Not What to Have, but How to Have It: Japan’s Debate on Acquiring Counterstrike Capabilities 2016–2023

Written by

Wrenn Yennie Lindgren

Senior Research Fellow

Charlotte Børing

Former employee

Ed.

Summary:

As part of its historic defense buildup, Japan is incorporating counterstrike capabilities in its defense posture. While previous administrations were reluctant to pursue such capabilities, during the second Abe administration (2012–2020) the Liberal Democratic Party-Kōmeitō coalition eventually deemed them necessary for Japan’s self-defense. However, the belief that conducting counterstrikes is within the boundaries of Japan’s constitution and exclusively defense-oriented policy is contested. In this article, we study the parliamentary debate on acquiring counterstrike capabilities and examine how Japanese politicians discuss the parameters of the use of this controversial military instrument. Based on a content analysis of parliamentary transcripts, we find that three topics in particular are central to the debate on counterstrike capabilities: (1) the defense of Taiwan, (2) the role of the US in Japan’s defense and interoperability, and (3) the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although the opposition and ruling parties differ in their positions on the parameters for conducting counterstrikes, such an acquisition is no longer politically unsustainable. As such, the parliamentary debate is increasingly about the use and implementation of counterstrikes rather than their existence at all.