Researcher
Karsten Friis
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Dr. Karsten Friis is a Research Professor in NUPIs Research group on security and defence.
His research area is security and defense policies in Europe, with an emphasis on NATO, the Nordic region, the Arctic, transatlantic relations, intelligence, cyber security and the Western Balkans. He has published and led several major projects on these topics. Friis is also a frequently used commentator in the public discourse - not least in relation to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Friis is a political scientist with a PhD from the University of Groningen, a Cand. Polit from the University of Oslo and an MSc from the London School of Economics. Friis has been associated with NUPI since 2007. Before that, he was a political adviser to the OSCE Mission to Serbia (2004 to 2007), the OSCE in Montenegro (2001) and in Kosovo (1999). Friis was also part of the EU's negotiating team for the referendum on independence in Montenegro in 2006. In addition, Friis has worked for several years in the Norwegian Armed Forces and served at NATO/KFOR in Kosovo.
Expertise
Education
2018 PhD, University of Groningen
1998 Cand Polit, Political Science, University of Oslo
1995 Master, International Relations, London School of Economics
Work Experience
2007- Senior Research Fellow/Senior Advisor/Advisor, NUPI
2004-2007 Political advisor for OSCE, Serbia/Montenegro
2001-2004 Advisor, the Norwegian Armed Forces
2000-2001 Political advisor, OSCE, Montenegro
1999-2000 Analyst/E-off, NATO/KFOR HQ, Kosovo
1999 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission
Aktivitet
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An assessment of the Military Advice the Chief of Defence of Norway recently submitted to the Minster of Defence.
Er Forsvaret forberedt på dagens sikkerhetsutfordringer?
Is the Norwegian Armed Forces prepared for today's security challenges?
The Military Threat to Europe
To what extent does Russia pose a military threat to Europe today? A military threat is traditionally regarded as a combination of capabilities and intentions. However, capabilities are evolving slowly while intensions may change rapidly. Russia's military modernization over the last decade has particularly strengthened its non-strategic nuclear weapons, the precision guided missiles, and the Navy.
The U.S. Cyber Strategy of Persistent Engagement
How does the U.S. Cyber Command wish to position itself in cyberspace?
Konflikt i cyberspace – Internasjonalt trusselbilde og mottiltak
The presentation discussed various kinds of cyber risks, cyberconflict in international relations, and implications for Norway
Konflikt i cyberspace – Internasjonalt trusselbilde og mottiltak
The presentation discussed various kinds of cyber risks, cyberconflict in international relations, and implications for Norway.
Digital sikkerhet
The presentation discussed various kinds of cyber risks, cyberconflict in international relations, and implications for Norway.
Debatt om ny e-lov i Menneskerettighetsuka
I regi av Menneskerettighetsuka i Oslo arrangererte Amnesty Jus Oslo en debatt om forslaget til den nye etterretningstjenesteloven.
The U.S. National Cyber Strategy and 5G
What are the challenges and priorities in the American cyberspace?
Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.