Publications
From the incoming editors: A leading International Relations journal with a Nordic touch
The new editors of Cooperation and Conflict introduce themselves and their aims for the journal going forward.
Vi forstår ikke verden ved å dele den inn i Vesten mot resten
This op-ed is in Norwegian.
Nordic countries and knowledge collaboration with authoritarian non-allied states: conditional openness with stronger demands for protection
The conditions surrounding international knowledge production and collaboration are changing. What has long remained a field characterized by overtly liberal and open practices is now subject to more scrutiny with regards to protecting national security and academic freedom. Developments concerning China especially, but also Russia, and other authoritarian states with knowledge-related ambitions have alerted authorities in many liberal, democratic states. This is the case in the Nordic region, too. In this focus edition, we study why and how stricter conditions for international knowledge collaboration are emerging in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. We are especially interested in problematizing and explaining what happens when stronger security concerns and calls for protection meet liberal norms, including academic freedom.
Norway’s handling of knowledge relations with states outside its security cooperation
Norwegian authorities have for several years actively promoted internationalization of the knowledge sector. This includes collaboration with authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, which are not part of Norway’s security cooperation. However, in the last few years, we have seen a clear turn towards questions of national security and the status of liberal norms garnering more attention, also with consideration to knowledge relations. We observe this in sharper warnings from the security services, revised legislation and regulations and new guidelines for knowledge collaboration with countries such as China and Russia. In this article we study these changes and discuss their possible implications. Empirically, we build on survey and interview data, and we examine policy documents and media reports on relevant incidents. In terms of theory, we draw on explanations grounded in the geopolitics and securitization literature. We argue that measures that are introduced to protect national security and liberal norms may also limit the operational space for independent research and thus change the parameters for academic freedom, especially in relation to activities with connection to actors from non-allied states. To avoid unnecessarily restrictive conditions, researchers and their institutions should actively demonstrate and communicate how they work to ensure responsibility in their knowledge relations. This is especially important in situations where ethical and security-related challenges are obvious.
Chips in the crosshairs
- The increasing use of economic sanctions coupled with the globalization of production of key goods and services has increased the security concerns around economic dependencies. - For the global manufacturing of semiconductors (chips), their increasing criticality in modern economies have made them a focal point in tensions between Washington and Beijing. - Spillovers from the Sino-US tensions on Dutch export policies highlight the challenges states face in navigating this new terrain. - Mapping economic networks to identify those prone to weaponization will be a key exercise for states preparing for greater political turmoil at the international level.
Even as war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine
Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent. It is time for NATO to get smarter about its Ukraine strategy, including the messaging that articulates that strategy. At the moment, NATO and its constituent members are attempting to walk the line between reassuring Ukraine of NATO countries’ commitments to its security and seeking to avoid escalation into a nuclear confrontation with Russia. Avoiding such escalation is a legitimate concern, but it is not enough to constitute a strategy. What NATO should do instead is steadily build defense and deterrence against Russian aggression in Ukraine by integrating it into its structures step by step. This will mean some degree of Ukrainian integration with NATO, even while Russia’s invasion is ongoing, writes Karsten Friis in this op-ed.
Heimevernet og forsvaret av Norge: Skjerpet trusselbilde, uforløst potensial
I forsvaret av Norge er Heimevernet (HV) en vital del av grunnmuren. Styrken er Forsvarets største, geografisk mest spredte, og har samtidig ansvaret for det bredeste spekteret av oppgaver – i fred, krise og væpnet konflikt. HV leverer mye effekt – og har et uutnyttet potensial til å levere enda mer – for en relativt sett billig penge. Likevel har styrkens andel av Forsvarssektorens samlede driftsbudsjett falt, fra 3,8 % i 2015, til 3,1 % i budsjettet for 2024 – en mulig indikasjon på at styrken ikke er høyt prioritert når det norske forsvarsbudsjettet økes. Dette forskningsnotatet gir en kort beskrivelse HVs ansvar og oppgaver, og peker på utviklingstrekk som vil kunne påvirke disse i nær fremtid. Notatet illustrerer gapet mellom oppgavene, de vedtatte ambisjonene om videreutvikling, og ressursene som blir stilt til rådighet. I forlengelsen av dette svekkes hele samfunnets motstandsdyktighet i en tid hvor usikkerheten er større enn på lenge. Rapporten peker på fire konkrete tiltak som ved hjelp av en relativt moderat budsjettøkning vil kunne utnytte det latente utviklingspotensialet i HV-strukturen og gi betydelig og umiddelbar effekt på Forsvarets samlede evne til å levere beredskap og sikkerhet overalt, alltid – i fred, krise og i krig.
The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges
With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Nordics will be united for the first time in a military alliance encompassing not only northern Europe but also the broader transatlantic region. It will eventually fortify northern European security, but several obstacles must be overcome first. NATO has done a formidable job since 2014 in updating its defence plans, cumulating in the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans approved in Vilnius 2023. Now Finland and Sweden need to be incorporated into these plans. A more challenging task is to implement NATO's New Force Model which is tremendously ambitious. Finland and Sweden's contributions will be important, but new investments must be made. NATO's Command Structure is yet to be fully reformed and fitted to the DDA. Joint Force Command Norfolk must urgently be staffed, without undue politicization in NATO. Nordic defence buildup can draw on regional cooperation in particular in five areas: in strengthening the area's command design through functional double-hatted headquarters; developing close air power cooperation through e.g. a Combined Joint Air Operations Centre; strengthening total defence cooperation across borders and expanding logistical infrastructure; establishing joint intelligence task forces; and joint training and exercises. The contributions of the United States and United Kingdom are indispensable when it comes to upholding the alliance's guarantee in northern Europe. The recent signing of Defense Cooperation Agreements between the US and the Nordics reinforces this—together with an increased presence of air and naval assets in the region. The same applies to the UK and the Joint Expeditionary Force which now has shifted its focus towards northern Europe. This engagement is a crucial addition to Nordic and NATO plans and activities in a period when growth in Nordic defence structures is occurring at a relatively slow pace. Only after the weaknesses and hurdles are addressed will the deterrence and defence of the region attain a fully credible level.
Public–Private Development Cooperation: Interface and Conflicting Logics in the Formation of a Strategic Partnership
Public–private development partnership constitutes the core of a deepening normative agenda that places private actors as active development agents and as means through which other development objectives are pursued in partnership with publicly funded aid actors. This normative agenda may challenge international development. This article goes beyond the official policy level to explore the formation of public– private development cooperation in practice, not just on paper. It zooms into the partnership between a Norwegian NGO and a multinational company and their joint project to renovate an old vocational college in Ethiopia to serve the private actor’s need for qualified workers. The article shows how a publicly funded development project becomes a proxy for private interests, but argues that the diversion of public aid is not due to bad intentions or conflicting interests. Rather, it is the result of interface situations created by the public–private partnership agenda and its intentional merger of actors with distinct institutional logics, accountabilities and rationales. The article demonstrates how actors put together as part of the public–private partnership agenda end up undermining the agenda itself because of the interface situations created in the nexus of public and private actors.