The bear and the EU-China-US triangle: Transatlantic and Russian influences on EU’s “pivot to Asia”
This article argues that in the case of the EU’s efforts to undertake a “Pivot to Asia”, added explanatory salience can be achieved by recognising firstly the importance of the transatlantic factor and the US’ own rebalance policies. Secondly, based on a model where the USA is regarded as a significant variable in the EU-China relationship, one may more saliently discern the influence of Russia by assessing its impact on the triangular EU-China-US relationship, both directly and indirectly. Addressing these issues in European policymaking, the article will be constituted of two main parts. In the first section, the triangular nature of European foreign policies towards China is introduced, addressing the transatlantic factor in EU-China relations. Based on research on the European policy debates on EU’s Asia policies and the American Pivot to Asia, the section will illustrate the degree to which EU policy initiatives are conceived as playing out on a range from cooperation to competition with the US’ rebalance initiatives. In the second section, the chapter will proceed to investigate a factor that is affecting, although to different degrees, all three corners of the triangular political context in which European China policies are being shaped, namely the effects of recent Russian actions in the Eurasian theatre. The analysis demonstrates how European policymakers struggle to define their place in the EU-China-US triangle. The dynamics of the ongoing Asian power shift highlights the dilemmas for the European continent, as it seeks to balance its relations in a shifting geopolitical landscape.
Lars Gjesvik
Lars Gjesvik is a senior researcher in the Research Group for Security and Defence at NUPI, where he also serves as the co-leader of the research...
EU gas supply security – the power of the importer
The chapter examines how the European Union can exert its market and regulatory power in its relations with key external energy suppliers. The focus is on the EU instrument toolbox and how various policy instruments have been used in relations with the main suppliers of gas to the Union. Due to the centrality of Russia and Norway to the EU’s gas supply and their different ways of relating to the Union in formal and regulatory terms, the chapter focuses on the impact EU market and regulatory power has had on the operations of these two actors. The chapter also presents some general conclusions on the effectiveness of the EU’s use of various policy instruments in relations with external suppliers of energy.
Market-specific Sunk Export Costs: The Impact of Learning and Spillovers
Firms may face sunk costs when entering an export market. Previous studies have focused on global or country-specific sunk export costs. This study analyses the importance of market-specific sunk export costs (defining ‘market’ as a product–country combination). We also study how market-specific export costs can be affected by various kinds of learning and spillover effects. We use firm-level panel data for Norwegian seafood exports distributed on products and countries. The results lend support to the hypothesis of market-specific sunk costs. We also find evidence of learning and spillover effects, particularly within the same product group.
TTIP and Norway: Impact and trade policy options
This study analyzes TTIP, its implications for Norway and Norway’s trade policy choices. TTIP will hardly be concluded under Obama's presidency, but the agreement could become a reality within a few years. TTIP aims at comprehensive cooperation in the regulatory area. In the short term there will be limited harmonization of standards but regulatory cooperation between different systems. In the long term, the goal is stronger cooperation in the regulatory area. TTIP will from what we know not lead to a lowering of European health regulations or a "race to the bottom". If TTIP is realized and Norway remains outside, the EEA Agreement will be little affected and the overall economic impact is moderate. If Norway joins TTIP, there will be a significant real income gain, with estimates ranging from 2236 to 6772 NOK per capita in the various scenarios. There is considerable variation across sectors. With Norway outside TTIP there will be a moderate negative impact for a majority of the sectors, especially some manufacturing sectors that face tougher competition in the EU and USA export markets. The oil industry will benefit from increased demand and higher prices. If Norway joins TTIP, a clear majority of industries will benefit; especially business services and a number of other service industries. The public sector gains from TTIP, mainly due to cheaper inputs. TTIP will contribute to the dismantling of import protection for Norwegian agriculture and without compensating measures, production and employment will be reduced. TTIP will still allow some import protection and this margin of maneuver, which depends on future negotiations, is important for the outcome. With a larger margin of manoeuvre and unchanged budgetarty support, most of Norway’s agriculture can be maintained. With less margin of manoeuvre, it will be more challenging. Norwegian accession to TTIP may occur in the form of a standard trade agreement in which Norway or EFTA are formally equal to the EU and the United States. Alternatively, Norway may participate in a European pillar as in today's "Open Skies" agreement on air traffic. If TTIP succeeds in establishing comprehensive regulatory cooperation, the latter solution is most likely. Such a solution implies that Norway will become more closely integrated with the European Union also in trade policy towards third countries. Norwegian entry into TTIP implies that we have to accept the established rules and negotiate bilaterally with the EU and the USA on market access. The negotiations with the USA will apply to all aspects of market access, while negotiations with the EU will apply only to areas in which the EEA agreement is not already deeper. The negotiations with the EU for TTIP entry will thus include, among other issues, tariffs for seafood and agriculture. As an alternative to membership in TTIP, Norway or EFTA may initiate a trade agreement with the USA. Such an agreement would likely be less extensive in the regulatory area. Such an agreement will also provide an economic gain for Norway, but less than accession to TTIP. For Norway as a whole, accession to TTIP creates a real income gain between 12.5 and 35 billion NOK according to various scenarios, while a free trade agreement with the United States results in a gain of about 7.4 billion NOK. TTIP also includes negotiations on so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), whereby foreign-owned companies can sue a state if they are unfairly or inappropriately treated. Such rights also exist in national law but international tribunals have to some extent extended the interpretation of what is considered unfair. The European Union has proposed a solution in TTIP with a permanent court as well as rules that discipline the interpretation of the principles, and thus avoids that ISDS unduly interferes into the states’ "right to regulate". This and many other issues are analysed in this report and six background papers.