Tobias Etzold
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Summary
Tobias Etzold (PhD) was a Senior Research Fellow in the Research Group for Security and Defense at NUPI. He mainly worked as project leader of the CLIMARCSEC (Climate change, Arctic and Security) project within the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC).
Expertise
Education
2010 Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Department of Political Science, Manchester Metropolitan University (United Kingdom)
2000 Master of Science, Political Science, Department of Political Science, Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands)
Work Experience
2023-2025 Senior Research fellow, NUPI
2020-2022 Lecturer in European Studies (Associate Professor on temporary basis), Department of Historical and Classical Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim
2019-2020 Desk officer, Europe department, Ministry for Justice, Europe and Consumer Protection of Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel (Germany)
2011-2018 Research Associate/Project Leader, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin
Aktivitet
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Clear all filtersGermany’s security and defence policies after the Zeitenwende: New government, new direction?
The German Zeitenwende (turning point of history), introduced in 2022, still has a long way to go when it comes to solving the structural problems that have long beset Germany’s security and defence policies. Moreover, it continues to face considerable domestic opposition. Even so, it remains an important ongoing process, signalling a positive way forward. Germany’s overall foreign, security and defence policy line – which features NATO and the EU as cornerstones – is unlikely to change significantly in the wake of the new conservative–social democratic government taking power. Nonetheless, the new administration will have to show more determination and political will if it is to get things done and assume greater responsibility for Germany’s and Europe’s security. In the shorter term, the German government has secured more funding for security and defence due to the release of the constitutional debt brake. In the medium and long term, however, a sound combination of creating debt and making room in the normal budget for more defence spending (which may also involve tax increases) will be required. At the same time, care must be taken to make more effective and efficient use of the available funds, rather than simply spending ever greater quantities. It would be wise to remain cautious and realistic about Germany’s political and military leadership capabilities in the short term, as the country has a lot of catching up to do in the first instance. Nonetheless, while Germany cannot lead alone in all domains and geographical areas, it can lead by example through continuing along the path it has embarked on. Successful leadership requires effective burden-sharing, meaning that several countries must be willing (whether singularly or jointly) to take the lead on particular issues or in specific geographical areas. Ideally, leadership should be conducted by small(er) groups of likeminded countries, including combinations of bigger and smaller states where appropriate. The close Norwegian–German security and defence partnership is characterized by mutual trust, common values and a long tradition of concrete cooperation, especially when it comes to maritime security. Over the longer term, this partnership can become even more strategic, systematic and sustainable, perhaps providing a model for other countries to follow. Moreover, the close relations between the two countries provides a counter-argument to those who accuse Germany of neglecting the interests of smaller European countries.
The Maritime Zeitenwende: Germany in the Northern Waters
In this report the authors study recent developments in German maritime defence policy and practice with a particular view on German-Norwegian relations. These relations are crucial, as the current security landscape challenges old geographical domains, particularly a stark division between operations in the Baltic Sea and North Sea. These areas are now being re-defined in and through military activity and technological advancements to address the security situation – including the increasing importance of protecting critical infrastructure – which will further contribute to policy development in the short and longer term.
Sweden’s thorny path into NATO: a changing country is finding its new place
On 7 March 2024, Sweden joined NATO after almost two years waiting for Turkey’s and Hungary’s approval. Sweden’s difficulties joining NATO due to Turkish and Hungarian resistance and its ambivalent reactions to related pressure were symptomatic for the country’s cumbersome switch from its normative non-aligned foreign and security policy towards a more conventional hard security and collective defence policy. Along those lines, the country’s self-perception and role as an international actor has changed significantly within only two years. Sweden quickly adapted to its new role as a NATO member, prepared involvement in NATO operations, stepped up military support for Ukraine and increased military spending, strengthening its armed forces significantly. This matches Norway’s recent plans for enhancing its defence, facilitating even closer Nordic cooperation, especially in the High North.
Small states coalition building in EU policy-making The cases of the Nordic and Baltic countries
Forming coalitions in various forms and shapes – institutionalized or ad hoc without any permanent structures, territorially constituted, i.e., consisting of countries from one region, or theme based – has become an important tool for small- and medium-sized EU member states in order to increase their political weight and impact in EU policy-making. On the basis of a conceptional and theoretical framework that distinguishes between different types of coalitions and the Baltic and Nordic EU member states as case studies, this chapter analyzes the use of coalitions for small states in an EU context along a number of examples of mainly regional coalitions. One important finding is that for defending their national interests Nordic and Baltic EU members’ governments overall seem to prefer flexible, issue-specific intergovernmental, non-institutionalized ad hoc coalitions consisting of a smaller number of like-minded countries. In contrast, while in the academic literature institutionalized coalitions and alliances are often labelled as the highest category of coalitions and indeed are good for informal consultations in a Nordic-Baltic context, in practice they do not seem to be preferred by these countries’ governments for negotiations in EU policy-making because of being not flexible enough or too small in terms of members.
Living up to expectations? German political ambitions and military role in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic
This project will contribute with knowledge and competence building about Germany’s evolving role as a military actor in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic ...
Climate change in the Arctic: Security implications and consequences for military operations – a MCDC project (CLIMARCSEC)
Climate-change occurs at some of the highest rates in the Arctic regions resulting in both emerging risks and new opportunities. ...