Publications
Militarization of Outer Space: Character and Background - Effects and Limitations?
For several decades now, the militarization of outer space has from time to time been presented and discussed as a new, and increasingly important feature of military development. Sometimes it has been the subject of more scrutinizing attention, and then often also warned against. The attention, and especially the warnings, increased, among other things, in the wake of President Ronald Reagan's initiative in 1983 about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), often called “Star Wars” in news media coverage. Especially after the turn of the millennium, the militarization of outer space – space – has again been highlighted as a development trend that could come to characterize the future military landscape more strongly than before, especially at the level of great powers. And once again, warnings against this have often been issued. However, even though examples of such militarization are often mentioned in discussions and warnings about the militarization of outer space, the concept itself remains somewhat unclear: What does militarization here encompass, and what falls outside? The ambiguity has less to do with outer space itself, but rather lies in the use of the word militarization itself. Also used in other areas, this is a word that can easily contribute to ambiguity. It is usually used to indicate that something becomes subject to military use or interference and thereby exploited for military purposes. But it is not always easy to see clear boundaries for what can reasonably be called militarization in this respect. For example, is a civil airport with a military presence and activity there to be considered militarized? Or to put the question of reasonableness in this respect even more sharply: can military use, possibly extensive military use, for military purposes of a road network for civilian travel be claimed to constitute a militarization of this?
Utenrikspolitikkens mål er å gjøre innenrikspolitikken mulig
This policy brief is in Norwegian only.
The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges
With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Nordics will be united for the first time in a military alliance encompassing not only northern Europe but also the broader transatlantic region. It will eventually fortify northern European security, but several obstacles must be overcome first. NATO has done a formidable job since 2014 in updating its defence plans, cumulating in the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans approved in Vilnius 2023. Now Finland and Sweden need to be incorporated into these plans. A more challenging task is to implement NATO's New Force Model which is tremendously ambitious. Finland and Sweden's contributions will be important, but new investments must be made. NATO's Command Structure is yet to be fully reformed and fitted to the DDA. Joint Force Command Norfolk must urgently be staffed, without undue politicization in NATO. Nordic defence buildup can draw on regional cooperation in particular in five areas: in strengthening the area's command design through functional double-hatted headquarters; developing close air power cooperation through e.g. a Combined Joint Air Operations Centre; strengthening total defence cooperation across borders and expanding logistical infrastructure; establishing joint intelligence task forces; and joint training and exercises. The contributions of the United States and United Kingdom are indispensable when it comes to upholding the alliance's guarantee in northern Europe. The recent signing of Defense Cooperation Agreements between the US and the Nordics reinforces this—together with an increased presence of air and naval assets in the region. The same applies to the UK and the Joint Expeditionary Force which now has shifted its focus towards northern Europe. This engagement is a crucial addition to Nordic and NATO plans and activities in a period when growth in Nordic defence structures is occurring at a relatively slow pace. Only after the weaknesses and hurdles are addressed will the deterrence and defence of the region attain a fully credible level.
Is liberal internationalism worth saving? Ad hoc coalitions and their consequences for international security
Slow responses and blocked decision-making of international organizations provide opportunities for ad hoc coalitions to fill functional and political gaps. Compared to UN peace operations, ad hoc coalitions avoid gridlock and high transaction costs, they are fast to set up, can be task and time specific, flexible and easily dissolved. However, they also have much lighter human rights and financial accountability frameworks, a patchy record of longer-term impact and can contribute to a more fragmented response to armed conflicts and threats to international peace and security.
The EU’s international cyber and digital engagements
Digital transformation is a key priority for the European Union. It drives economic growth and enables societal development. However, the EU’s leadership in digital matters and its capacity to deliver are not universally recognised. There is skepticism about the EU’s leadership and its vision for a human-centric digital future - one that places human rights and the rule of law at the center of technological innovation and digital transformation. Simultaneously, the EU’s global influence is limited by its own ability to deliver certain critical capabilities in the digital and cyber domains. While expectations for the EU’s role have grown, cyber and digital policies are governed primarily by an intergovernmental method. This policy brief looks at how the EU frames and implements its international cyber and digital engagements with third countries. What drives the cooperation and and what are the specific tools and mechanisms deployed by the EU? The policy brief also considers implications for Norway.
Friendship in International Politics
In the international political discourse of the early 21st century, claims of friendship and “special ties” between states and their leaders are commonplace. Frequently reported by international media, such claims are often used as entry points for scholars and pundits seeking to evaluate the contents, relative strength, and present-day conditions of a given state-to-state relationship. Advancing the claim that friendships not only exist but also matter in and to the international political domain, international relations scholars began in the mid-2000s to trace and explore friendship—as a concept and practice—across time, societies, cultural contexts, and scientific disciplines. As part of the research agenda on friendship in international politics, scholars have explored why, how, and under what conditions friendships between states emerge, evolve, subsist, and dissolve; how amicable structures are typically organized; how they manifest themselves on a day-to-day basis; and what short- and long-term implications they may have for international political processes, dynamics, outcomes, and orders.
Annex to the report 'Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks'
This annex is connected to the NUPI Report 'Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks' found here: https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/norway-s-strategic-dependencies-in-global-supply-chain-networks
Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks
Economic interdependence and global supply chains are being investigated anew. For a long time, a belief in the ability of growing economic ties to foster cooperation, dampen conflict, and enhance prosperity was predominant in academic and political thinking alike. However, these assumptions have recently proven to be half-truths at best. Rather than dampen conflict, the asymmetries of global supply chains have turned them into coercive tools for the powerful to wield against the powerless. Through sanctions and export controls, states controlling vital chokepoints in global economic networks can cause harm in targeted states, and through controlling the nodes of information highways, intelligence agencies can gain access to sensitive information by leveraging the key position of their domestic companies. For states with small, open economies, this development poses a thorny problem: the toolbox for realigning global supply chains is limited, but reliance on supply chains beyond national control is extensive. The problem is not limited to being in a position of dependence, however. For smaller states, being in control over global assets, or being a key provider of a product or resource others depend on can be a double-edged sword. As economic coercion becomes more widely deployed, the impetus for protecting and securing assets increases, and the risk that they might drag smaller states into geopolitical contests grows. Addressing these concerns, it is vital to develop tools, frameworks, and methodologies for assessing supply chains from a national perspective, with a focus on how economic interdependence might introduce geopolitical risks. Against this background, this report builds on recent theoretical and methodological developments for analyzing global supply chains in light of their potential for geopolitical weaponization. More precisely, it will study Norway’s position in global value chains by combining recent methodological developments on the network analysis of supply chains and recent analysis of country-level aggregated analysis of supply dependencies. This allows for a study of supply chains as networks of economic relations, in which the position of different national economies contains both strategic capacities, or assets, by being central suppliers on which other countries depend, and vulnerabilities, by depending heavily on other countries. The report thus uses network analysis to identify Norway’s positions and their related strategic vulnerabilities and assets. Link to the Annex for this report: https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/annex-to-the-report-norway-s-strategic-dependencies-in-global-supply-chain-networks
How does climate change affect peace and security?
This comic is based on findings from our series of Climate, Peace, and Security Fact Sheets, which aim to present reliable, relevant, timely and actionable information and analysis on climate-related peace and security risks in selected countries and regions on the United Nations Security Council Agenda. The Climate, Peace, and Security Fact Sheets are a joint product by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The information in this comic does not necessarily reflect the views of the donor.
A role for state governments in social licensing for renewable energy projects in Mexico
In Mexico, energy governance has mainly been a federal matter. However, the state (regional) governments, motivated by environmental and climate concerns, economic development opportunities, and social community needs, have recently started to explore ways to facilitate renewable energy development. But although state governments claim renewable energy reduces energy poverty and express support for a just transition, these projects do not seem to have social licenses—explicit support for them to proceed—at the local community level. The discrepancy between rhetoric and reality is related to the way these projects are negotiated and implemented. In this policy brief we examine two paths that the Mexican states can take to improve the social licensing of renewable energy projects. First, they can establish a framework for ethical conduct and evaluation of the potential impacts of renewable energy projects, including elements such as adherence to international standards, inclusive planning processes, and environmental and social impact assessments. Second, they can implement proactive, engagement-focused measures that empower state and local governments to facilitate renewable energy projects and reduce transaction costs.