Publications
Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions
Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.
How the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy came home
After leaving the EU, the UK needed to rethink its place in the world. Kristin Haugevik and Øyvind Svendsen examine the aspirations and meanings underpinning the “Global Britain” narrative and argue that its scope and ambitions have changed significantly in the years following the Brexit referendum.
Adapting to turbulent waters: EU maritime security and implications for Norway
Maritime security has become a top priority for the EU, as evident in its Strategic Compass for security and defence (2022) where it was identified as a strategic domain. The intensification of geopolitical tensions has further extended strategic competition to the seas. At the same time, a proliferation of threats has emerged at sea, including the security of migration routes, human rights at sea, implications of climate change and global warming, and the pressing challenges posed by organised crime and marine terrorism. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines have heightened the urgency for safeguarding critical infrastructure at sea, for surveillance, and coastal and offshore patrolling. Governance of the high seas invites further challenges. They are considered part of the Global Commons that, as with outer space, the atmosphere and the poles, are largely beyond the jurisdiction of nation states. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and decline in international cooperation, enhancing the EU’s maritime presence has been recognised not only as a paramount security imperative, but also as an economic interest of the Member States: The EU has the largest maritime territory in the world (counting exclusive economic zones), is home to 329 key seaports and most goods to and from Europe travel via the sea (90% of trade exports). In addition, up to 99% of global dataflows travel via subsea cables, and the EU’s energy dependence on oil and gas, which largely travels to the EU via the sea, remains high. Maritime security is thus among the fastest-growing EU policy areas. In addition to the threats listed above, Russia and China's increasing assertiveness at sea has intensified longer term processes towards an increasingly robust and multifaceted EU maritime foreign and security policy.
Collective defence in Europe: What place for the EU?
Collective defence is the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, anchored in NATO’s Article 5 stating that an attack against one ally is an attack against all. With the deteriorating security environment in Europe, questions have been asked about whether, and if so how, the EU’s clause on mutual defence – article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union – could be operationalized and perhaps be a supplement to NATO’s article 5 as a guarantor of collective defence in Europe. The debate is driven by perceived limits in NATO’s ability to deal with hybrid threats, the broader implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the necessity for European states to take more responsibility for their security. For EU member states to succeed with its collective defence obligations within the union, political will, legal interoperability with NATO and capability development should be addressed further.
NATO and Transatlantic Security Relations
NATO is considered the most important institution in the transatlantic security relationship. Its history is marked by continuity, resilience, and deliberate adaptation to an ever-changing and more complex security environment. This chapter seeks to assess some of the key historical turning points to shed light on how NATO has managed to remain relevant throughout all these years, and in particular how have the recent turbulent years in Washington D.C. and the renewed tensions with Russia have impacted the organisation. We will argue that a combination of strong US engagement and leadership with a broadly shared threat perception among Allies (primarily towards Russia) is the combination that continues to make NATO a significant embodiment of transatlantic security relations.
Naturalisation through mainstreaming Counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation in UN and EU discourse
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, counter-terrorism was initially pursued throughout the world as a matter of exceptional ‘hard security’. International and national authorities generally position terrorism as a uniquely threatening phenomenon warranting delineated budgets, systems, and structures within the law enforcement and defence realms. However, with the growing focus on radicalisation as assumedly essential in leading to terrorism and counter-radicalisation as an ever more central part of counter-terrorism, its scope was expanded far beyond the ‘hard security’ field; counter-radicalisation enabled the growth and integration of counter-terrorism into ‘softer’ societal sectors. This chapter argues that this shift from a hard security framing of counter-terrorism to a broadening of its scope through a foregrounding of counter-radicalisation should be conceptualised as a process of ‘mainstreaming’. After explaining the concept of mainstreaming and how it captures this development, the chapter offers a brief discourse analysis of such mainstreaming through the lens of key official UN and EU counter-terrorism documents. On the basis of this investigation, the chapter finds that the discursive mainstreaming of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation suggests their ‘naturalisation’.
Everyday migration hierarchies: negotiating the EU’s visa regime
Critical security studies have shed invaluable light on the diffuse governmental technologies and pernicious effects of the EU’s bordering practices. While scholars have focused upon the experience of precarious migrant groups, this article suggests that extending our critical gaze to include seemingly privileged migrants can further understanding of just how far the insecurity produced by the EU’s migration regime reaches. Focusing on the migration process of international students in Norway, this article inquires into how these migrants experience, theorize and negotiate the EU’s visa regime and its governmental technologies. We show how their subjective understandings of ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ hierarchies of the visa regime play out in their bureaucratic encounters, influencing their everyday lives. Ultimately, the article shows how the regime’s disciplinary effects extend further than prior critical research has appreciated.
The EU and the governance of the Maritime Global Space
This article investigates the extent to which the European Union (EU) contributes to the governance of Global Spaces by exploring its policies towards the maritime domain. In a more competitive and uncertain geopolitical setting, are the EU’s policies changing and becoming more strategic? Or does the EU continue to promote multilateral cooperation and regulation of the maritime Global Space, and if so, what type of governance regimes does it promote? Developing and applying three analytical models of Global Space policies, the article finds that the EU has been consistent in its approach, which reflects a combination of its strong interest in free navigation and an attempt to achieve sustainable growth through climate regulation. Despite more geopolitical conflict in these areas and in international relations more broadly, the EU’s approach to the maritime Global Space is to promote international governance regimes.
The EU and the governance of the Maritime Global Space
This article investigates the extent to which the European Union (EU) contributes to the governance of Global Spaces by exploring its policies towards the maritime domain. In a more competitive and uncertain geopolitical setting, are the EU’s policies changing and becoming more strategic? Or does the EU continue to promote multilateral cooperation and regulation of the maritime Global Space, and if so, what type of governance regimes does it promote? Developing and applying three analytical models of Global Space policies, the article finds that the EU has been consistent in its approach, which reflects a combination of its strong interest in free navigation and an attempt to achieve sustainable growth through climate regulation. Despite more geopolitical conflict in these areas and in international relations more broadly, the EU’s approach to the maritime Global Space is to promote international governance regimes.