Publications
Changing or frozen narratives? The Arctic in Russian media and expert commentary, 2021–2022
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has brought Russia–West relations to its lowest point since the Cold War. Relations in the Arctic region are not excepted, evidenced not least by the other seven member states’ pausing their participation in Russia’s Arctic Council chairmanship (which concluded in May 2023). To the extent that “Arctic exceptionalism” – the notion that the Arctic has been characterised by a cooperative mode between Russia and the West which has remained relatively untouched by increasing tensions elsewhere – was ever an appropriate description, Western analysts have now declared it firmly dead. How does this situation look from within Russia? This research paper investigates how the Russian state media and the foreign policy expert community have portrayed the Arctic in 2021 and 2022. How much change has been seen since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine? By surveying “the story about the Arctic” as presented by mainstream narrators and experts, we gain insights into, among other things, how changes in Arctic cooperation, sanctions, the role of China in the Arctic, and the question of climate change are conveyed to Russian audiences. The paper proceeds as follows. We start by briefly explaining the methods and data used. We then present a portrayal of the Arctic in Russia’s government’s newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta, followed by the role of the Arctic in analyses published by the Russian International Affairs Council and the journal Russia in Global Affairs. Lastly, we conclude by discussing a general continuity in the way the Arctic is framed in the material, and foreground three core themes: climate change, security, and cooperation.
Stormaktenes militærmakt: Militær kapasitet og muligheter for å bidra med forsterkninger til Norge
This report is in Norwegian only. Norsk forsvarspolitikk bygger på en tro på at medlemskapet i NATO og partnerskap med viktige allierte vil sikre at Norge får militære forsterkninger dersom en krig bryter ut. Kollektivt forsvar og bilateralt samarbeid er to av tre grunnpilarer i det norske forsvarskonseptet (Figur 1). USA, Storbritannia, Tyskland og Frankrike er regnet som de viktigste stormaktene i NATO. Denne rapporten gir et bilde av hvordan disse stormaktenes væpnede styrker er utformet, hvordan de utvikler seg, hva de er i stand til å gjøre, og hvor mye de kan gjøre på en gang. Hensikten er å forbedre forståelsen av hva Norge kan forvente å få av militær støtte i krig.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is faced with a confluence of climate change, environmental degradation, resource exploitation and conflict dynamics that is exacerbating insecurity in the country. The dual impact of climate change and the global green energy transition risks deepening divisions over resource management and fostering intercommunal conflict over resources such as land and water. Climate related security risks threaten to undermine human security through increased livelihood and food insecurity and changing patterns of transhumance.
A more strategic European Union in a more contested space
Space is becoming an increasingly important domain for societies and politics alike, also from a geopolitical and hence security and defence perspective. The EU is a key actor in space, but its approach to space is changing in a more uncertain and contested geopolitical environment. While still focused largely on the civilian aspects of space, the EU has developed a more strategic approach towards space, increasingly using the domain also for security and defence, including military, purposes. As the EU develops quickly in a more challenging and uncertain environment, Norway needs to understand EU developments and their implications at an early stage, and work to secure participation where interests align.
Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions
Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.
How the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy came home
After leaving the EU, the UK needed to rethink its place in the world. Kristin Haugevik and Øyvind Svendsen examine the aspirations and meanings underpinning the “Global Britain” narrative and argue that its scope and ambitions have changed significantly in the years following the Brexit referendum.
Adapting to turbulent waters: EU maritime security and implications for Norway
Maritime security has become a top priority for the EU, as evident in its Strategic Compass for security and defence (2022) where it was identified as a strategic domain. The intensification of geopolitical tensions has further extended strategic competition to the seas. At the same time, a proliferation of threats has emerged at sea, including the security of migration routes, human rights at sea, implications of climate change and global warming, and the pressing challenges posed by organised crime and marine terrorism. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines have heightened the urgency for safeguarding critical infrastructure at sea, for surveillance, and coastal and offshore patrolling. Governance of the high seas invites further challenges. They are considered part of the Global Commons that, as with outer space, the atmosphere and the poles, are largely beyond the jurisdiction of nation states. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and decline in international cooperation, enhancing the EU’s maritime presence has been recognised not only as a paramount security imperative, but also as an economic interest of the Member States: The EU has the largest maritime territory in the world (counting exclusive economic zones), is home to 329 key seaports and most goods to and from Europe travel via the sea (90% of trade exports). In addition, up to 99% of global dataflows travel via subsea cables, and the EU’s energy dependence on oil and gas, which largely travels to the EU via the sea, remains high. Maritime security is thus among the fastest-growing EU policy areas. In addition to the threats listed above, Russia and China's increasing assertiveness at sea has intensified longer term processes towards an increasingly robust and multifaceted EU maritime foreign and security policy.
Collective defence in Europe: What place for the EU?
Collective defence is the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, anchored in NATO’s Article 5 stating that an attack against one ally is an attack against all. With the deteriorating security environment in Europe, questions have been asked about whether, and if so how, the EU’s clause on mutual defence – article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union – could be operationalized and perhaps be a supplement to NATO’s article 5 as a guarantor of collective defence in Europe. The debate is driven by perceived limits in NATO’s ability to deal with hybrid threats, the broader implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the necessity for European states to take more responsibility for their security. For EU member states to succeed with its collective defence obligations within the union, political will, legal interoperability with NATO and capability development should be addressed further.
NATO and Transatlantic Security Relations
NATO is considered the most important institution in the transatlantic security relationship. Its history is marked by continuity, resilience, and deliberate adaptation to an ever-changing and more complex security environment. This chapter seeks to assess some of the key historical turning points to shed light on how NATO has managed to remain relevant throughout all these years, and in particular how have the recent turbulent years in Washington D.C. and the renewed tensions with Russia have impacted the organisation. We will argue that a combination of strong US engagement and leadership with a broadly shared threat perception among Allies (primarily towards Russia) is the combination that continues to make NATO a significant embodiment of transatlantic security relations.