Researcher
Niels Nagelhus Schia
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Summary
Niels Nagelhus Schia is a research professor, head of NUPI's Research group on security and defense, and co-chair of NUPI's Center on digitalization and cyber security studies.
He is a former fellow of the NSSR (New School for Social Research) and holds a PhD degree in social anthropology from the University of Oslo.
With a focus on the role of cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance in international relations Schia tracks new developments in policy and research, and provide academic studies, expert analysis and strategic policy recommendations. His research focus combines anthropology and international relations theory with theories of cyber security. His current projects are concerned with norms and state behavior in cyber space, development assistance and capacity building, societal vulnerabilities, sovereignty and cyberspace, global governance and cyberspace. In the research project GAIA (funded by the Research Council of Norway's IKTPLUSS initiative) Schia explores links between digital value chains, national autonomy and international politics. This is a four-year cooperation between SimulaMet, NUPI and several other institutions and universities. Read his most recent article The Cyber Frontier and Digital Pitfalls in the Global South published in Third World Quarterly (2018).
Schia has worked on numerous topics within international organizations, global governance, peacebuilding and statebuilding over the previous years. He has acted as an adviser to governments and international organizations on issues pertaining to capacity building, institution building and global governance. He has participated in international discussions and working groups in the United Nations and regularly participates at international conferences. He has long experience with developing and finalizing research projects financed by governments and research councils. A cross cutting concern in these research projects has been the exploration of global connections to more localized and national contexts. This is also a concern in his book Franchised States and the Bureaucracy of Peace (Palgrave Macmillian, 2018) and in his chapter Horseshoe and Catwalk: Power, Complexity and Consensus-Making in the United Nations Security Council in the book Palaces of Hope: The Anthropology of Global Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Schia has published in scientific journals such as Third World Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, International Peacekeeping, Journal of International Relations and Development, and Political and Legal Anthropology.
His current research focuses on cyber security, cyber capacity building in developing countries and emerging economies, internet governance and collaboration between states and non-state actors.
He is a former Fulbright Scholar and from January 2017 he is a co-editor of the leading Scandinavian-language International Relations-journal Internasjonal Politikk.
Expertise
Education
2015 PhD, Social Antropology, University of Oslo
2004 Cand.polit., Social anthropology, University of Oslo
Work Experience
2022- Head of NUPI's Research group on security and defence
2017- Co-editor of the leading Scandinavian-language International Relations-journal Internasjonal Politikk
2015- Head, NUPI's Cyber Security Centre. 2010 Advisor, Civil Affairs, Policy Best Practices Services (PBPS), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York HQ
2009 Visiting scholar at The New School for Social Research, New York, Leiv Eiriksson mobility programme (The Research Council of Norway) and Fulbright Scholar
2003- Research Assistant / Research Fellow / Senior Research Fellow/Research Professor, NUPI
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2012-2016 Board member Fulbright Alumni Association of Norway
2013-2016 Head of Scientific Committee for Fulbright annual research award
Aktivitet
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Theory Seminar: Cyber Conflict in the study of International Relations
Max Smeets will take a closer look at the academic literature on analysing cyber conflict.
Cybersikkerhet
(In Norwegian only) Den teknologiske utviklingen og framveksten av digitale nettverk har ført til noen av de mest dramatiske endringene vi har sett på flere generasjoner. Dette gjelder både endringer i sosial samhandling, men også endringer i den mer generelle samfunnsmessige utviklingen. Disse framskrittene har også hatt viktige implikasjoner for sikkerhetspolitikk, internasjonal politikk og forhold mellom stormakter. I fokusspalten i dette nummeret av Internasjonal Politikk har vi invitert samfunnsvitere til å belyse hvordan cybersikkerhet bidrar til å endre forhold mellom stater og internasjonale organisasjoner samt internasjonal politikk.
Neumann, NUPI og utenriksdebatten
(In Norwegian only) Iver B. Neumann begynte på NUPI i 1988. Etter tre tiår som NUPI-forsker (riktignok med en periode som Montague Burton-Professor i International Relations på LSE i London) meldte han i 2018 overgang til OsloMet. Med NUPI som plattform har Neumann satt et solid fotavtrykk i norsk offentlighet, og han er i dag en av Norges mest profilerte og internasjonalt anerkjente forskere på utenriks- og internasjonal politikk. Han er hyppig sitert, og er blant de 20 norske forskerne som publiserer mest ifølge CRISTIN-registeret.1 Han er særlig opptatt av norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, identitet, diplomati og Russland.
Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs
In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.
Forebygging av krig og konflikt i cyberdomenet
(Available in Norwegian only): Cyberdomenet representerer kanskje en av vår tids største trusler mot internasjonal fred og sikkerhet men er viet lite oppmerksomhet hva gjelder forebyg- ging av krig og konflikt. Det er behov for internasjon- ale forpliktende kjøreregler som hever blikket over IKT-forvaltning, digitalisering og cybersikkerhetstil- tak og fokuserer på fredelige relasjoner mellom sta- ter i cyberdomenet. Skal en slik diskusjon ha effekt må den tas i FNs Sikkerhetsråd.
Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
Parabasis: Cyber-diplomacy in Stalemate
Governments and industry around the world are working together to bring the next billion users online,1 but their synergies fade when it comes to how to keep online populations safe and secure. Further, the third and fourth billion of Internet users will enter a terrain very different from that available to their predecessors. Vulnerabilities in ICTs as well as de facto exploitation of these vulnerabilities by state and non-state actors has been acknowledged and problematized. Evidence of malicious and hostile operations involving ICTs and the Internet abounds. Uncertain about the true potential of ICTs, governments and users have focused on rules and responsibilities for protecting against cyberattacks, espionage and data manipulation. But where is there an understanding of how to remedy and improve the situation? The first part of this report analyzes and contextualizes the UN First Committee process. The second part offers the authors’ extensions to the theme, analyzing the relative successes and failures of the leading cyberpowers in promoting the world order of their liking. In particular, we analyze how Russia, as the initiator of the First Committee process, has created momentum and gathered support for its calls for specific international regulation and institutionalization of the process on the one hand, and stronger governmental control of the development and use of ICTs and the flow of information on the other. In conclusion, we offer some recommendations for governments wishing to pursue the goal of free and open cyberspace—indeed a rule-based world order. The full text can be read here: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2569401
International Cybersecurity: Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark
Tikk and Kerttunen inform new entrants and nonparticipating governments of the discussions and outcomes of the UN First Committee Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and discuss prospects for the 2019/2020 GGE. They explain why the Group will not able to provide answers to practical cybersecurity issues facing the majority of states. The authors call states to critically review their reasons for and expectations towards the UN First Committee dialogue on international cybersecurity.
The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)
Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.