Publications

Escaping the Long Shadow of Homo Sovieticus: Reassessing Stalin’s Popularity and Communist Legacies in Post-Soviet Russia

It is often asserted that the values and attitudes of Homo Sovieticus, marked in the rising “popularity” of Stalin, live on in contemporary Russia, acting as a negative factor in social and political development. This article critiques the argument that attitudes to Stalin reflect unreformed Soviet values and explain Russia’s authoritarian regression and failed modernization. Our critique of this legacy argument has three parts. First, after examining the problematic elements of the Levada Center approach, we offer alternative explanations for understanding quantitative data on Stalin and the repressions. Second, we examine interview data showing that, for those with a pro-Stalin position, “defending Stalin” is only a small part of a broader worldview that is not obviously part of a “Soviet legacy.” Third, we consider survey data from the trudnaia-pamiat’ project and find common reluctance to discuss much of the Stalinist past, which we argue represents an agonistic stance. Thus, we interpret attitudes to Stalin within a broader context of complex social and cultural transformation where the anomie of the 1990s has been replaced with dynamics toward a more positive identity construct. On the one hand, the antagonistic mode of memory is visible in statist and patriotic discourses, which do not seriously revolve around Stalin but do resist strong criticism of him. On the other hand, we find many more in Russia avoid the Stalin question and adopt an agonistic mode, avoiding conflict through a “de- politicized” version of history.

Et tredje perspektiv på årsakene bak Russlands angrepskrig

Cooperation in an Era of Strategic CompetitionEU-NATO Relations in the Context of War and Rivalry

This Policy Brief looks at the growing relations and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It does so in the context of a return to war in Europe and growing strategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China. Europeans have long been called to take on more responsibility for their own defence and there is a window of opportunity to build these relations sooner rather than later.

Noen har hevdet at mitt moralske kompass er gått i stykker

Jeg forsøker å skjønne hvorfor Kreml handler som det gjør. Er det virkelig det samme som å støtte disse handlingene?

Failing through: European migration governance across the central Mediterranean

Both today and under Gaddafi’s authoritarian rule, externalised migration controls have played a crucial role in EUropean irregular mobility governance across the Central Mediterranean. Offloading migration management on Tripoli is puzzling due to the fragility of its institutions, the ill-preparedness of its security forces, and widespread abuse against migrants. Why have European member states and EU institutions relapsed to relying on Libyan forces to govern irregular migration? In this paper, we argue that the EU has failed through the migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean by drawing on already established albeit ineffective and contentious policy tools. The collapse of Libya’s state apparatus, European Court of Human Rights’ censure of Italy’s illegal pushbacks and public opinion pressure temporarily displaced but did not fundamentally change EUrope’s restrictive approach to irregular mobility governance. While some new and less restrictive border enforcement policies were developed in response to the soaring death toll, this humanitarian turn was short-lived. By combining the mechanism of failing forward with institutionalist insights, our concept of failing through explains why the EU and its member states soon backslid into pre-existing institutional arrangements like bilateral agreements with Libyan authorities notwithstanding their problematic legal, ethical and political implications.

Beroligelse 2.0: Teori, praksis og rammevilkår i en ny tid

Konseptet beroligelse utgjør en del av «arvesølvet» i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk. Russlands siste invasjon av Ukraina har aktualisert debatten om den «klassiske» beroligelsen: de selvpålagte begrensningene på alliert militær aktivitet i Norge. I denne artikkelen forstås beroligelse som mer enn det å «slipe ned» den alliansebaserte avskrekkingen. Konseptuelt er det er derfor hensiktsmessig å skille mellom to typer beroligelse: passiv og aktiv. En konseptuell oppdatering vil være nyttig for å forstå beroligelsens ulike form(er), mulige effekt(er) og konseptets fortsatte relevans i Norges forhold til Russland – i en tid der den teknologiske utviklingen og markante geopolitiske endringer endrer rammevilkårene og forutsetningene som beroligelse er tuftet på. En mer spesifisert forståelse av konseptet inkluderer en bredere del av norsk utenrikspolitikk – både i teori og i praksis – og inkluderer en rekke samarbeids- og konfliktflater i det norsk-russiske forholdet som går ut over den «klassiske» beroligelsen. Denne artikkelen argumenterer ut fra premisset om at vi ikke vet om beroligelse virker etter hensikten. Beroligelse, et konsept som i utgangspunktet bygget på etterkrigstids-realismens verdenssyn og logikk, bør derfor også analyseres med andre teoretiske «linser» som kan gi bedre forståelse av effektene av de ulike formene for beroligelse i en verden med andre rammevilkår enn da Holst lanserte konseptet.

Hva er det vi egentlig løser ved å slette TikTok?

Hvilke apper må Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet vurdere i neste runde?

Adaptive Peacebuilding: A New Approach to Sustaining Peace in the 21st Century

This open access book responds to the urgent need to improve how we prevent and resolve conflict. It introduces Adaptive Peacebuilding through evidence-based research from eight case studies across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. It also considers how China and Japan view and practice peacebuilding. The book focuses on how peacebuilders design, implement and evaluate programs to sustain peace, how interactions between external and local actors have facilitated or hindered peacemaking, and how adaptation to complexity and uncertainty occurred in each case study.

Morten Bøås om jihadisme og russisk innblanding i Sahel-regionen

Morten Bøås som gjest i podcasten "statsbøttekottet" Det er tid for innhold fra SPD! I dagens episode av Statsbøttekottet har vi med oss Morten Bøås. Han er seniorforsker ved NUPI. Temaet for episoden er fred og konflikt i Afrika, med spesielt fokus på russisk innblanding i Sahel-regionen. Vi får blant annet vite hva som er spesielt med Sahel, og hva er egentlig jihadisme?

Germany’s Zeitenwende in foreign and security policy: Domestic developments and alliance dynamics after one year

Days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a Zeitenwende, a historical turning point to which Germany would respond by reforming its foreign and security policies. In a speech in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Scholz listed five points for the reform agenda: supporting Ukraine (also militarily), sanctioning Russia, increased German contribution to NATO’s eastern flank, investment in more capable armed forces, and decoupling from Russian energy. The third point included a €100 billion special investment fund, so-called Sondervermögen, that would be used to boost Germany’s military capabilities and especially alleviate the most urgent material shortcomings of the armed forces. Given that Germany had been considered a laggard in European defence due to its restrictive approach on military capability – partly because of the historical legacy of guilt for World War II and partly a condition of Germany’s reunification after the Cold War – the announcement of a turning point raised expectations in Euro-Atlantic defence circles.