Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Afghanistan*
- Climate change, environmental degradation and water scarcity are undermining agriculture-based livelihoods, which is aggravating food security and poverty. The impacts are highly gendered, as Taliban restrictions and sociocultural norms limit women’s mobility, income and access to assistance, further increasing their climate vulnerability.
- Climate change-related hazards and declining access to natural resources are key drivers of internal displacement and migration and contribute to forced immobility. Meanwhile forced mass returns are placing additional pressure on receiving communities and on scarce water resources and basic services.
- The impacts of climate change increase pressure on natural resources, sometimes intensifying water and land disputes that have been further complicated by Taliban involvement in farmer– herder conflicts. Growing water scarcity, combined with poor resource management, heightens risks of regional instability.
- Economic crises, sanctions-related constraints, governance challenges and limited climate finance impede effective adaptation and resource management, which increases risks of social tensions, livelihood loss and instability.
International engagement with the de facto, Taliban-led authorities remains complex and sensitive. However, without sustained international support to improve climate governance, natural resources management and infrastructure, Afghanistan’s ability to cope with climate impacts will remain severely limited. The international community should explore avenues for the Afghan population’s representation in UNFCCC mechanisms and access to climate finance in line with principled approaches. The United Nations and its member states should implement the recommendations of the independent assessment on Afghanistan mandated by Security Council Resolution 2679 (2023), including expanding technical assistance on climate adaptation, water management, environmental security and transboundary resource management.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
- The international community should advance the established preliminary principled engagement on climate governance that strengthens the resilience of Afghanistan’s population. UN member states and donors should invest in climate adaptation and resilience projects that are gender-responsive and target the most vulnerable groups. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in Afghanistan and their partners should continue to work with local communities to strengthen the resilience of agricultural livelihoods.
- The UN, its member states and its implementing partners should work with local communities to enhance investments in anticipatory climate adaptation and disaster management and preparedness. Programming should explicitly address the specific needs faced by vulnerable groups such as internally displaced people (IDPs), returnees and climate-affected host communities to prevent resource competition and social tensions.
- The UN and its member states should support and expand initiatives that aim to strengthen regional environmental cooperation—particularly over water and disaster preparedness in the transboundary river basins. UNAMA and the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) can play a role in facilitating platforms that engage relevant regional and local stakeholders in constructive dialogue on climate, peace and security.
- Beyond humanitarian and basic human needs, UN member states and donors should support medium- to long-term resilience, including by integrating conflict sensitivity and environmental peacebuilding into programming. This entails improved aid-coordination mechanisms on climate change, developing a joint strategy on climate resilience and clear priorities for action. UNAMA and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office should continue efforts to coordinate donors and implementers and facilitate exchanges of lessons learned and knowledge-sharing.
Climate exposure: Trends and projections
Afghanistan is landlocked with a semi-arid to dry climate. The topographies are diverse, ranging from mountainous regions in the north-eastern, eastern and central parts of the country, arid desert lands in the south-west and plains in the north-west. Afghanistan’s climate also varies across regions and topographies.1 Extreme weather events such as droughts and flooding are influenced by changing temperatures, snowmelt and rainfall, but patterns differ across ecological zones.2 The frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in the country are increasing, and the projected effects of climate change are anticipated to increase it further.3
The mean annual temperature in Afghanistan has increased from 12.23°C in 1960 to 14.24°C in 2024.4 Climate models project a further increase of 1.5–3°C by 2050, depending on global greenhouse gas emission rates, with the Central Highlands at particular risk.5 Given Afghanistan’s complex topography, this change will vary significantly across regions.6
Average annual precipitation between 1961 and 2022 was 327 millimetres, with substantial regional variation.7 No significant long-term change in precipitation has been registered over the past century, although seasonal variability and precipitation intensity have increased in some regions.8 Future precipitation projections remain uncertain, but suggest slightly lower average daily rainfall and more intense extreme weather events, with projected annual precipitation in the range 260–499 mm by 2039.9 In most years since 1997 there has been drought in parts of Afghanistan, with the frequency and intensity increasing in recent decades. By 2030 local droughts are likely to become the norm, rather than temporary and cyclical events.10
Socioecological vulnerabilities
Afghanistan faces multiple interconnected challenges that weaken its population’s resilience to climate change and socioeconomic shocks. Prolonged conflict, mismanagement, unsustainable land-use practices and natural hazards have driven environmental degradation, while economic hardship, widespread poverty and poor governance heighten exposure to climate risk.11
Nearly 80 per cent of Afghanistan’s population is directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture.12 Rising temperatures and shifting precipitation have intensified recurring droughts; combined with low adaptive capacity, this has led to crop failure, pasture loss and desertification. The intensity and frequency of droughts have increased in recent decades, and provinces in central, north and north-west Afghanistan are most prone to agricultural drought due to limited coping capacity and high socioeconomic and ecological fragility.13 Decades of conflict-driven deforestation have increased exposure to flash floods in the east, north and west, causing significant asset loss.14
Rapid urbanization in the 2000s led millions to abandon traditional farming and seek jobs in the construction and service sectors. The further urban expansion, slow economic growth and financial collapse that followed the 2021 Taliban takeover led to rising urban unemployment, increasing food insecurity and poverty. Alongside agricultural sector decline, climatic shocks, restrictive policies and human rights violations, this has exacerbated the humanitarian situation.15 In 2025 an estimated 2.8 million people returned to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan, leading to a loss of remittances that has further aggravated the economic situation and increased pressure on scarce resources and limited services, thereby heightening people’s climate vulnerability.16 As of December 2025, 21.9 million people (45 per cent of the population) were projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026.17
Climate-related peace and security risks
Climate change is rarely the main driver of conflict, but it can undermine development gains, exacerbate the dynamics of ongoing violence, amplify existing tensions and disrupt fragile peace processes. Violent conflict and political instability can also weaken community resilience to the effects of climate change. This fact sheet uses four interrelated pathways to navigate the relationship between climate change, peace and security: (a) livelihood impacts, (b) migration and mobility, (c) armed actors and security, and (d) political and economic grievances.
Livelihood impacts
Climate change, environmental degradation and conflict have had negative impacts on natural resource-dependent livelihoods in Afghanistan. The population’s high exposure to climate shocks is compounded by factors such as poor water management, ineffective government mechanisms and inadequate infrastructure.18
Recurring droughts, irregular patterns of rainfall and snowfall in some regions, and rising temperatures have severely affected both surface water and groundwater resources in Afghanistan. They have also led to a rise of pests and disease in herds and crops. All these factors cause significant degradation and loss of traditional farming-based livelihoods in rural areas. This has contributed to an overall decline in the agricultural sector, which has worsened health, nutrition and food security and deepened overall economic decline.19 Environmental degradation and drought can also drive competition over access to water and land, exacerbating inter- and intracommunal socioeconomic tensions and weakening social cohesion and resilience. Such competition is likely to increase as limited water availability is further reduced by poor water management of irrigation systems and climate stressors.20
Livelihood insecurity in Afghanistan remains highly gendered, with women and girls being disproportionately affected. The Taliban’s restrictions on women’s and girls’ rights, combined with sociocultural norms, impose barriers to women’s participation in public spaces and increase their financial and social dependence on men. This heightens their vulnerability to climate change and reduces their adaptive capacity. For example, many Afghan women face barriers accessing disaster assistance due to their reliance on men as intermediaries, putting female-headed households particularly at risk.21 The Taliban’s restrictive policies on women initially pushed more rural women into agriculture and family businesses to cope with economic hardship, albeit in short-term, seasonal and low-paid roles. However, as agriculture is highly vulnerable to and affected by droughts and floods, many women and men have been forced to seek alternative livelihoods. Despite the Taliban’s restrictive policies, this has led tens of thousands of women to start small businesses and become entrepreneurs.22
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office, donors and their implementing partners should continue working with local communities to strengthen the resilience of agricultural livelihoods, improve disaster preparedness, and gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive environmental peacebuilding approaches.
Migration and mobility
Displacement and migration patterns in Afghanistan are driven by a complex interplay of causes. From April to December 2025, nearly 675 500 Afghans migrated to neighbouring countries due to climate impacts, particularly from Faryab, Ghor, Badghis and Balkh provinces, which have been heavily affected by drought.23 As of 2024, there were 5.5 million IDPs in Afghanistan, of which 1.3 million had been displaced by natural disasters.24 Climate-related hazards and extreme weather have been the main drivers of new displacement since 2022.25 In the first quarter of 2025, 79 per cent of new displacements were climate-related, with water scarcity increasingly reported as a key factor for people’s decision to leave.26
Climate-related displacement is often a last resort when other adaptation strategies are no longer available. In recent years, there has been a decline in Afghans’ ability to adapt to climate change due to limited physical, financial and social capital, compounded by lack of government support.27 IDPs often face heightened risks of marginalization and restricted access to basic services and economic opportunities, and many remain exposed to climate hazards even after relocating.28 The recent influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan has further complicated these pressures. Without adequate support from the authorities for reintegration, the returnees face heightened climate vulnerability due to lack of information and preparedness, as well as exclusion from community-based decision-making and protection mechanisms, undermining their resilience.29 Amid severe water crises across many communities, returnees bear a disproportionate burden; for example, 75 per cent of returnees in Herat and Kandahar provinces report difficulty or great difficulty accessing clean water.30
Resource scarcity is also prone to politicization, with returnees becoming scapegoats for perceived shortages.31 Ongoing displacement and return movements, combined with climate hazards and pressure on already overextracted local resources, risk exacerbating social tensions and resource competition in communities.32 At the same time, some communities experience forced immobility, where physical barriers (e.g. floods and heavy rainfall, animal pests, and diseases) or socioeconomic barriers restrict people’s ability to relocate in response to climate-related crises. People who have stayed in their climate-affected places of origin (e.g. in Balkh province) are facing risks such as damaged and destroyed houses due to flooding and heightened food insecurity because of reduced livelihood opportunities and rising food prices driven by drought. People with disabilities are at particular risk of facing barriers to accessing essential services.33
The UN, including donors and implementing partners should address the specific needs of IDPs and returnees, while also supporting local dispute-resolution mechanisms to prevent and manage natural resource conflicts. They should also invest in climate-sensitive resettlement programmes in high-return areas to respond to specific needs arising in these communities.
Armed actors and security
Climate and the environment have serious implications for livelihood security in Afghanistan and any change in them can intensify existing disputes over resource sharing.34 Such disputes can be further worsened by the involvement of armed actors. Since the Taliban seized power in 2021, tensions over pastureland and water points between sedentary farmers and Kuchi nomads in central and northern Afghanistan have intensified, eroding intercommunal trust. The Taliban has tended to favour Kuchis, while particularly Hazara communities have experienced arbitrary land deprivation, forced displacements and other human rights violations, which have amplified their sense of insecurity.35 Loss of livelihoods in communities highly affected by climate change has also increased interest in recruitment to the Taliban’s police and military forces.36
Escalating water scarcity combined with prolonged state mismanagement of water heightens the risk of regional instability.37 Afghanistan is home to four transboundary basins and five connecting regional rivers, several of which are under severe climate stress.38 To meet domestic agricultural and food security needs and to consolidate public support, the Taliban has pledged to construct dams and irrigation canals. Afghanistan’s climate-affected downstream neighbours view these pledges as threats to water availability, which in turn can create tensions that challenge regional transboundary water cooperation.39 This is particularly evident in relations with Iran, where border clashes in 2023 linked to disputes over water use in Helmand River resulted in three casualties.40 With few, weak transboundary mechanisms in place, climate change impacts combined with political instability risk further escalating regional tensions over shared water resources.41 At the same time, water cooperation can serve as an entry point for dialogue. It can further lay the ground for inclusive peace by bringing diverse actors together around shared environmental objectives.42
UNAMA and the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) should facilitate and support transboundary environmental cooperation, particularly over water and disaster preparedness.
Political and economic grievances
Since the Taliban seized power in 2021, Afghanistan has faced a deep economic crisis, driven by factors including sanctions and frozen assets, declining international aid, restrictions on women’s employment, skilled workers leaving government jobs and poor governance.43 Prolonged drought since 2021, combined with underdeveloped water infrastructure and a severe water crisis, has further aggravated the humanitarian crisis and widespread poverty.44
The Taliban continues to enforce repressive policies, leaving little space for public dissent. Women protestors, journalists, and former government and security officials have been particularly subjected to detentions, violence and arrests.45 Rural protests over economic grievances are more likely to be heeded. Both the central administration and provincial authorities face sustained pressure from local communities over water access, economic hardship and urgent need for resilience measures.46
International sanctions and economic decline have prompted the de facto authorities to turn to mineral resources to generate revenue, leading to expanded mining activity and increased involvement of external contractors. Unregulated mining and associated environmental degradation have triggered local protests, in some cases resulting in violent clashes between miners and local residents—most recently in Takhar province in January 2026, where four people were killed.47
Governance challenges, the political context and international donor hesitancy pose significant impediments to advancing climate, peace and security efforts and implementing effective climate-adaptation strategies.48 Without adequate climate finance, international support and demonstrated commitment by the Taliban to improve climate governance, climate change is likely to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities. It will thus contribute to displacement, livelihood loss and conflict and will undermine long-term stability and efforts to improve human security.49
UN member states and donors should support UNAMA in multi-stakeholder, coherent engagement with the de facto authorities to advance relevant and inclusive climate and environment governance mechanisms.
Endnotes
* This is an updated version of the fact sheets on Afghanistan published in February 2022 and February 2023.
1 Rahimi, S. T. et al., ‘Spatiotemporal changes in future precipitation of Afghanistan for shared economic pathways’, Helyon, vol. 10, no. 7 (2024).
2 Baizayee, B. (ed.), Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan (LDCF): Baseline Assessment Report, Technical Report no. 2014/001 (UN Environment Programme: Kabul, Sep. 2014); Qutbudin, I. et al., ‘Seasonal drought pattern changes due to climate variability: Case study in Afghanistan’, Water, vol. 11, no. 5 (May 2019), p. 1096.
3 Qutbudin et al. (note 2); Oskorouchi, H. R. and Sousa-Pouza, A., ‘Floods, food security, and coping strategies: Evidence from Afghanistan’, Agricultural Economics, vol. 52, no. 1 (Jan. 2020); and Afghan National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), Second National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (NEPA: Kabul, Dec. 2017).
4 World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal, Historical climate, Observed timeseries of annual average mean surface air temperature, Afghanistan, 1901–2024.
5 Brown, O., Climate-fragility Risk Brief: Afghanistan, Climate Diplomacy (Adelphi Research: Berlin, 30 Oct. 2019); and Afghan National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), ‘Afghanistan’s National Inventory Report (NIR) 2019 submission under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’, 2019.
6 These projections are based on the 6th phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6) and Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) 1-2.6. See World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 4), Future climates, Projected timeseries anomaly of average mean surface air temperature.
7 World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 4), Historical climate, Observed timeseries of annual precipitation, Afghanistan; and World Bank Data, Average precipitation in depth (mm per year), Afghanistan.
8 Afghan National Environmental Protection Agency (note 3); and World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB), Climate Risk Country Profile: Afghanistan (World Bank/ ADB: Washington, DC/Manilla, 2021).
9 See World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (note 4), Future climates, Projected timeseries anomaly of precipitation; and World Bank and Asian Development Bank (note 8).
10 Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), ‘Afghanistan drought risk management strategy 2019’, Feb. 2020.
11 Gautam, Y. et al., Examining Poverty and Food Insecurity in the Context of Long-term Socio-ecological changes in Kabul, Afghanistan Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) Report no. 1 (CMI: Bergen, May 2023); Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), 2025 Resilience Report: Climate, Conflict and Resilience: Pathways to Sustainable and Inclusive Solutions (IsDB: Jeddah, May 2025); and D’Souza, S. M., ‘Climate crisis in Taliban ruled Afghanistan: The need for an alternate approach’, eds J. Vesterlund Mathiesen and D. Vestenskov, Still Here—Understanding and Engaging with Afghanistan after August 2021 (Scandinavian Military Studies Press: Copenhagen, 2024).
12 International Federation of Red Cross Societies (IFRC), ‘Operation update: Afghanistan’, 4 Nov. 2024.
13 Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), ‘Afghanistan: Understanding drought’, 3 July 2024; and Jamalzi, A. R. et al., ‘Drought risk assessment for agriculture in Afghanistan’, Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment, vol. 40, no. 34 (2026).
14 Amini, M., ‘War, deforestation and flooding: in Afghanistan they are all linked’, The Guardian, 14 Sep. 2024.
15 Gautam et al. (note 11); Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC), Joining Forces Against the Impact of Climate Change in Afghanistan, NAC Climate Symposium (NAC: Oslo, 2024); and Wafa, S. et al., ‘The impacts of climate change on agriculture in Afghanistan: A review’, Journal of Natural Science Review, vol. 2, special no. (2024).
16 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Afghanistan situation: Afghan returns emergency update #17’, 19 Dec. 2025; Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), ‘Afghanistan: Forced displacement from Iran’, Briefing note, 8 Sep. 2025.
17 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Afghanistan: Humanitarian needs and response plan 2026’, 16 Dec. 2025.
18 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Climate Impacts, Return and Displacement in Afghanistan (UNHCR: May 2025).
19 Gautam et al. (note 11); and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Afghanistan: The alarming effects of climate change’, 1 Aug. 2023.
20 Assessment Capacities Project (note 13); and Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), ‘Afghanistan—Land conflicts and humanitarian action: A conflict sensitivity perspective’, Thematic report, 26 July 2023.
21 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Afghanistan: Climate Vulnerability Assessment (IOM: Kabul, Feb. 2025).
22 World Bank, Afghanistan Gender Monitoring Survey: Baseline Report (World Bank: Washington, DC, Feb. 2023); and International Crisis Group (ICG), A Precarious Lifeline? Women-led Business in Afghanistan (ICG: Brussels, 17 Dec. 2025).
23 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Afghanistan Climate Vulnerability Assessment, Population and Mobility, Round 3 (IOM: Kabul, Dec. 2025).
24 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IMDC), GRID 2025: Global Report on Internal Displacement (IMDC: Geneva, 2025).
25 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (note 18).
26 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Afghanistan: Climate Vulnerability Assessment, Round 2 Quarter 1 2025 (IOM: 2025); and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (note 18).
27 Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), ‘Afghanistan—No place to stay, no place to go: Perspectives from climate-affected areas of Balkh Province’, Thematic report, 14 Aug. 2025; and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (note 18).
28 Spink, P., Climate Change Drives Migration in Conflict-ridden Afghanistan (ActionAid International: Johannesburg, 2020); and Assessment Capacities Project (note 27).
29 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (note 18); and UN Development Programme (UNDP), ‘From return to rebuild for Afghan returnees and host communities’, Nov. 2025.
30 Mercy Corps, Crisis Compounded: Afghanistan’s Returnees Face an Escalating Water Emergency (Mercy Corps: Portland, OR, Oct. 2025).
31 Alimia, S., ‘Water, climate and refuge across Afghanistan and the sub-region’, Asia Displacement Solutions Platform (ADSP), Oct. 2024.
32 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (note 18); Assessment Capacities Project (note 27); and Alimia (note 31).
33 International Organization for Migration (note 26); and Assessment Capacities Project (note 27).
34 Assessment Capacities Project (note 20); and Madadi, S., The Political Economy of Climate Governance in Afghanistan: An Analysis of the Context and Challenges (Middle East Institute: Washington, DC, Feb. 2024).
35 Moradi, K., “Throwing Dust in Our Eyes”: Nomadic–Sedentary Land Conflict in Hazarajat under the Taliban and its Human Rights Impacts (Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Lund, 2025).
36 UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Interview with author, 26 Jan. 2026.
37 Faizee, M. and Schmeier, S., ‘Navigating water (in)security in Taliban’s Afghanistan: Insights into local, national and regional water security challenges’, Water, Peace and Security (WPS) Partnership, Aug. 2023.
38 Mansfield, D. and Aclis, Digging an Ever-deeper Hole: The Response to Climate Change in the Helmand River Basin (Alcis and XCEPT: 2025); and Akhundzadah, N. A., ‘Analyzing temperature, precipitation, and river discharge trends in Afghanistan’s main river basins using innovative trend analysis, Mann-Kendall and Sen’s slope methods’, Climate, vol. 12, no. 12 (2024).
39 UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Interview with author, 26 Jan. 2026; and Faizee and Schmeier (note 37).
40 Mansfield and Aclis (note 38); and Kumar, R., ‘On the Afghanistan–Iran border, climate change fuels fight over water’, Science, 2023.
41 Faizee and Schmeier (note 37); Barry, S. et al., Climate, Peace and Environmental Resilience in the Asia-Pacific Region (Adelphi: Berlin, June 2025); and Kumar (note 40).
42 Klimes, M. and Yaari, E. A., ‘Water diplomacy: Facilitating dialogues’, Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), 2019.
43 D’Souza (note 11); Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Economic causes of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis’, 4 Aug. 2022; and Mayar, A., ‘Afghanistan’s climate crisis: A call for decentralised and inclusive finance’, Policy Brief no. 221, Toda Peace Institute, 21 May 2025. 44 Human Rights Watch (note 43); and Reda, D., Entry Points for Climate Finance and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan
44 Human Rights Watch (note 43); and Reda, D., Entry Points for Climate Finance and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan (Berghof Foundation: Berlin, 2025).
45 George, P. et al., ‘Asia-Pacific overview’, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), Sep. 2025; and Karaçalti, A. and Bynum, E., ‘Two years of repression: Mapping Taliban violence targeting civilians in Afghanistan’, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), 11 Aug, 2023.
46 UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Interview with author, 26 Jan. 2026.
47 Hunter, M. and Ginn, P., ‘Treasure hunt: Why is Afghanistan part of the great extractives race?’, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 8 Jan. 2025; Hakimi, A. H., ‘Taliban gold rush turns deadly, putting spotlight on Chinese-backed mining’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 Jan. 2026; and UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Interview with author, 26 Jan. 2026.
48 Reda (note 44); D’Souza (note 11); and Kluijver, R., ‘Is it time to recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan?’, The Conversation, 29 Dec. 2024.
49 Mayar (note 43); D’Souza (note 11); and UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Interview with author, 26 Jan. 2026.
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