In the Blind Spot of the Norwegian EU Debate: EU Health Preparedness After COVID-19

This article challenges the Norwegian EU debate by focusing on an overlooked but increasingly important policy area for European cooperation, namely health policy and more specifically health preparedness. The EU has started major processes related to health preparedness in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. Norway takes part in some of these processes through the EEA agreement but is also currently excluded from important areas. This article serves two purposes: it maps ongoing EU development in health preparedness and assesses the extent to which this area should occupy more space in the Norwegian EU debate, including the sustainability of the current status quo. The article further identifies two specific areas that are central to Norway in relation to health preparedness. The first concerns the development of the EU’s Health Union and Norway’s political work to ensure formal access to all the initiatives that have recently been developed in the EU. The other concerns the effects that the EU’s intensified work on health preparedness has for the Norwegian health industry. The article concludes that Norwegian vulnerabilities are particularly linked to Norway’s political role as an EU outsider, but that these vulnerabilities must be considered in the context of any contribution the Norwegian health industry can make in the European health market if Norway becomes more closely connected to the Health Union.

How do donors integrate climate policy and development cooperation? An analysis of the development aid policies of 42 donor countries

This article assesses how donor countries integrate climate action into their development aid policies. An analytical framework is developed for the systematic comparison of development aid policies along three dimensions: hierarchy of policy objectives, types of measures the donors implement, and linkages to international climate negotiations. Analyzing the development aid policies of 42 donors, we find that only three have redesigned their development aid policies to fully integrate climate policy concerns. Instead, donors treat climate change as a thematic priority area. This includes several donors that are currently not obliged to provide climate finance under the UNFCCC. Furthermore, five major donor countries emphasize the use of diverse foreign policy tools to support climate action in developing countries. Importantly, we identify how other development goals (poverty, gender) are integrated with climate policy goals. Only two donor countries clearly separate development aid and climate finance. Luxembourg states that its climate finance pledge is additional to development, while New Zealand has a separate climate finance strategy where the allocation of funds is based on climate mitigation effectiveness concerns.

Expelled from the Fairytale: The Impact of the Dissident Legacy on Post-1989 Central European Politics

To understand the political dimension of dissident legacies, we need first to understand the components that “made” the dissidents and follow their reconfiguration after 1989, leading to initial empowerment followed by gradual demise of the liberal post-dissident elite. Dissidence in the form that first appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s in central and eastern Europe constituted a particular mode of political practice, combining open, non-violent dissent with universalist moral claims. The phenomenon of dissidentism was transnational, as political empowerment of oppositionists was achieved through a particular network of relationships between domestic audiences, repressive regimes, and Western media, social movements, trade unions, political parties, and policymakers. The specificities of the dissidents’ empowerment can partly explain key features of post-dissident politics and the visible backlash against former prominent dissidents, which has contributed to the rise of illiberalism and to democratic backsliding. This article traces the post-1989 trajectories of a few who belonged among central Europe’s most prominent representatives in this symbolic category, to try to explain the causes and character of the swift backlash against them—or as Václav Havel put it, their “expulsion from the fairytale.” Three pillars of dissident political power turned into the roots of their demise. First, critics question the dissidents’ uniqueness and rewrite their master narrative. Further, we see a clash of representations that results from the dissidents’ transnational empowerment, and third, the broader anti-elite and anti-intellectual tendencies that always accompanied dissidence as its shadow became amplified by more recent populist rhetoric.

The urgent need for social science and humanities knowledge for climate action in Europe

The morphology of Putinism: the arrangement of political concepts into a coherent ideology

Scholarly analysis has been divided as to whether Putinism is a coherent ideology. With the decision to invade Ukraine, this question requires reexamination. This article interprets the evolution of Putinism in morphological terms, tracing how political concepts developed into a distinctive ‘thin’ ideology. After interpreting the original formation of Putinism (2000–2012), I unpack how interlinked processes of securitization and culturization reshaped the arrangement of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. This was preceded by discursive closure between the Kremlin and its ideological antagonists over critical junctures in 2012 and 2014. An emphasis on the reactive, events-driven dynamic of Putinism reveals how it functions as an immanent morale that reinforces preexisting power networks and strives to win the loyalty of the population. Preserving culture and security has become synonymous with maintaining the very existence of the Russian Federation. With the launch of the ‘Special Military Operation’ in February 2022, this ideology was not immediately transformed but rather deployed on a new and more dramatic level. The ideological reconfiguration examined in this article must be understood as a crucial precursor to the decision to escalate the war in Ukraine, which ris reshaping Russia’s political trajectory in dramatic and unpredictable ways.

Pragmatism and protest: Russia’s communist party through Covid-19 and beyond

The Covid-19 epidemic came at a sensitive time for Russia’s leadership, which was attempting a political reset and structural reforms, including the removal of President Putin’s presidential term limits. This article examines how issues related to the pandemic provided new opportunities for the systemic opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who emerged as the main beneficiaries after capitalising on opportunities created by the epidemic. The underappreciated role of systemic opposition parties in electoral authoritarian systems, which balance “voice” and “loyalty” to benefit both themselves and the regime, is examined in the context of the Covid-19 crisis.

Introduction to the Special Issue on Under Communism’s Shadow The Memory of the Violent Past in Present-Day Russia

Perhaps no topic could be more crucial to the concept of “post-communism” than how the Soviet past is commemorated, challenged, or forgotten. The study of historical memory is often correctly tied to identity politics and nation-building. While the usable past framework is broadly applicable to all modern states, in the Russian case a degree of alarmism and negativity surrounds interpretations of how the country has managed its communist past, particularly its violent parts. A significant element to this is a teleological view of progress and the salience of the transition paradigm. In memory studies, this is manifested in the dominance of the cosmopolitan memory mode as the correct way the violent past should be commemorated. The introduction reviews the existing literature on Russia’s memory politics and highlights three limitations: (1) overemphasis on the political center and the failure to capture the diversity of regions, (2) too much focus on the supply side of memory politics, and (3) one-sided presentations of the role the Great Patriotic War plays in Russian memory politics. The introduction reviews how the special issue contributions address these limitations in the literature and shows how, taken together, they offer ideas for new research on memory studies. A case is made for how this new research agenda can better understand memory processes and how they relate to broader ideological, cultural, social, and political change in Russia.

Ecosystems and Ordering: A Dataset

This article presents a dataset, examining how global ecosystems are governed, offering data about cooperation initiatives around 221 cross-bordered ecosystems. This sample of cases was selected from a list of 1525 “meta-ecosystems” catalogued by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and a team of scientists (terrestrial ecosystems, [6]; freshwater ecosystems, [2]; and marine ecosystems, [9]). The 221 ecosystems were selected because they are shared by four or more bordering countries. Departing from this unit of analysis, we researched the cooperative cross-border governance anchored in each ecosystem and categorized each of these based on the level and type of cooperation. In generating this dataset, our coding scheme was designed to also capture cases of non-cooperation: when our search protocol did not result in the identification of any initiative for an ecosystem, the ecosystem was coded as a “zero case.” When we found initiatives connected to the ecosystems, our coding typology specifically classified cooperation initiatives along two dimensions: cooperation geographical scope and cooperation scope (single or multi-issue). The dataset presents ecosystem-anchored cooperation initiatives, as well as wider initiatives that may address ecosystem issues, to systematically attend to the question of the extent to which and in which form ecosystems are addressed in transboundary governance efforts. The dataset allows for further study of ecosystemic governance patterns, enabling analysis of the causes and consequences of cooperation, since it can be easily integrated with both the ecosystem and state-level data. The dataset is presented in two .csv files and has been handled with R software in order to present the visualization.

Climate Obstruction in Poland: A Governmental–Industrial Complex

Poland is known for its climate scepticism and denial throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Despite its recent rapid deployment of renewable energy sources, Poland remains Europe’s most coal-dependent economy. Since 2004, consecutive governments have been ‘pulling the brake’ on the European Union’s more ambitious climate policy initiatives and decarbonization targets. There are recent signs of changing societal attitudes, but the country is alone among EU nations in lacking a net zero emissions target or a coal power phase-out date. This situation has been created and perpetuated by a coalition of governmental institutions, agencies, state-owned energy companies, and utilities that constitute a governmental–industrial complex (GIC). While the GIC has moderated its discourse and policies, it continues to promote ‘silver bullet’ technologies such as ‘clean’ coal and new nuclear power plants. Poland’s commitment to a just, gradual energy transition is a climate imposter tactic, part of an overarching strategy of delay.

Contesting just transitions: Climate delay and the contradictions of labour environmentalism

The notion of ‘just transition’ (JT) is an attempt to align climate and energy objectives with the material concerns of industrial workers, frontline communities, and marginalised groups. Despite the potential for fusing social and environmental justice, there is growing concern that the concept is being mobilised in practice as a form of ‘climate delayism’: a problem more ambiguous than open forms of denialism as it draws in multiple and conflictual agents, practices, and discourses. Using an historical materialist framework, attentive to both energy-capital and capital-labour relations, we show how JT is vulnerable to forces and relations of climate delay across both fossil capital and climate capital hegemonic projects. We review this through an engagement with the climate obstructionism literature and the theory of labour environmentalism: the political engagement of trade unionists and workers with environmental issues. As tensions within the labour movement surface amidst the unsettling of the carbon capital hegemony, we assess the degree to which (organised) labour—as an internally differentiated, contradictory movement—is participating in climate breakdown through a ‘praxis of delay’. Trade unions and industrial workers are often implicated in resisting or undermining transitions, but this is related significantly to their structural power relations vis a vis the fossil hegemony. Notably, JT negotiations are themselves structurally embedded within the carbon capital economy. The general preferences of trade unions for social over environmental justice might be prevalent but are neither universal nor inevitable; JT is open and contested political terrain, and labour-environmental struggles remain imperative for building just energy futures.