How are these two supposed to cooperate?
They don’t have much in common, Donald Trump and Keir Starmer. But does that mean we are about to see a British showdown with the United States? In this op-ed in Dagsavisen, NUPI researchers Øyvind Svendsen and Paul Beaumont raise this question. At first glance, the two leaders appear to be diametrical opposites. On one side, the somewhat rigid social democrat and human rights lawyer Starmer; on the other, the ruthless rule-breaker Trump. Can they cooperate at all? Must the British now break away from their special relationship with their American guiding star?
Tourists as a Means of Power
For many in Norway, Chinese tourists represent an important source of income. For China, tourism is hardline politics. Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide (Arbeiderpartiet) recently told Aftenposten that we must exercise caution regarding Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, but that this does not preclude a future free trade agreement. Minister of Culture Lubna Jaffery (Arbeiderpartiet) also seeks to strengthen cooperation with China. It is reasonable to question whether the government fully understands Chinese power politics. As China expert Torbjørn Færøvik emphasizes, it is one thing to work towards cooperation and dialogue with China, “but weaving the Norwegian economy into the Chinese one is something quite different.”
Expelled from the Fairytale: The Impact of the Dissident Legacy on Post-1989 Central European Politics
To understand the political dimension of dissident legacies, we need first to understand the components that “made” the dissidents and follow their reconfiguration after 1989, leading to initial empowerment followed by gradual demise of the liberal post-dissident elite. Dissidence in the form that first appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s in central and eastern Europe constituted a particular mode of political practice, combining open, non-violent dissent with universalist moral claims. The phenomenon of dissidentism was transnational, as political empowerment of oppositionists was achieved through a particular network of relationships between domestic audiences, repressive regimes, and Western media, social movements, trade unions, political parties, and policymakers. The specificities of the dissidents’ empowerment can partly explain key features of post-dissident politics and the visible backlash against former prominent dissidents, which has contributed to the rise of illiberalism and to democratic backsliding. This article traces the post-1989 trajectories of a few who belonged among central Europe’s most prominent representatives in this symbolic category, to try to explain the causes and character of the swift backlash against them—or as Václav Havel put it, their “expulsion from the fairytale.” Three pillars of dissident political power turned into the roots of their demise. First, critics question the dissidents’ uniqueness and rewrite their master narrative. Further, we see a clash of representations that results from the dissidents’ transnational empowerment, and third, the broader anti-elite and anti-intellectual tendencies that always accompanied dissidence as its shadow became amplified by more recent populist rhetoric.
The urgent need for social science and humanities knowledge for climate action in Europe
The morphology of Putinism: the arrangement of political concepts into a coherent ideology
Scholarly analysis has been divided as to whether Putinism is a coherent ideology. With the decision to invade Ukraine, this question requires reexamination. This article interprets the evolution of Putinism in morphological terms, tracing how political concepts developed into a distinctive ‘thin’ ideology. After interpreting the original formation of Putinism (2000–2012), I unpack how interlinked processes of securitization and culturization reshaped the arrangement of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. This was preceded by discursive closure between the Kremlin and its ideological antagonists over critical junctures in 2012 and 2014. An emphasis on the reactive, events-driven dynamic of Putinism reveals how it functions as an immanent morale that reinforces preexisting power networks and strives to win the loyalty of the population. Preserving culture and security has become synonymous with maintaining the very existence of the Russian Federation. With the launch of the ‘Special Military Operation’ in February 2022, this ideology was not immediately transformed but rather deployed on a new and more dramatic level. The ideological reconfiguration examined in this article must be understood as a crucial precursor to the decision to escalate the war in Ukraine, which ris reshaping Russia’s political trajectory in dramatic and unpredictable ways.
Pragmatism and protest: Russia’s communist party through Covid-19 and beyond
The Covid-19 epidemic came at a sensitive time for Russia’s leadership, which was attempting a political reset and structural reforms, including the removal of President Putin’s presidential term limits. This article examines how issues related to the pandemic provided new opportunities for the systemic opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who emerged as the main beneficiaries after capitalising on opportunities created by the epidemic. The underappreciated role of systemic opposition parties in electoral authoritarian systems, which balance “voice” and “loyalty” to benefit both themselves and the regime, is examined in the context of the Covid-19 crisis.
Introduction to the Special Issue on Under Communism’s Shadow The Memory of the Violent Past in Present-Day Russia
Perhaps no topic could be more crucial to the concept of “post-communism” than how the Soviet past is commemorated, challenged, or forgotten. The study of historical memory is often correctly tied to identity politics and nation-building. While the usable past framework is broadly applicable to all modern states, in the Russian case a degree of alarmism and negativity surrounds interpretations of how the country has managed its communist past, particularly its violent parts. A significant element to this is a teleological view of progress and the salience of the transition paradigm. In memory studies, this is manifested in the dominance of the cosmopolitan memory mode as the correct way the violent past should be commemorated. The introduction reviews the existing literature on Russia’s memory politics and highlights three limitations: (1) overemphasis on the political center and the failure to capture the diversity of regions, (2) too much focus on the supply side of memory politics, and (3) one-sided presentations of the role the Great Patriotic War plays in Russian memory politics. The introduction reviews how the special issue contributions address these limitations in the literature and shows how, taken together, they offer ideas for new research on memory studies. A case is made for how this new research agenda can better understand memory processes and how they relate to broader ideological, cultural, social, and political change in Russia.
Climate Obstruction in Poland: A Governmental–Industrial Complex
Poland is known for its climate scepticism and denial throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Despite its recent rapid deployment of renewable energy sources, Poland remains Europe’s most coal-dependent economy. Since 2004, consecutive governments have been ‘pulling the brake’ on the European Union’s more ambitious climate policy initiatives and decarbonization targets. There are recent signs of changing societal attitudes, but the country is alone among EU nations in lacking a net zero emissions target or a coal power phase-out date. This situation has been created and perpetuated by a coalition of governmental institutions, agencies, state-owned energy companies, and utilities that constitute a governmental–industrial complex (GIC). While the GIC has moderated its discourse and policies, it continues to promote ‘silver bullet’ technologies such as ‘clean’ coal and new nuclear power plants. Poland’s commitment to a just, gradual energy transition is a climate imposter tactic, part of an overarching strategy of delay.
From possible conflict to wartime cooperation: Laying the foundations of regional cooperation in the Caspian Sea (2002–2018)
This research paper uses snapshots of media coverage in the Caspian states to explore the stateled region-building efforts around the Caspian Sea from 2002–2018. Counter to the dominant conflict thesis in the literature, the findings suggest that the five states have moved towards more comprehensive political and economic cooperation. Relations have gradually been anchored in an understanding of the Caspian Sea as a shared space with multiple interlinkages and dependencies, even describing it as a “sea of peace and friendship”. This depiction is maintained by the Caspian states, also after the Sea became an arena and lifeline for Russia’s war against Ukraine after February 2022. This paper provides background and analysis of the developing regional cooperation and explores in the conclusion how this cooperation has gained new salience in Russia’s response to the sanction regime.