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Politics and Security in the Arctic (POPSARC)
At a time marked by major international turbulence – war in Europe, the breakdown of established diplomatic fora, the entry of new actors and stakeholders – there is an urgent need for also understand...
The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges
With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Nordics will be united for the first time in a military alliance encompassing not only northern Europe but also the broader transatlantic region. It will eventually fortify northern European security, but several obstacles must be overcome first. NATO has done a formidable job since 2014 in updating its defence plans, cumulating in the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans approved in Vilnius 2023. Now Finland and Sweden need to be incorporated into these plans. A more challenging task is to implement NATO's New Force Model which is tremendously ambitious. Finland and Sweden's contributions will be important, but new investments must be made. NATO's Command Structure is yet to be fully reformed and fitted to the DDA. Joint Force Command Norfolk must urgently be staffed, without undue politicization in NATO. Nordic defence buildup can draw on regional cooperation in particular in five areas: in strengthening the area's command design through functional double-hatted headquarters; developing close air power cooperation through e.g. a Combined Joint Air Operations Centre; strengthening total defence cooperation across borders and expanding logistical infrastructure; establishing joint intelligence task forces; and joint training and exercises. The contributions of the United States and United Kingdom are indispensable when it comes to upholding the alliance's guarantee in northern Europe. The recent signing of Defense Cooperation Agreements between the US and the Nordics reinforces this—together with an increased presence of air and naval assets in the region. The same applies to the UK and the Joint Expeditionary Force which now has shifted its focus towards northern Europe. This engagement is a crucial addition to Nordic and NATO plans and activities in a period when growth in Nordic defence structures is occurring at a relatively slow pace. Only after the weaknesses and hurdles are addressed will the deterrence and defence of the region attain a fully credible level.
BRICS - en allianse mot verden
BRICS utvidast. Russland overtar samstundes leiarskapen i organisasjonen som utfordrar Vesten. Kva kan skje? NUPI-forskar Julie Wilhelmsen er ein av deltakarane i denne samtala i NRK-programmet Debatt i P2.
Russian-speakers in Estonia: A Minority Without Agency
This article explores the conditions of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and sees the development of these conditions as a product of an interaction between the nationalizing state, the Russian-speaking minority, the minority’s “kin state”, and the international community; a framework dubbed the “quadratic nexus” by David J. Smith, expanding upon the theories of Rogers Brubaker. This article provides an updated empirical analysis of the impact of the quadratic dynamic in Estonian minority relations, as the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has shifted the balance of power between the agents in Smith’s nexus. The result of this shift is that the conditions of the Russian-speaking minority are now almost entirely decided by the nationalizing state, influenced by Russian aggression. The Russian Federation has made the protection of minority rights in Estonia increasingly difficult by pressuring the Estonian political elite to take an even more conservative stance on nationality policies as a response to the perceived threat from their neighbor in the east, in addition to reinforcing international indifference to minority rights in Estonia. This, combined with the preexisting socio-economic conditions of the Russian-speaking minority has led to the near total loss of the minority’s agency. The article is in Norwegian only.
Deterrence and (Re)assurance in the High North – Finland and Norway Compared
- Finland and Norway are both frontline states to Russia with a similar deterrence and defense strategy. - Finland’s geopolitical position as a frontline state is mainly defined by the long land border to Russia. Norway is predominantly a maritime frontline state. - Norway is both a frontline state and a rear area for staging support to military operations in the Nordic Region. - Geography is a factor influencing the different approaches in Finland and Norway to foreign military activity near Russia. Also, proximity to nuclear forces and test areas.
The next migration crisis: Is the EU better prepared?
In this podcast episode we take a closer look on how the EU will handle a new migration crisis. A new wave of mass migration to Europe might be bu...
NUPIpodden #2: Valg i Storbritannia - går May på en valgsmell?
I morgen går britene til valgurnene for å avgjøre hvem som skal lede Storbritannia gjennom Brexit. NUPI-forsker Kristin Haugevik gir deg det du tr...
Hvor mye hjelp kan Norge få i krig?
Utenrikspolitikkens mål er å gjøre innenrikspolitikken mulig
This policy brief is in Norwegian only.
Climate and Russia - Does the world need nuclear power?
The rising global temperature must be restricted to well below a two-degree increase. It’s crucial to make electricity production carbon neutral as quickly as possible. Is nuclear power the new game changer for achieving this ambitious goal? In this documentary from DW, NUPI Research Professor Kacper Szulecki is interviewed about nuclear energy.