Has military activity in the Arctic increased after 2022?

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Arctic remained largely unaffected. Apart from the suspension of military cooperation and the introduction of limited economic sanctions, trade, investments, diplomatic ties, and people-to-people exchanges continued. Observers often referred to this as “Arctic exceptionalism” – the notion that the region stood out as a space for international cooperation and governance despite mounting geopolitical tensions elsewhere.

That picture changed dramatically after 2022. Western countries imposed sweeping economic and political sanctions on Russia, and the Arctic Council’s work was put on hold. But what about the military dimension?

In a new article, Karsten Friis, Senior Research Fellow at NUPI, examines how Russian and Western military activity in the European Arctic has developed before and after 2022. The study challenges common assumptions of heightened military escalation in the North following the war in Ukraine and asks: How have Russian and NATO military activities in the Arctic actually evolved?

• Read the full article here.

Russian Military Strategy in the North

No country possesses greater military capability in the Arctic than Russia. The Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, forms the backbone of Russia’s maritime nuclear second-strike force. The submarines stationed there are designed to carry out a retaliatory strike should Russia come under nuclear attack.

To safeguard this capability, Russia has developed what is known as a “bastion defense” – in other words, an effort to establish a secure operating area in the Barents Sea, shielded from hostile intrusions.

– The Russian air and naval forces have largely been preserved, and fleet modernization continues much as before the invasion, including the introduction of new classes of submarines, explains Friis.

– These modern submarines are of particular concern to the West because they are designed to be difficult to detect when operating in the deep sea. In addition to the strategic ballistic nuclear missiles primarily aimed at the United States, some of these submarines can be equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles, which may also carry nuclear warheads, he continues.

Since 2022, however, Russia’s ground forces in the region have been significantly weakened.

– Large parts of the land forces have been redeployed to Ukraine, and according to Western intelligence, their capacity has been reduced to around 20 percent of previous levels, Friis notes.

Western Activity in the Arctic

On the Western side, NATO and its allies have increased their military presence and activity in the Arctic.

– The United States and the United Kingdom have resumed exercises in the Barents Sea, which had been on hold since the 1980s. In addition, strategic bombers from the U.S. Bomber Task Force continue to train regularly with Nordic allies, Friis explains.

– The number of port calls by nuclear-powered submarines and naval vessels in Norway and Iceland has also risen significantly, he adds.

NATO’s enlargement with Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024 marks an important structural shift. While both countries have long cooperated with the Alliance, formal membership provides a clearer framework for joint planning in the North.

At the same time, NATO activity is carefully calibrated.

– Norway deliberately restricts allied exercises in the eastern parts of Finnmark, ensuring that training takes place at a safe distance from Russian territory, Friis notes.

– This approach reflects what the academic literature describes as ‘restrained signalling’ – a cautious yet clear demonstration of presence and readiness, without any intention of escalation, he continues.

Stability over Escalation

Despite heightened political tension and military build-up on both sides, Friis’ analysis shows that the overall level of military activity in the Arctic has remained relatively stable.

– Both Russia and NATO are exercising strategic restraint, and activity in the region largely follows established patterns, he says.

– There have been minor changes in capacity and training routines, but they remain limited. For example, U.S. and British naval forces operate far more frequently in regions such as the Mediterranean, he explains.

These findings suggest reason for cautious optimism: despite sweeping changes in Europe’s security landscape, the Arctic has not become a new arena of military confrontation.

– Military interaction in the region continues to be shaped by a shared recognition of the risks of escalation, particularly given the presence of strategic nuclear weapons, Friis points out.

An Arctic Exception?

At the same time, Friis stresses that the future remains uncertain.

– The ongoing war in Ukraine may lead Russia to adjust its priorities, and a stronger Western presence could eventually trigger sharper reactions from Moscow, he warns.

The war has already had direct consequences in the Arctic. Russia has used air bases on the Kola Peninsula for aircraft bombing Ukraine, and on some occasions Ukraine has managed to launch drones that reached all the way to these bases.

Even so, the article concludes that there is currently no operational “spillover” from the war in Ukraine into the European Arctic. While regions such as the Black Sea and the Baltic face heightened risk, the Arctic still stands out as an area of controlled military behavior and a prioritized status quo.

This relative stability, however, cannot be taken for granted.

– In a security environment marked by turbulence and unpredictability, it is crucial that Norway continues to play an active role in preserving the Arctic as a region of low tension, Friis concludes.