ ideology. After interpreting the original formation of Putinism (2000–2012), I unpack how interlinked processes of securitization and culturization reshaped the arrangement of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. This was preceded by discursive closure between the Kremlin and its ideological antagonists over critical junctures in 2012 and 2014. An emphasis on the reactive, events-driven dynamic of Putinism reveals how it functions as an immanent morale that reinforces preexisting power networks and strives to win the loyalty of the population. Preserving culture and security has become synonymous with maintaining the very existence of the Russian Federation. With the launch of the ‘Special Military Operation’ in February 2022, this ideology was not immediately transformed but rather deployed on a new and more dramatic level. The ideological reconfiguration examined in this article must be understood as a crucial precursor to the decision to escalate the war in Ukraine, which ris reshaping Russia’s political trajectory in dramatic and unpredictable ways.
Pragmatism and protest: Russia’s communist party through Covid-19 and beyond
The Covid-19 epidemic came at a sensitive time for Russia’s leadership, which was attempting a political reset and structural reforms, including the removal of President Putin’s presidential term limits. This article examines how issues related to the pandemic provided new opportunities for the systemic opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who emerged as the main beneficiaries after capitalising on opportunities created by the epidemic. The underappreciated role of systemic opposition parties in electoral authoritarian systems, which balance “voice” and “loyalty” to benefit both themselves and the regime, is examined in the context of the Covid-19 crisis.
Introduction to the Special Issue on Under Communism’s Shadow The Memory of the Violent Past in Present-Day Russia
Perhaps no topic could be more crucial to the concept of “post-communism” than how the Soviet past is commemorated, challenged, or forgotten. The study of historical memory is often correctly tied to identity politics and nation-building. While the usable past framework is broadly applicable to all modern states, in the Russian case a degree of alarmism and negativity surrounds interpretations of how the country has managed its communist past, particularly its violent parts. A significant element to this is a teleological view of progress and the salience of the transition paradigm. In memory studies, this is manifested in the dominance of the cosmopolitan memory mode as the correct way the violent past should be commemorated. The introduction reviews the existing literature on Russia’s memory politics and highlights three limitations: (1) overemphasis on the political center and the failure to capture the diversity of regions, (2) too much focus on the supply side of memory politics, and (3) one-sided presentations of the role the Great Patriotic War plays in Russian memory politics. The introduction reviews how the special issue contributions address these limitations in the literature and shows how, taken together, they offer ideas for new research on memory studies. A case is made for how this new research agenda can better understand memory processes and how they relate to broader ideological, cultural, social, and political change in Russia.
NUPI’s Russia Conference 2024