Researcher
Andrew E. Yaw Tchie
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie is a Senior Researcher in the Research group on peace, conflict and development. At NUPI, he works on stabilisation, peace operations, peacebuilding and security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. He also coordinates the Training for Peace Project.
Tchie is a visiting Professor at the University of Buckingham, a visiting Senior Researcher at Kings College London and Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
Expertise
Education
2018 Dr Phil., Department of Government, University of Essex
2013 Master of Science, Conflict Resolution and Peace. Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester
2011 Masters of Arts, Politic and Communication, University of London, London
2006 Bachelor of Arts, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. (Broadcasting Research)
Work Experience
2020- Senior Research Fellow and Training for Peace (TfP) Programme Coordinator, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (NUPI)
2020- Associate Fellow, Africa, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
2020- Visiting Professor, Dept. of Humanities Research Institute, University of Buckingham
2020- Senior Research Fellow for Africa Security and Obasanjo Fellow, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
2018-2020 Editor of the Armed Conflict Database and Research Fellow, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
2018-2020 Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Conflict and Health, Kings College London
2017-2018 Conflict Adviser, Research and Policy team, Syria Relief
2015-2017 Civil Affairs Officer, United Nation Mission in South Sudan
2015- Associate Fellow, University of Essex
2013-2015 Conflict Adviser and Research Fellow, United Nations Development Program (Nepal) 2012- Field Researcher, Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution, University of Essex (Nepal)
2009-2010 Researcher, Commonwealth Secretariat
Aktivitet
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Clear all filtersA Forgotten People in An Unstable Region - The Effectiveness of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei Executive Summary
Established in June 2011, UNISFA aims to foster peace, stability, and development in the disputed Abyei region. Focused on implementing the Abyei Protocol, the mission addresses border demarcation (through the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism for the Sudan-South Sudan boundary since South Sudan’s independence in 2011) and security concerns and supports local governance through engagement with administrations. However, since 2011, UNISFA’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate and protecting civilians has been questioned as sporadic and spontaneous violence remains very high. While the overall security situation in Abyei has shown signs of improvement, persistent conflict dynamics stemming from intra- and inter-communal tensions, hired armed elements, and humanitarian challenges continue to set the region back. The rise of communal conflicts between new ethnicities and communities entering the “Abyei box” – often referred to as the Abyei area – has led to further tensions with the mission over its ability to protect civilians. In this Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) study, the authors set out to explore the effectiveness of UNISFA in meeting its mandated tasks in several areas. These include: 1. Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; 2. Support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism; 3. Provide de-mining assistance, technical advice, and security; and 4. Provide aid to humanitarian personnel and oil infrastructure in the Abyei Administrative Area (AAA), respectively. The report examines how effective the mission has been in meeting its core mandate, what we can understand from the mission’s success and challenges, and how adaptive the mission has been regarding the ongoing crisis in Sudan and South Sudan and its impact on Abyei, which has strategic and broader implications for the mission. Co-authors Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie – Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Training for Peace Programme. Dr Fiifi Edu-Afful – Visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at the American University School of International Service and the University of Maryland Department of Government & Politics. He was formerly a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Contributing authors Christian Ulfsten – former Research Assistant with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Ruth Adwoa Frimpong – Project Consultant with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) Nigeria. EPON series editor Dr Cedric de Coning, Research Professor – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
A Forgotten People in an Unstable Region - The Effectiveness of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
Established in June 2011, UNISFA aims to foster peace, stability, and development in the disputed Abyei region. Focused on implementing the Abyei Protocol, the mission addresses border demarcation (through the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism for the Sudan-South Sudan boundary since South Sudan’s independence in 2011) and security concerns and supports local governance through engagement with administrations. However, since 2011, UNISFA’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate and protecting civilians has been questioned as sporadic and spontaneous violence remains very high. While the overall security situation in Abyei has shown signs of improvement, persistent conflict dynamics stemming from intra- and inter-communal tensions, hired armed elements, and humanitarian challenges continue to set the region back. The rise of communal conflicts between new ethnicities and communities entering the “Abyei box” – often referred to as the Abyei area – has led to further tensions with the mission over its ability to protect civilians. In this Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) study, the authors set out to explore the effectiveness of UNISFA in meeting its mandated tasks in several areas. These include: 1. Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; 2. Support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism; 3. Provide de-mining assistance, technical advice, and security; and 4. Provide aid to humanitarian personnel and oil infrastructure in the Abyei Administrative Area (AAA), respectively. The report examines how effective the mission has been in meeting its core mandate, what we can understand from the mission’s success and challenges, and how adaptive the mission has been regarding the ongoing crisis in Sudan and South Sudan and its impact on Abyei, which has strategic and broader implications for the mission. Co-authors Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie – Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Training for Peace Programme. Dr Fiifi Edu-Afful – Visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at the American University School of International Service and the University of Maryland Department of Government & Politics. He was formerly a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Contributing authors Christian Ulfsten – former Research Assistant with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Ruth Adwoa Frimpong – Project Consultant with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) Nigeria. EPON series editor Dr Cedric de Coning, Research Professor – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
The Impact and Response to Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation and Hate Speech in the Digital Era Executive Summary
Over the past decades, the use of misinformation, malinformation, disinformation and hate speech (MDMH) has contributed to the escalation of violence in environments where the United Nations deployed Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO). The widespread utilisation of modern technology in UN PKO environments raises the magnitude of the MDMH threat. In some settings, MDMH places communities and peacekeepers at risk of harm, but more broadly, MDMH places UN PKOs in ever more challenging situations which they are often incapable of responding to. The spread of information by actors as part of hearts and minds campaigns and other information strategies to bring populations on the ground on their side is nothing new. Simultaneously, the diffusion of rumours and false information can contribute to the escalation of tensions between and within groups and communities and result in widespread violence. All of these can support and contribute to the intensification and acceleration of MDMH, impacting not only the conflict dynamics but also the use of indiscriminate violence. The online uptake of MDMH may further aggravate these dynamics. It can undermine the stability of mission environments, local conflicts, indiscriminate use of violence by non-state and state actors, impact detrimentally on human rights, and jeopardise overall processes of achieving and sustaining peace and supporting its processes. The report draws on four UN PKOs as case studies and hinges further analysis on two UN PKOs to provide and understand context specific examples of the rising challenges that UN PKO face with MDMH. This report by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) in collaboration with Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP) and Training for Peace sets out to explore some of these key developments and challenges questioning, what is the impact of MDMH on UN PKO’s and their ability to effectively implement their mandates? What efforts have the selected UN PKO’s taken to respond to MDMH? What are the lessons identified and recommendations for UNPKOs to address MDMH?
The Impact and Response to Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation and Hate Speech in the Digital Era
Over the past decades, the use of misinformation, malinformation, disinformation and hate speech (MDMH) has contributed to the escalation of violence in environments where the United Nations deployed Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO). The widespread utilisation of modern technology in UN PKO environments raises the magnitude of the MDMH threat. In some settings, MDMH places communities and peacekeepers at risk of harm, but more broadly, MDMH places UN PKOs in ever more challenging situations which they are often incapable of responding to. The spread of information by actors as part of hearts and minds campaigns and other information strategies to bring populations on the ground on their side is nothing new. Simultaneously, the diffusion of rumours and false information can contribute to the escalation of tensions between and within groups and communities and result in widespread violence. All of these can support and contribute to the intensification and acceleration of MDMH, impacting not only the conflict dynamics but also the use of indiscriminate violence. The online uptake of MDMH may further aggravate these dynamics. It can undermine the stability of mission environments, local conflicts, indiscriminate use of violence by non-state and state actors, impact detrimentally on human rights, and jeopardise overall processes of achieving and sustaining peace and supporting its processes. The report draws on four UN PKOs as case studies and hinges further analysis on two UN PKOs to provide and understand context specific examples of the rising challenges that UN PKO face with MDMH. This report by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) in collaboration with Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP) and Training for Peace sets out to explore some of these key developments and challenges questioning, what is the impact of MDMH on UN PKO’s and their ability to effectively implement their mandates? What efforts have the selected UN PKO’s taken to respond to MDMH? What are the lessons identified and recommendations for UNPKOs to address MDMH?
UNMISS 2022 Mandate Renewal: Risks and Opportunities in an Uncertain Peace Process
Ahead of the March 2022 renewal of the mandate for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) conducted an assessment focused on two core mandate areas: protection of civilians (PoC) and support for the peace process. Based on the assessment to follow, the report lays out several strategic considerations for the new UNMISS mandate
A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force
In January 2015, the African Union (AU) authorised the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security arrangement of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to deal with the threat of Boko Haram (BH) in the Lake Chad region. Its mandate includes the responsibility of ensuring a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the BH insurgency, reducing violent attacks against civilians, facilitating stabilisation programmes in the Lake Chad region, facilitating humanitarian operations, and the provision of assistance to affected populations. To achieve its mandate, the MNJTF undertakes both kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Its mandate has been renewed annually since 2015, and in December 2022, the AU renewed its mandate for another 12 months. This report assesses the effectiveness of the MNJTF in delivering on its three mandate priorities to generate recommendations. It is important to note that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) renewed the mandate of the MNJTF earlier than expected, and as a result, this report offers reflections on how to enhance the effectiveness of the mission going forward. Despite long standing constraints, such as insufficient funding, gaps in operational command and control, inadequate equipment and an intelligence-sharing cell, the MNJTF has recorded appreciable successes. Its efforts and successes have counteracted BH and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists, resulting in a significant decline in attack incidents in the region. In addition, they have created a conducive environment for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their communities and the resumption of trade between the northeast of Nigeria and neighbouring markets in Cameroon and Chad. The recent acquisition of assets, growing coordination among the sectors, and shift from a defensive to an offensive posture brought about by the current Force Commander (FC) are some factors contributing to the recent successes of the MNJTF. Nevertheless, the lack of policing capability, intelligence gaps, evolving terrorist-organised crime dynamics, and resource-capacity mismatch are some of the current impediments to the efforts of the MNJTF to end the menace posed by terror groups in the Lake Chad region.The partnership between the AU and the MNJTF is considered vital not only for the mission’s credibility but also for the critical role the AU can play in appropriately resourcing the MNJTF. While the general conclusion drawn from respondents was that the AU was doing its best to improve the situation, there was still a need for it to do more in certain important areas. This situation calls for the prioritisation of current challenges and for appropriate deployment of available resources to address them. To enhance the capacity and effectiveness of the force in combating terrorism in the Lake Chad region, the report recommends prioritising developing police capacity across member states, strengthening the MNJTF intelligence capacity, aligning training with core priority areas to close capacity gaps, and institutionalising a due diligence framework for funds utilisation. The prospects of the MNJTF achieving its core responsibilities in the months and years ahead will depend to some extent on how the mandate renewal recognises and allocates sufficient resources to address areas of priority concerns.
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors, its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.
UNITAMS Mandate Renewal Study: Fostering a Process of Trust and Inclusivity
The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on 3 June 2020 under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2524 to support Sudan during its transition to democratic rule and it was renewed the following year through SC 2579(2021). UNITAMS was conceived of and designed to respond to new and long-standing issues in Sudan: the political transition process that began with the December 2018 revolution and the legacy of armed conflicts. The Mission’s mandate explicitly recognises the adverse effects of climate change on the stability of Sudan and stresses the need for appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies. Yet, since the adoption of the Mission’s mandate in June 2020 and its renewal in June 2021, Sudan’s political, security and economic situation has deteriorated significantly. An attempted military coup in September 2021, followed by a successful coup d’état on 25 October 2021, has further worsened Sudan’s political crisis, increasing insecurity, undermining the economy, and resulting in the interruption of bilateral and international funding – all amidst the continuing global pandemic. This fast-changing political, security and economic context has placed UNITAMS in a very delicate position in relation to the host government. It has required UNITAMS to focus a significant portion of its attention on good offices and diplomacy so that, together with the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other international partners and Sudanese stakeholders, it can support a process aimed at bringing Sudan’s transition back on track. While the UNITAMS mandate remains relevant and adequate, the Mission must continue to be allowed the flexibility to adapt its focus to the fast-changing dynamics on the ground. UNITAMS’ good offices’ role should remain at the centre of the Mission’s efforts during the next mandated period, helping Sudanese stakeholders to find an inclusive political settlement that can secure a transition to democratic rule in the medium to long term. At the same time, the Mission should continue its work in support of its other objectives and priorities, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of the peace agreement, and advisory and capacity building, particularly related to the rule-of-law sector. The Mission should strengthen its focus on and ability to integrate climate-related security risks into its analytical work, especially as it relates to supporting local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts to prevent inter-communal violence. While there has been significant progress in strengthening collaboration among the UN, AU and IGAD, maintaining and sustaining the partnership must remain a key priority in the Mission’s work to promote regional stability.
Terrorismo e instabilità, i governi locali cercano «soluzioni africane a problemi africani»
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie is interviewed to discuss the increase in violence and the vicious circle created by the coups d´état in Africa and emphasises that African Problems must be solved by African solutions.
Enhancing the African Union’s function in supporting transitional governments in Africa
In 2010, the African Union (AU) committed to establishing the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as a Pan-African platform to promote good governance, democracy and respect for human rights. The AGA was devised to support the implementation of objectives outlined in the legal and policy pronouncements in the AU’s shared values. However, over the past few years, despite the efforts of this pillar, there has been a noticeable decline in democracy, governance and human rights values in some AU member states. The emergence of coups and constitutional changes has coincided with a trend in the use of transitional agreements/ governments across Africa. Many of these transitional agreements are stagnant, fail to deal with the root causes of grievances (they neglect the challenges that transitional governments must navigate), and often delay steps towards democratic consolidation. Instead they produce forms of military government that entrench authoritarian rule led by military actors who use the transitional agreements to eventually deliver electoral authoritarianism. This paper explores the rise, implementation and effectiveness (processes) of transitional agreements in six African states. It contends that the recent launch of the AU’s Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme is a worthy effort for supporting transitions in Africa. However, it argues that the AU needs to strengthen the AGA pillar and put in place better provisions to support transition mechanisms. It must develop context-specific adaptive stabilisation strategies to support the different forms of transitional government(s), systems, mechanisms and institutions underpinning these transitions to avoid the emergence of an array of transitional governments that do not deliver for the affected communities. Finally, steps must be taken to deal with the root causes of coups etc., which initially receive widespread support, but might indicate that civilian support may be linked to temporarily seeking solutions to the challenges (e.g., economic underdevelopment, centre-rural challenges, political isolation, insecurity etc.) that the government of the day has neglected to deal with.