Climate Change and Arctic Security, Multi-Actor, Diverse and Distributed Assets and Modalities
Climate and Environmental Change (CEC) is driving highly variable operational environments for Allies and adversaries alike. While technology is often touted as the determinant for strategic advantage, this is not necessarily true in the Arctic where whoever has the most knowledge possesses more strategic options and can apply the knowledge to achieve strategic dominance short of open conflict. Rapidly acquiring precise knowledge while limiting our adversaries acquisition requires that we understand their patterns of obtaining information and comprehension. Failure to understand their patterns results in an inability to detect or mitigate adversarial activity. Futures planning attempts to do this, in part, but lacks the precision and rigor to provide concrete outputs that can be used tactically. By adding a framework that looks at multiple actors, distributed assets, and modalities, this lack can be overcome.
Considering ecological security from the perspective of Arctic ecosystemic politics
This brief essay is part of a book forum on Matt McDonald's book (2021) presenting the idea of ecological security. In the essay, I reflect on progress and prospects for Arctic cooperation and governance in order to consider the promise and limitations of McDonald’s ecological security framework. The Arctic is an instructive example for such an exploration. The longstanding post-Cold War cooperation in the Arctic is strongly rooted in an appreciation of the interconnected nature of the Arctic ecosystem, even as the governance mechanisms remain far from what would qualify as an ecological security approach in McDonald’s sense. Nonetheless, I suggest that especially two aspects are instructive from the Arctic example. The first relates to how ecological security would potentially interface with an already quite full landscape of governance practices rooted in ecosystems, and associated power political genealogies and effects. The second point is a reflection on unfolding events, seeking to explore how continued inputs from other forms of security governance could impact on emerging or partial attempts to govern with an ecological security perspective. Here, the status of Arctic cooperative governance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an illustrative example to consider. Both points can be read as impediments limiting the applicability of the ecological security framework. However, as McDonald argued, impediments are not the same as absolute limits (2021, 192) and potential obstacles are explored here in the spirit of advancing possibilities for ecological security.
The Russia Conference 2023: Russia and the West – a new reality
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Research on friendships in the Arctic
Norway and Poland as actors in a changing security landscape (NORPOLFACTOR)
The aim of the project is to develop enhanced knowledge of the security-related challenges, risks and threats Poland and Norway face in their strategic environment in the aftermath of the Russian inva...
Asia-Arctic Diplomacy a Decade Later: What has changed?
Ten years ago, five Asian states – China, India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea – joined the Arctic Council as observers. This article discusses how the Asia-Arctic Five’s policies policies and priorities have evolved over the past decade and what their hopes are for the incoming Norwegian chairmanship of the Council.
Tobias Etzold
Tobias Etzold (PhD) is a Senior Research Fellow in the Research Group for Security and Defense at NUPI. He mainly works as project leader of the C...
Security realities of freezing politics and thawing landscapes in the Arctic