The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism?
The Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel reflects the commitment of African states to cooperate to address common security challenges. Yet, little is known about its counter-terrorism strategy for the region. This article focuses on the security pillar of the G5 Sahel, the Joint Force (FC-G5S), and provides a critical examination of its mandate to combat terrorism in the Sahel. It explains the context into which the force was deployed and provides an overview of its conceptualisation and configuration. It demonstrates that in its current form, there is a danger of advancing a security-first stabilisation strategy that relies heavily on military-led counter-terror operations to contain and deter the threat of terrorist groups which can have serious consequences for local communities living among insurgents. The article argues that while establishing firmer border control and enhanced intelligence-sharing between the G5 Sahel states is important, the current counter-terror response risks depoliticising insurgents, and neglects the sociopolitical and economic grievances and problems of governance that have enabled violent extremism to take root in the first place. Removing the categorisation of jihadist insurgents as terrorists only and understanding their multifaceted identities – some as legitimate social and political actors – would open up more policy responses, including dialogue and conflict resolution.
Theory Seminar: Protest Diffusion During the 1919 Egyptian Revolution
Neil Ketchley will discuss his latest article on the diffusion of protest in a population.
Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON)
NUPI together with 40 partners from across the globe have established an international network to undertake research into the effectiveness of peace operations. ...
UN Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix will talk about the status of UN Peace Operations.
Implementation in practice: The use of force to protect civilians in United Nations peacekeeping
Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.
Kvifor forhandle fred? Ein analyse av forhandlingsstart i den væpna konflikten i Colombia
(Article available in Norwegian only): The conflict in Colombia has seemed insolvable for decades. Despite several peace attempts, it has always flared up again. In this article, I explain the onset of peace negotiations in 2012 between the Government of Colombia and the FARC, the largest guerrilla group in the country. I claim the fundamental explanation for why they initiated negotiations was the military weakening of the FARC in the 2000s, which led the guerrilla group to appreciate the necessity of ending the conflict through negotiation in order to reach at least some of their goals. The second most important factor was the change in leadership in Colombia, where in 2010 the newly-elected president, Juan Manuel Santos, considered a political solution possible and more attractive than his predecessor did, and took pragmatic measures to create a sustainable process. In addition, third parties contributed to safe and secret proceedings and to trust in the peace process. Negotiations begun in 2012 are – through a structured, focused comparison – compared with the peace dialogue in Caguán (1999-2002) between the same actors, where negotiation did not start. Case studies like this one can help us understand dynamics behind the choices of armed actors to pursue political solutions to armed conflicts. The onset of negotiation, which I analyze, must not be equated with a peace agreement or the end of the conflict. It can, however, provide important answers about where armed actors’ motivation to end conflicts come from, and under what conditions this motivation can bring the parties to the negotiating table.