Korea’s unfinished war: The UN Command 73 years after the armistice
Norway's role in the Korean War is largely forgotten at home, but South Korea still remembers it. During the war, 683 Norwegians served at NORMASH...
Science diplomacy and sovereignty in Svalbard
Power politics and security dynamics in the Arctic increasingly manifest themselves in international research and science collaboration. Changes are visible also in the archipelago of Svalbard, where research is increasingly marked by strategic competition and framed in security policy terms. To a greater extent than before, research in the Arctic is defined by security measures and cautiousness. This Policy Brief discusses how Svalbard’s status as both a geopolitical hotspot and a global laboratory for climate research makes for a difficult balancing act.
From armed conflict to climate risk
Development assistance to Afghanistan, including over USD 800 million in climate financing, was suspended in 2021. This seminar asks what can be done, and which structures on the ground can carry the work.
The Adaptive Peacebuilding Guidebook
When we hear the word “peace”, we often think of the end of a war, a peace agreement, or large-scale reconstruction efforts that follow a conflict. In reality, however, peace does not emerge the day after a conflict ends. Rather, it is nurtured gradually through everyday interactions, relationships, and collective efforts. Peace is not something that can be delivered from the outside; it is something that emerges from within societies and communities themselves. The “Adaptive Peacebuilding Guidebook” seeks to translate this understanding into a practical framework through the approach known as Adaptive Peacebuilding. The academic foundations, theories, and concepts underpinning Adaptive Peacebuilding have already been articulated in the book Adaptive Peacebuilding: A New Approach to Sustaining Peace in the 21st Century . Adaptive Peacebuilding views peacebuilding not as a process of implementing predetermined plans or applying universal solutions, but as a process through which people learn, reflect, and adapt collectively in response to changing circumstances. Based on the academic insights presented in that book, the newly published guidebook to Adaptive Peacebuilding clearly summarizes the concept of Adaptive Peacebuilding for practitioners and presents eight case studies from United Nations agencies, bilateral development agencies such as JICA, and NGOs.
Recognition and Japan’s Post-coup Diplomacy in Myanmar and Afghanistan
How does Japan diplomatically engage with post-coup countries? Officially, it does not maintain diplomatic relations. Unofficially, however, Japan conducts a vibrant post-coup diplomacy. Probing different forms of recognition, this article investigates how Japan manages its diplomacy with countries where illiberal, military governments have violently assumed power. Since the military government’s coup in Myanmar in 2021, Japan has adapted its policies in terms of magnitude, span and content to remain engaged in this strategic location. Similarly, since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Japan has shifted its contributions for humanitarian assistance, political process and economic infrastructure. In both cases, Japan has crafted its post-coup relations amid intensifying great power dynamics on the one hand, and a changing domestic policy agenda for foreign aid and security on the other. Japan has developed its own distinct form of post-coup diplomacy that involves a ‘pragmatic’ approach to engagement and implied forms of recognition.
Recognition and Japan’s Post-coup Diplomacy in Myanmar and Afghanistan
How does Japan diplomatically engage with post-coup countries? Officially, it does not maintain diplomatic relations. Unofficially, however, Japan conducts a vibrant post-coup diplomacy. Probing different forms of recognition, this article investigates how Japan manages its diplomacy with countries where illiberal, military governments have violently assumed power. Since the military government’s coup in Myanmar in 2021, Japan has adapted its policies in terms of magnitude, span and content to remain engaged in this strategic location. Similarly, since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Japan has shifted its contributions for humanitarian assistance, political process and economic infrastructure. In both cases, Japan has crafted its post-coup relations amid intensifying great power dynamics on the one hand, and a changing domestic policy agenda for foreign aid and security on the other. Japan has developed its own distinct form of post-coup diplomacy that involves a ‘pragmatic’ approach to engagement and implied forms of recognition.