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Researcher

Niels Nagelhus Schia

Research Professor, Head of the Research group on security and defense, Head of NUPI's Research Centere on New Technology
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Contactinfo and files

nns@nupi.no
(+47) 90 40 12 01
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Summary

Niels Nagelhus Schia is a research professor specializing in the intersection of new technology and international relations. He leads the Research group on security and defense at NUPI, and co-manages the institute’s Research Centre for New Technology. With a PhD in social anthropology from the University of Oslo and a fellowship from the New School for Social Research (NSSR), Schia combines deep academic insight with practical experience in global policymaking.

Schia has chaired prominent initiatives such as the Norwegian government's expert group on AI, democracy, and elections (2024–2025), he served as co-coordinator for the reference group on Norway's role in the UN Security Council (2021–2022), and he has been the project leader of several larger research projects. A former Fulbright scholar and board member of the Fulbright Association in Norway, he is also a longstanding contributor to international conferences, United Nations discussions, and working groups.

Beyond his research, Schia is deeply engaged in shaping the global academic and policy landscape. He was co-editor of Internasjonal Politikk, the leading Scandinavian journal on international relations, for nearly a decade (2017–2025). He serves as a member of the Holberg Debate working group, the advisory council of the United Nations Association of Norway, and other forums dedicated to advancing knowledge and dialogue in his field.

Expertise

  • Cyber
  • Development policy
  • Diplomacy
  • Foreign policy
  • Africa
  • Peace operations
  • International organizations
  • United Nations

Education

2015 PhD, Social Antropology, University of Oslo

2004 Cand.polit., Social anthropology, University of Oslo

Work Experience

2022- Head of NUPI's Research group on security and defence

2017- Co-editor of the leading Scandinavian-language International Relations-journal Internasjonal Politikk

2015- Head, NUPI's Cyber Security Centre. 2010 Advisor, Civil Affairs, Policy Best Practices Services (PBPS), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York HQ

2009 Visiting scholar at The New School for Social Research, New York, Leiv Eiriksson mobility programme (The Research Council of Norway) and Fulbright Scholar

2003- Research Assistant / Research Fellow / Senior Research Fellow/Research Professor, NUPI

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2012-2016 Board member Fulbright Alumni Association of Norway

2013-2016 Head of Scientific Committee for Fulbright annual research award

Aktivitet

Publications
Publications
Report

Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei

Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.

  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Foreign policy
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Foreign policy
Publications
Publications
Report

The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs

In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.

  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Conflict
  • International organizations
  • United Nations
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Conflict
  • International organizations
  • United Nations
Publications
Publications
Report

Forebygging av krig og konflikt i cyberdomenet

(Available in Norwegian only): Cyberdomenet representerer kanskje en av vår tids største trusler mot internasjonal fred og sikkerhet men er viet lite oppmerksomhet hva gjelder forebyg- ging av krig og konflikt. Det er behov for internasjon- ale forpliktende kjøreregler som hever blikket over IKT-forvaltning, digitalisering og cybersikkerhetstil- tak og fokuserer på fredelige relasjoner mellom sta- ter i cyberdomenet. Skal en slik diskusjon ha effekt må den tas i FNs Sikkerhetsråd.

  • Defence
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Conflict
  • International organizations
  • United Nations
  • Defence
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Conflict
  • International organizations
  • United Nations
Publications
Publications
Report

Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions

This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.

  • Defence
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Asia
  • Defence
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Asia
Publications
Publications
Report

Parabasis: Cyber-diplomacy in Stalemate

Governments and industry around the world are working together to bring the next billion users online,1 but their synergies fade when it comes to how to keep online populations safe and secure. Further, the third and fourth billion of Internet users will enter a terrain very different from that available to their predecessors. Vulnerabilities in ICTs as well as de facto exploitation of these vulnerabilities by state and non-state actors has been acknowledged and problematized. Evidence of malicious and hostile operations involving ICTs and the Internet abounds. Uncertain about the true potential of ICTs, governments and users have focused on rules and responsibilities for protecting against cyberattacks, espionage and data manipulation. But where is there an understanding of how to remedy and improve the situation? The first part of this report analyzes and contextualizes the UN First Committee process. The second part offers the authors’ extensions to the theme, analyzing the relative successes and failures of the leading cyberpowers in promoting the world order of their liking. In particular, we analyze how Russia, as the initiator of the First Committee process, has created momentum and gathered support for its calls for specific international regulation and institutionalization of the process on the one hand, and stronger governmental control of the development and use of ICTs and the flow of information on the other. In conclusion, we offer some recommendations for governments wishing to pursue the goal of free and open cyberspace—indeed a rule-based world order. The full text can be read here: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2569401

  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • United Nations
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • United Nations
Publications
Publications
Report

International Cybersecurity: Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark

Tikk and Kerttunen inform new entrants and nonparticipating governments of the discussions and outcomes of the UN First Committee Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and discuss prospects for the 2019/2020 GGE. They explain why the Group will not able to provide answers to practical cybersecurity issues facing the majority of states. The authors call states to critically review their reasons for and expectations towards the UN First Committee dialogue on international cybersecurity.

  • Cyber
  • United Nations
  • Cyber
  • United Nations
Publications
Publications
Scientific article

The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)

Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.

  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Asia
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Asia
Publications
Publications
Report

Managing a Digital Revolution - Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar

Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.

  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Asia
  • Security policy
  • Cyber
  • Asia
Publications
Publications
Scientific article

Tre grunner til at Norge bør med i FNs sikkerhetsråd

Norge har meldt seg på i kampen om en plass i FNs Sikkerhetsråd i 2021-2022. Kronikken presenterer 3 grunner til at Norge bør med i Sikkerhetsrådet.

  • Diplomacy
  • Foreign policy
  • International organizations
  • United Nations
  • Diplomacy
  • Foreign policy
  • International organizations
  • United Nations
Publications
Publications
Report

Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar

Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.

  • Cyber
  • Asia
  • Cyber
  • Asia
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