More bark than bite? Assessing China’s coercive measures in Scandinavia
Amid growing concern about Chinese coercion, this article examines the extent to which Beijing has resorted to such measures in Scandinavia based on case studies of Denmark and Sweden. Distinguishing between the actual use of and threats of using coercive measures, the article finds few instances of coercion even if Chinese authorities have repeatedly warned of negative consequences of violating China’s interests in the case of Sweden, while frequently expressing anger and frustration at perceived provocations by the Danish government or NGOs. However, as relations between Norway and China have also recently deteriorated, the risks of Norway being subjected to Chinese coercion should be assessed in a broader geographical context given an increasing number of reported cases from other regions.
Per Erik Solli
Per Erik Solli is Senior Defence Analyst in NUPIs Research group on security and defence. Solli also has a position as Senior Adviser at Nord Univ...
Europe, Norway, and the Ukraine crisis
We will take a closer look at how the war in Ukraine affects security, trade, economy, and migration in Europe and in Norway.
POSTPONED! Webinar: New political dividing lines and implications for European integration
The last decade there has been a political divide in Western societies. Which consequences does this have on national policies and future European cooperation?
Security debates and partnership choices in the Nordic states: From differentiation to alignment
Summary: What security challenges do the Nordic states highlight in a fluctuating security environment? Towards which partner institutions, networks and states do they orient themselves, and what role do they envision for further Nordic security and defence cooperation? Focusing on Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, this report maps and analyses present-day debates on security and defence in these four states. Examining both official positions and perspectives presented in the wider political and media debates in all four states, a key finding is that their perceptions of the security environment and of key partnerships have become more aligned over the past decade. Further, all four states are woven into a complex web of European and transatlantic initiatives, partnerships and institutions in security and defence. While Finland and Sweden remain outside of NATO and Norway and Iceland outside of the EU, the Nordic states’ participation and degree of integration in European and transatlantic structures is more similar than it used to be. We also observe that the four states appear more aligned than before in their views on how Nordic security and defence cooperation should develop in the future, and for what purpose. While it is still premature to talk about a ‘common Nordic order’ in the security and defence domain, in all four states we find that there is interest in and commitment to further strengthening Nordic security and defence cooperation.
Nordic Cooperation: Drivers and constraints
Remarks at the seminar "Nordic cooperation amid pandemic travel restrictions"
Nordic Airpower Cooperation and Finland’s F-35 decision: Towards a New Era?
The Nordic states air forces have cooperated closely, especially after Russia reinvigorated its military posture in the region from 2007-2008. With regional security policy and military strategy becoming more closely integrated after 2014, this tactical activity has become a key part of an emerging strategic-level pattern of cooperation. Closer political and military integration has enabled regional security cooperation to proliferate across unit types and activities. With the introduction of new generation fighter aircraft in the short term, and future air combat systems in the longer term, cooperation is set to change, but given its dual imperative is bound to continue and expand as new avenues emerge. Especially, the continuation of CBT in the short and long term has both a tactical and strategic rationale. Finland’s decision to procure the F-35 Lightning II will enable even closer airpower cooperation in the Nordics and in a broader European and trans-Atlantic framework, both in peace, crisis, and armed conflict. System similarity with Norway extends to the JSM, which opens the possibility for joint development of this weapon system and its operational use. As such, the procurement sets the stage for closer collaboration at both the tactical, operational and military-industrial levels.
Nordic cooperation amid pandemic travel restrictions
Since 2020, the Nordic countries have been confronted with the Covid-19 pandemic, which has been a multi-level stress test for the region. The strong basis of open borders and free movement in Nordic cooperation has been questioned by national pandemic measures, including wide travel restrictions. The Nordic dimension to pandemic responses has largely been missing, the trust between the countries has arguably been put to test and cross-border commuters have been subjected to differential treatment. Especially cross-border regions have suffered the consequences of travel restrictions, causing disruptions to work and private life. The report draws attention to the preparedness of the Nordic Region to jointly confront global crises. It explores the different strategies and travel restrictions adopted by four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. It also studies how Nordic cooperation functioned in a time of crisis. At the local level, it examines the economic, labour market and social implications for three cross-border regions, that is, Tornedalen, Svinesund and Öresund. The report finds that while there is room for improvement in handling a crisis like the pandemic, there are diverging views on the desirability to have all-Nordic approaches to situations affecting national security. The consequences are, however, serious for free movement and the aim to become the most integrated region in the world.