Researcher
Andrew E. Yaw Tchie
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie is a Senior Researcher in the Research group on peace, conflict and development. At NUPI, he works on stabilisation, peace operations, peacebuilding and security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. He also coordinates the Training for Peace Project.
Tchie is a visiting Professor at the University of Buckingham, a visiting Senior Researcher at Kings College London and Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
Expertise
Education
2018 Dr Phil., Department of Government, University of Essex
2013 Master of Science, Conflict Resolution and Peace. Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester
2011 Masters of Arts, Politic and Communication, University of London, London
2006 Bachelor of Arts, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. (Broadcasting Research)
Work Experience
2020- Senior Research Fellow and Training for Peace (TfP) Programme Coordinator, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (NUPI)
2020- Associate Fellow, Africa, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
2020- Visiting Professor, Dept. of Humanities Research Institute, University of Buckingham
2020- Senior Research Fellow for Africa Security and Obasanjo Fellow, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
2018-2020 Editor of the Armed Conflict Database and Research Fellow, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
2018-2020 Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Conflict and Health, Kings College London
2017-2018 Conflict Adviser, Research and Policy team, Syria Relief
2015-2017 Civil Affairs Officer, United Nation Mission in South Sudan
2015- Associate Fellow, University of Essex
2013-2015 Conflict Adviser and Research Fellow, United Nations Development Program (Nepal) 2012- Field Researcher, Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution, University of Essex (Nepal)
2009-2010 Researcher, Commonwealth Secretariat
Aktivitet
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Clear all filtersThe United Nations–African Union Partnership and the Protection of Civilians
The landscape of peace operations in Africa has transformed over the past decade, including a marked increase in African-led peace support operations (PSOs). Since the early 2000s, the African Union (AU) and UN have evolved distinct, albeit parallel, conceptual and operational approaches to the protection of civilians (POC). While the UN views POC in peacekeeping as a whole-of-mission objective, with military, police, and civilian components prioritizing POC and proactively protecting civilians, the AU views itself as contributing to the protection of civilians primarily by neutralizing armed groups and establishing a protective environment. These differences raise important questions about how POC will be upheld in the context of the UN-AU partnership. This report examines the operational differences between UN and AU approaches to POC, assessing their respective advantages and limitations. It highlights how African-led PSOs tend to be more able and willing to use force to respond to outbreaks of violence and to contain aggressors but have less sustainable and flexible financing than UN peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping missions with POC mandates have more robust civilian and police components but may lack rapid response capabilities. To strengthen their partnership on POC, the two organizations should leverage their comparative advantages, acknowledge their respective limitations, and work toward an approach to POC that is tailored to each context.
Converging Global Norms and Institutional Policies with Bottom-Up Approaches to the Protection of Civilians
The participation of the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) in the protection of civilians (PoC) has shown that their respective experiences have evolved and helped to support the ideals of PoC. PoC is considered a key indicator to the success of the UN mission, and the concept has grown in relevance across activities of the UN. Equally, over the last two decades, the AU Peace and Security Council has increasingly mandated and deployed Peace Support Operations (psos) to prevent and respond to human security threats and mass atrocities on the African continent. However, the existence of Ad hoc Security Initiatives (asis) and Enterprise Security Arrangements (esas) that are swifter at deploying to areas of insecurity allows affected states to use forces within and across their borders to attempt to deal rapidly with protection concerns. The use of asis and esas for protection concerns differs from large UN and AU operations, which rely on a clear mandate, policy, guidance, and principles developed from built-up experience. The article explores the nature and use of asis and esas and asks whether these new operations can provide better civilian protection outcomes. It explores how asis and esas can adopt PoC guidelines from the AU to allow for better protection and PoC in the specific environments where asis and esas operate. Finally, the article proposes ways asis and esas can integrate the AU PoC policy into their operations.
Consolidating African-led Peacebuilding Efforts
While the United Nations (UN) holds the primary responsibility for securing global peace, it increasingly emphasises the importance of partnerships with regional organisations. In practice, this means the UN often engages only once peace has been brokered. The wider international community looks to leading regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU) in the case of Africa, to take the lead in peacebuilding. As such, the AU has emerged as a key actor — mobilising international support for peacebuilding across the continent, while also driving the development of significant localised initiatives and anchoring these in state institutions towards advancing peace and stability. However, in persistent, violent conflicts, peacebuilding efforts often take a backseat. Stabilisation frequently takes centre stage, while policymakers focus on immediate humanitarian priorities and the prevention of further violence. As a result, peacebuilding in Africa is rarely uniform across states. It is often concentrated in capitals and urban areas, producing long-term effects that may exacerbate tensions and inadvertently reinforce the very disparities that initially sparked conflict. Peacebuilding is not a neutral process. It can maintain and entrench existing social structures, framing democracy as the sole driver of change while overlooking peacebuilding as a space of political contestation, negotiation and tension, and one that confers or denies legitimacy. This study examines African-led peacebuilding efforts that seek to address conflicts’ structural contradictions and root causes. It calls for a rethink of regional organisations’ approaches to peacebuilding in complex stabilisation environments, advocating for a more adaptive regional peacebuilding strategy that acknowledges its deep interlinkages with stabilisation.
Managing Climate, Peace and Security Risks in the Borderlands of the Lake Chad Region (CPS-Lake Chad)
This is a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) report for the research project on managing climate, peace and security risks in the borderlands of the Lake Chad Basin Region. An updated version was published 8 May 2026.
Confronting escalating threats: adapting stabilisation for Africa’s 21st century security challenges
This article explores the understanding and implementation of stabilisation and Climate, Peace and Security (CPS) across Africa.
Managing climate, peace and security risks in the Lake Chad Region
The policy brief summarises findings from a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA), undertaken for the climate, peace and security risks in the Lake Chad region research project (CPS-Lake Chad). The publication is part of the project project 'Managing Climate, Peace and Security Risks in the Borderlands of the Lake Chad Region (CPS-Lake Chad)' which is funded by the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme. It brings together world-leading experts and local researchers to examine conflict-affected borderlands, how conflicts connect across borders, and the drivers of violent and peaceful behaviour.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Abyei
The Abyei Administrative Area, a disputed territory that lies between Sudan and South Sudan, faces complex interconnected challenges. Communities in Abyei largely depend on climate-sensitive livelihoods such as cattle herding, farming and seasonal migration. Increased flooding and prolonged dry spells in recent years have reduced crop yields, affected livestock rearing and displaced households, which has deepened existing livelihood and security challenges. Limited basic services and poor infrastructure, combined with weak governance, constrain the coping capacities of local communities and increase their need for humanitarian assistance. Yet funding cuts and insecurity have led some humanitarian organizations to scale back operations, while the civil war in Sudan continues to increase humanitarian needs in Abyei. The territory’s disputed status further impedes long-term development planning to address interconnected challenges, including climate-related security risks.
The Gambia Has Decided: A model for intervention, or a missed opportunity?
Recent years have seen increased instances of democratic backsliding across West Africa, particularly through military coups. This Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in collaboration with the African Union (AU), can work proactively together to strengthen democratisation processes. Against this backdrop, this report presents an in-depth case study on The Gambia. In particular, it evaluates the AU- and ECOWAS-led interventions that followed the country’s elections in 2016. In the course of its assessment, the study articulates insights for Africa-led interventions. These draw on an array of tools, including mediation, political missions and military pressure. Another key focus of the report is the changing nature of partnerships between the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) as part of their responses to political crises. This includes examining the extent to which the AU and ECOWAS coordinated efforts to address the constitutional crisis that followed the disputed outcome of the December 2016 polls. The study culminates in a series of key findings. Among these is that the principle of subsidiarity remains ambiguously defined; that coordination between the AU and ECOWAS was uneven and at times duplicative; and that national ownership in The Gambia was insufficiently embedded in the reform process. This suggests that while ECOWAS´ visible and robust intervention was decisive in restoring constitutional order, the AU´s more technical engagement lacked visibility and sustainability. Both actors struggled to align their support in a coherent and mutually reinforcing manner. Over time, this served to reduce how both organisations were able to act as continuous and legitimate actors in the country. These findings offer guidance on how the AU and RECs could partner more effectively to address crises in Africa. Clarifying subsidiarity is a key step. While the term is widely used by the AU and RECs, the key questions of subsidiarity — such as the political dimensions it entails; and how the AU and ECOWAS could jointly address a lack of political will at the member state level — remain unresolved. Other areas of guidance defined in the report include strengthening joint planning and communication; and ensuring that balanced attention is given not only to immediate security concerns, but also longterm governance reform. The study concludes that without deeper institutionalised coordination mechanisms and stronger political will from both continental and national actors, the sustainability of such interventions will remain limited.
The Effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
The report assesses the effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), deployed in 2021 to counter the ASWJ insurgency in Cabo Delgado. SAMIM helped reduce insurgent capacity and restore some state presence, but it struggled with mismatched resources, limited host-nation cooperation, and parallel Rwandan operations. The mission never achieved key tasks such as sustained territorial stabilisation, air and maritime support, or long-term capacity-building of Mozambican forces. Political constraints and operational gaps ultimately led to its withdrawal in mid-2024, despite persistent insecurity.