Regions

Reconciling Indonesia’s Climate Ambition: Who Gets to Shape the Policymaking Process?

Indonesia entered COP30 in Belém, Brazil, with more ambitious pledges, but the governance that produces those commitments has changed little. Successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) show greater ambition on paper yet remain shaped by a narrow technocratic circle, limited public participation, and growth-first economic assumptions. This expert-centered approach reveals a persistent tension between development priorities and the Paris Agreement’s goals. To strengthen credibility, ambition, and delivery before the next pledge-and-review cycle, Indonesia should: • Expand NDC involvement beyond the existing expert group. • Build a climate action coalition to coordinate national and local efforts. • Invest in capacity building while maintaining national control. • Publish comprehensive implementation roadmaps with well-defined targets and milestones. • Reduce reliance on FOLU and land-use sinks by accelerating energy and industrial decarbonization. • Rebuild strategic climate diplomacy to guide focused coalitions at COPs.

Når rompolitikk blir sikkerhetspolitikk: Norsk deltakelse i EUs romaktiviteter

The report is in Norwegian but it has an English summary. This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries to inform decisions about Norway’s continued participation in EU space activities for 2028–2034. It does so by evaluating the benefits for both Norway and the EU of continued Norwegian participation. The report situates the discussion within a broader context, considering not only direct economic gains but also how political, technological and security developments have transformed the conditions for space activities, space policy, and Norway’s role in Europe’s evolving space landscape. Norway is deeply dependent on well-functioning space capacities, both for societal and defence-related purposes. Space-based services have become critical infrastructures with few substitutes, underpinning key sectors of the Norwegian economy, everyday services, public administration, and military systems. The increasing criticality of space is not unique to Norway but reflects the deep embeddedness of satellite-based services in modern societies. At the same time, the politics of space have grown more tense and contested. Space is increasingly embedded in power politics, strategic competition and concerns about resilience. For small states like Norway, the high costs and complexity of space activities mean self-sufficiency is unfeasible, and cooperation necessary. On the civilian side, this cooperation has mainly been oriented towards European cooperation, in the European Union's Space Programme (2021-2027) and in the European Space Agency (ESA). In a changing geopolitical context, the EU has assumed a stronger and clearer role as a security policy actor. Resultingly, its space policies are changing and are now closely tied to the EU’s ambitions for strategic autonomy and a stronger role in security and defence. This shift blurs the distinction between the EU and ESA, and between civilian and military aims and capacities. Closer and more integrated European cooperation on space ties EU member states more closely together but it also sharpens boundaries between the EU and other countries. At the same time, there is a major restructuring under way in how the EU finances and organizes its efforts in the space sector. This backdrop places Norwegian space policy in a new and demanding context. This report examines the consequences of these developments for Norway, and how they change the framework conditions for Norwegian space policy and participation in the EU’s space activities. The report is structured around the following overarching research questions: Where is Europe’s space policy heading? What is Norway’s role in this development? What are the benefits of Norwegian participation in the EU’s space activities? And what are the alternatives to continued Norwegian participation in the EU’s space activities for the period 2028–2034? The report finds that participation in EU space activities (2021-2027) has been highly beneficial to Norway, providing essential services and integration into a broader European ecosystem for technology development, exports and learning. At the same time, the EU also benefits from Norwegian participation: Norway offers niche expertise, unique Arctic capabilities, and northern ground infrastructure that are costly or difficult for other European states to replicate, thereby strengthening European competitiveness and resilience. Looking ahead to 2028–2034, non-participation would weaken Norway’s access to key data, services and information, undermine the position and competitiveness of Norwegian space industry, make an ambitious national space policy harder to pursue, and risk an erosion of space competence. For the EU, it would mean having to replace or go without Norwegian capabilities and resources. For both parties this is a suboptimal outcome.

India in the Multilateral System: UN, Bretton Woods and Club Governance

Nordisk drejning i nordområderne

Engelsk: In the Norwegian Government’s new High North strategy, the Nordic region has a more prominent role. What does that mean – for the High North and for Nordic cooperation?

Handlingsrom og norsk støtte til kvinner, fred og sikkerhet i Afghanistan og Sudan

This article examines how Norwegian support for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in Afghanistan and Sudan is affected by factors such as war, humanitarian crises and democratic decline. In the article, the authors look more closely at the factors that influence the support provided, and how the relevant actors respond to changes in the framework conditions. The authors find that the work is affected by changes in the political space, including armed conflict and democratic decline. The situation is somewhat different in the two countries, but in both cases, the absence of official cooperation with the countries’ central authorities requires Norway to take a more flexible approach to the WPS work and to direct more of its efforts toward the local level. In both Sudan and Afghanistan, there are local variations in terms of humanitarian access and willingness to work with the WPS agenda. In other words, there is room for Norway to continue its work to support the implementation the WPS agenda in these contexts, although in countries affected by crisis and conflict this often must be done differently than in countries where Norway has an embassy or official cooperation with the local authorities.

Kvinner, fred og sikkerhet i norsk utenrikspolitikk: En politikk med vikeplikt?

Women, Peace and Security in Norwegian Foreign Policy: A Policy of Yielding?Over the past 25 years, Norway has been an important supporter and driving force behind the global effort to implement the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, and has built significant status as a leading actor in this field. As we mark the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, we see that the international community’s commitment to and belief in shared global values – which has laid the foundation for Norway’s status building – is changing. This means that continued strong support for the WPS agenda may not yield the same results in terms of international status and foreign policy capital in the years to come. In this article, we outline what place the WPS agenda has had – and still has – in Norwegian foreign policy, and question the extent to which Norway will have the ability and willingness to continue to play a leading global role on WPS given the current, turbulent, geopolitical situation. The already well-established status as a global leader on WPS means that Norway is well positioned for taking this work forward. However, this will require an approach that is adapted to a changing international system, and a willingness to pursue a policy which is increasingly contested and where the return, at least in the form of status and foreign policy capital, may not come as easily and as quickly as it did in the past.

“BRIexit”: Unravelling Withdrawals from the Belt and Road Initiative

Twelve years into the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), over 140 countries have joined, but a few have left. These withdrawals, or BRIexit, though limited in number, raise crucial questions about the prospect of Beijing’s flagship initiative and the shifting geopolitical landscape in which it operates. What explains the withdrawals? More importantly, has there been any impact on the legitimacy of the BRI? Whilst some BRIexits stem from economic calculations, others reflect changing state preferences or mounting external pressures—trends that could reshape the BRI’s future, especially under a more aggressive second Trump administration.