Recognition and Japan’s Post-coup Diplomacy in Myanmar and Afghanistan
How does Japan diplomatically engage with post-coup countries? Officially, it does not maintain diplomatic relations. Unofficially, however, Japan conducts a vibrant post-coup diplomacy. Probing different forms of recognition, this article investigates how Japan manages its diplomacy with countries where illiberal, military governments have violently assumed power. Since the military government’s coup in Myanmar in 2021, Japan has adapted its policies in terms of magnitude, span and content to remain engaged in this strategic location. Similarly, since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Japan has shifted its contributions for humanitarian assistance, political process and economic infrastructure. In both cases, Japan has crafted its post-coup relations amid intensifying great power dynamics on the one hand, and a changing domestic policy agenda for foreign aid and security on the other. Japan has developed its own distinct form of post-coup diplomacy that involves a ‘pragmatic’ approach to engagement and implied forms of recognition.
Recognition and Japan’s Post-coup Diplomacy in Myanmar and Afghanistan
How does Japan diplomatically engage with post-coup countries? Officially, it does not maintain diplomatic relations. Unofficially, however, Japan conducts a vibrant post-coup diplomacy. Probing different forms of recognition, this article investigates how Japan manages its diplomacy with countries where illiberal, military governments have violently assumed power. Since the military government’s coup in Myanmar in 2021, Japan has adapted its policies in terms of magnitude, span and content to remain engaged in this strategic location. Similarly, since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Japan has shifted its contributions for humanitarian assistance, political process and economic infrastructure. In both cases, Japan has crafted its post-coup relations amid intensifying great power dynamics on the one hand, and a changing domestic policy agenda for foreign aid and security on the other. Japan has developed its own distinct form of post-coup diplomacy that involves a ‘pragmatic’ approach to engagement and implied forms of recognition.
Building influence: China's Belt and Road Initiative and the geopolitics of infrastructure
Over the past decade, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has redrawn physical, economic, and political maps. From ports in the Indian Ocean to...
Global governance in transition: EU–Japan perspectives
New forms of cooperation are emerging, and countries are increasingly turning to smaller, more flexible alliances to navigate uncertainty. In this...
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Economics, Politics, and Norms
Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy aims to promote economic prosperity, peace, free trade, and the rule of law across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Scholars primarily have interpreted FOIP through three lenses: economics, security, and norms. Economically, it reflects Japan’s support for regional connectivity, trade, and infrastructure development as both a growth strategy and a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In security terms, FOIP emphasizes maritime readiness, defense cooperation with like-minded partners, and adherence to international maritime law amid tensions in the South and East China Seas. Normatively, it advances Japan’s values-based diplomacy, promoting democracy, human rights, and a rules-based order in contrast to authoritarian models. Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced FOIP in 2016, the concept has been adopted and adapted by many and diverse actors, each aligning it with their own strategic aims. This flexibility, unlike the more centralized BRI, is a hallmark of FOIP, resulting in a co-created, evolving, and often strategically ambiguous foreign policy. Dozens of countries from across the world incorporate FOIP language in their foreign and security policies, forming what some may consider a “narrative alliance” in the international system. The scholarship on FOIP is growing rapidly, yet there remain significant theoretical, methodological, and empirical questions unanswered.
Chinese Infrastructure Power in a Changing Global Landscape and its Alternatives
This seminar draws on five years of research to examine China's Belt and Road Initiative and its alternatives, from Europe and Latin America to Southeast Asia and the MENA region.
Chinese infrastructure power in a changing global landscape and its alternatives
This seminar draws on five years of research to examine China's Belt and Road Initiative and its alternatives, from Europe and Latin America to Southeast Asia and the MENA region.
Alaska, not Greenland, should worry the United States in the Arctic
The Arctic Institute: Erdem Lamazhapov (FNI) and Andreas Østhagen (FNI) argue that the US is letting itself be distracted by Greenland. While China is planning to begin construction of yet another icebreaker this year and is conducting joint military exercises with Russia in the Arctic, the US Coast Guard has delayed the development of several icebreakers until around 2030, and chosen to focus on Greenland. The FNI researchers emphasise that China's emerging maritime power has changed the strategic significance of the North Pacific.
Autoritære regimer former nå verdenspolitikken - i et system skapt av Vesten
Aftenposten: Alexander Dukalskis (University College Dublin) og Alexander A. Cooley (Columbia University) konkluderer med at det er viktig at Norge forsvarer sine liberale prinsipper i en tid med demokratisk tilbakegang. De sier Norge bør styrke båndene til likesinnede demokratier, fortsette å investere i egne sivile institusjoner, medier og forskningsmiljøer for å bygge motstandskraft mot de nye illiberale påvirkningskrefter i en verden i endring.