Energy as a tool of statecraft after Ukraine and Gaza
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have transformed how energy functions as a tool of statecraft, revealing that contemporary energy-related power extends far beyond the manipulation of commodity trade. Direct targeting of electricity systems, fuel infrastructure, and even nuclear power facilities has become a central feature of warfare, exposing the vulnerability of modern, electrified societies. These attacks, combined with intensified forms of economic coercion such as sanctions, price caps, and market reconfiguration, underscore the inadequacy of the traditional “energy weapon” concept, which focuses narrowly on supply disruptions by exporting states. Instead, the new energy security landscape is shaped by interdependence, infrastructure exposure, cyber risk, and shifts triggered by the global energy transition. As decarbonization advances, vulnerabilities migrate from fuels to technologies, value chains, and critical raw materials, generating new geopolitical asymmetries and strategic dependencies. For European policymakers, these developments demand a reconceptualization of energy security that prioritizes systemic resilience, protection of civilian energy infrastructure, and integrated approaches to economic statecraft, defence planning, and climate policy. Understanding energy as both a strategic asset and a potential target is essential for navigating a future in which energy systems are increasingly central to conflict, coercion, and geopolitical competition.
Energy as a tool of statecraft after Ukraine and Gaza
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have transformed how energy functions as a tool of statecraft, revealing that contemporary energy-related power extends far beyond the manipulation of commodity trade. Direct targeting of electricity systems, fuel infrastructure, and even nuclear power facilities has become a central feature of warfare, exposing the vulnerability of modern, electrified societies. These attacks, combined with intensified forms of economic coercion such as sanctions, price caps, and market reconfiguration, underscore the inadequacy of the traditional “energy weapon” concept, which focuses narrowly on supply disruptions by exporting states. Instead, the new energy security landscape is shaped by interdependence, infrastructure exposure, cyber risk, and shifts triggered by the global energy transition. As decarbonization advances, vulnerabilities migrate from fuels to technologies, value chains, and critical raw materials, generating new geopolitical asymmetries and strategic dependencies. For European policymakers, these developments demand a reconceptualization of energy security that prioritizes systemic resilience, protection of civilian energy infrastructure, and integrated approaches to economic statecraft, defence planning, and climate policy. Understanding energy as both a strategic asset and a potential target is essential for navigating a future in which energy systems are increasingly central to conflict, coercion, and geopolitical competition.
Rethinking Red Sea Security: Toward a Cooperative Regional Framework
The Red Sea sits at the intersection of geopolitical rivalry, maritime insecurity, and global trade. What pathways are there toward greater cooperation and stability in the region?
Resilience, Peacebuilding, and Preventing Violent Extremism: A Complex Systems Perspective on Sustaining Peace
How can resilience and peacebuilding help address the root causes of violent extremism? This seminar marks the Norwegian book launch of a new volume exploring this challenge.
Breakfast seminar: Rethinking Red Sea Security: Toward a Cooperative Regional Framework
The Red Sea sits at the intersection of geopolitical rivalry, maritime insecurity, and global trade. What pathways are there toward greater cooperation and stability in the region?
Breakfast seminar: Rethinking Red Sea Security: Toward a Cooperative Regional Framework
The Red Sea sits at the intersection of geopolitical rivalry, maritime insecurity, and global trade. What pathways are there toward greater cooperation and stability in the region?
Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa irrigation project: Implications for transboundary water management in Central Asia
Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa irrigation project could exacerbate water scarcity and destabilize Central Asia. To ensure sustainable resource management and avert potential conflict, a multilateral water-sharing agreement must be negotiated among the states involved with mediation by the international community.
Czech and Norwegian perspectives on new security threats concerning Russian war on Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted the world’s energy system. The most urgent need was to phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian energy imports and find a quick replacement. In this joint paper, we approach the issue from two different perspectives of the Czech Republic and Norway, looking for intersections and identifying opportunities to strengthen cooperation and facilitate the accelerated energy transition and diversification. We conclude that both countries have taken immediate action in addressing the most pressing energy-related risks. The potential for closer cooperation is obvious. Both countries should maximise the level of collaboration by taking advantage of existing institutional frameworks (NATO and EU/EEA). In the energy dimension, the key to cooperation in the short term is gas (investment in production in Norway, development of export pipelines or protecting critical sub-sea infrastructure). In the longer term, both countries should jointly cooperate on developing of hydrogen market, including production and transportation.
Room for Change? Premises of the EU's Space Policy
Since 2009, the EU’s space policy has, to a large extent, been grounded in principles linked to the EU’s climate and environmental agenda, based on a peaceful orientation toward the use of outer space. The ongoing transformation in Europe, where geopolitics has greater momentum, can be described as a shift away from the EU as a normative space actor, which has been the institutionalized premise of the EU’s space policy. The article problematizes the fact that, despite increased attention to security and defense in space policy, this shift does not materialize in practice. Drawing on institutional theory, the article discusses the factors that sustain stability and prevent rapid change, explaining how continuity in the EU’s space policy makes transformation difficult. Based on the EU’s two space strategies from 2016 and 2023, as well as interviews with space policy bureaucrats within the EU system, the article analyzes whether security and defense have become strengthened premises of the EU’s space policy. The findings are based on traceable structural and strategic shifts that may indicate significant change. The article further examines how the lack of operationalization in the EU’s space strategies, internal political disagreement among EU member states regarding the EU’s mandate, and technological lock-ins in the development of space capabilities challenge the EU’s ability to implement its defense and security agenda in its space policy. The findings show that the EU is not able to implement new security and defense ambitions in its space policy at the expected pace of the political leadership.