The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States
Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.
“Irregular” Migration and Divergent Understandings of Security in the Sahel
On 23 September 2020, the EU launched its new Pact on Migration and Asylum. In a refreshingly blunt press-release accompanying the Pact one could read: “The current system no longer works. And for the past five years, the EU has not been able to fix it”. The stated aim of the Pact is a fairer sharing of responsibility and solidarity between member states while providing certainty for individual asylum applicants. This is intended to rebuild trust between EU members as well as improve the capacity to better manage migration. However, whether the Pact will be implemented and have an effect on EU external migration policy in the Sahel remains to be seen. Following the 2012 crisis in Mali and further spread of instability to neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso, the central areas of the Sahel region have gained prominence as “producers” of transnational security threats, such as violent extremism, “irregular” migration and human trafficking. With Niger also being a major transit hub for northbound “irregular” migrants, this trend was further exacerbated by the so-called European refugee and migration crisis in 2015. This has led to unprecedented international attention in recent years, and consequently, a growing number of bilateral and multilateral donor assistance programmes and external military interventions. Since 2015, the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming from this area to Europe has been reduced. At first glance, this could mistakenly be understood as a success-story in migration management, or alternatively, that fewer people want to travel the dangerous route across the Mediterranean. However, the situation on the ground is going from bad to worse, despite increased levels of international resources invested to foster stabilisation and development in the region. Why? This IAI Commentary is based on the authors’ forthcoming journal article: “The Fragility Dilemma and Divergent Security Complexes in the Sahel”, in The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2020).
Myanmar: How to Become an Attractive Destination for Renewable Energy Investment?
Myanmar is endowed with abundant renewable energy resources, and its solar potential is the greatest in the Greater Mekong Subregion – yet, this potential remains largely untapped. The country’s 50% electrification rate remains the lowest in ASEAN, and the government plans to electrify the entire country by 2030. The share of renewable energy in the energy mix is expected to rise from less than 1% in 2020 to 12% in 2025. In addition to expanding electricity access, renewable energy could also stimulate much-needed employment and economic growth in Myanmar. We propose five actions that can improve the investment climate in Myanmar for renewable energy investment: strengthen renewable energy governance; join IRENA and intensify capacity building; adopt a feed-in tariff or auction mechanism; build a regulatory framework for renewable energy; simplify the business environment for investors.
Malaysia: How to Scale Up Investment in Renewable Energy
Malaysia set a target of 20% renewables in the energy mix by 2025, an 18% increase from the 2% it had in 2018. One of the planned measures is the development of large-scale solar power. To reach the target, it will be necessary to attract a total of USD 8 billion of renewable energy investment during this period. Considering the fact that Malaysia attracted only USD 2.5 billion from 2006 to 2018, the country will need to attract USD 1.3 billion on average every year from 2019. To achieve this, it will need to undertake serious reform measures to improve the investment climate for renewables and conditions for renewable energy deployment. Given the ever-increasing global competition for renewable energy investment, the rapid implementation of such reforms becomes an imperative. This in turn requires strong governance. We propose five actions that can improve the attractiveness of Malaysia’s investment climate for renewable energy to 2025 and beyond: reform energy governance in favour of renewable energy; ensure streamlined management of the regulatory framework for renewable energy; develop a framework for easier grid connection and use; enhance awareness-raising measures for investors; make market entry easy and attractive.
The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States
Presentation at the International Politics Seminar, Department of Politics, Gothenburg University.
Fixers and friends: local and international researchers
While we live in a highly unequal world where your position and place will determine what you have access to. However, based on years of fieldwork in the Sahel, this chapter turns this question around, exploring if it is possible to make inequaity work for mutual benefit. The answer is a modestly yes, and the chapter suggest if not a code of conduct, at least some personal principles of fieldwork that have come to guide my way of doing fieldwork, of making inequality work for mutual benefit.
Lao PDR: How to Attract More Investment in Small-Scale Renewable Energy?
Lao PDR adopted the Renewable Energy Development Strategy in 2011 and set a target of 30% small-scale renewables in the energy mix by 2025. The country relies heavily on large hydropower in electricity production and is an attractive investment destination for hydropower. At the same time, Lao PDR has also significant small-scale hydro and solar power potential. We propose five actions that can improve the investment climate in Lao PDR for small-scale hydropower, solar and wind energy: establish an autonomous government agency for renewables; join IRENA and build capacity for renewable energy governance; adopt a feed-in tariff and build a robust regulatory framework; develop a roadmap for small-scale renewable energy; facilitate market entry for investors.
Comments on Norwegian-Russian relations in the context of information on Russia's role in hacking of the Stortinget
Comments on Norwegian-Russian relations in the context of information on Russia's alleged role in hacking of the Stortinget on 24 August 2020 in TV2 Nyhetskanalen