Researcher
John Karlsrud
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Dr. John Karlsrud is a Research Professor in the Research group on peace, conflict and development.
Karlsrud earned his PhD at the University of Warwick. He is a member of the Editorial Boards of the journals Internasjonal Politikk and Contemporary Security Policy. Karlsrud has been a Visiting Fulbright Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, and a Visiting Research Fellow at the International Peace Institute.
Topics of particular interests are norm change, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian issues. He previously served as Special Assistant to the United Nations Special Representative in Chad and as part of the UN Development Programme’s leadership programme LEAD.
He has worked in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Chad, Palestine (West Bank), Norway and USA, and conducted field research and shorter missions to Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Ukraine.
Expertise
Education
2014 Senior Executive Course 13, Norwegian Defence University College, Aug-Nov 2014
2010-2014 Ph.D., Politics and Internationals Studies, University of Warwick. Title: Linked Ecologies and Norm Change in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
2005 Master of Peace and Conflict Studies / International Affairs with Distinction Joint Master from Institute for Graduate Studies in International Affairs, Australian National University and the Peace Research Centre of Oslo
Work Experience
2020- Head of the Reserach group on peace, conflict and development
2015- External Associate, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick 2015 Fulbright Visiting Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
2015 Visiting Fellow, International Peace Institute
2012 Lecturer, IR Master
2010- Programme Manager and Senior Research Fellow at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
2010- Senior Research Fellow, NUPI
2008-2010 Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), Chad
2006-2008 Policy and Strategy Analyst, Strategic and Regional Initiatives Unit (SRIU), Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA), UNDP New York HQ
2005-2006 Researcher and Assistant to the Managing Director, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (AIS)
2002-2003 Liaison and Operations Officer for NATO in Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), seconded by the Norwegian Army
Aktivitet
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Clear all filtersDoing Less With More? The Difficult ‘Return’ of Western Troop Contributing Countries to United Nations Peacekeeping
Among others, the deployment of the UN stabilization mission to Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013 has been characterized by a number of researchers as a ‘return’ of Western troop contributors to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in Africa. The aim of this report is to look at the reality of that ‘return,’ and whether it has enhanced the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping overall and of the UN mission in Mali in particular. In policy and academic circles, the return has been hailed as an opportunity for Western member states to contribute niche capabilities such as ISRs including surveillance drones, military transport and attack helicopters, special forces, and to share experiences and practices developed over a long period of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism warfare in e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq. In Mali, the UN mission is mired in a situation where these experiences were considered as relevant, all the more so as some considered that new UN peacekeeping missions could be deployed to Libya, Somalia, Syria, or in Yemen, thereby making Mali a key testing ground for the future from this perspective. However, while Western countries may indeed have lessons to share, the report argues that so far their contribution to MINUSMA has been a very mixed blessing. The report explores these challenges and impact of them on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, defined as the ability to sustain peace over time.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali
Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.
United Nations Stabilization Operations: Chapter Seven and a Half
The UN Security Council has in recent years included the term ‘stabilization’ in the name of the operations deployed to Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Central African Republic. But, are they stabilization operations? Although the concept has become increasingly popular in the UN context, it seems to denote everything from robust military action to early peacebuilding activities, and for this reason the UN high-level independent panel on peace operations in 2015 recommended to avoid the concept until it was further clarified. To contribute to this clarification, the article follows two main lines of inquiry—first it unpacks the different meanings of stabilization in UN peace operations by drawing upon the experiences of current UN stabilization missions such as MONUSCO in the DRC and MINUSMA in Mali. Based on this inquiry, it argues that what we are witnessing is cognitive slippage—where a broad range of unrelated activities are gathered under the same concept as a discursive tool to get financial and political support from Western partners. Second, the article ventures on to examine how the center of gravity of international interventions has moved on to a prevalence of ad-hoc coalitions undertaking counterterrorism operations, and what impact this has on UN peace operations, and in particular the understanding of stabilization in these. It argues that these missions could be termed Chapter seven and a half operations as they combine UN peace operations under Chapter VII mandates with the inclusion of regional ad hoc coalitions of the willing.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
This report assesses the extent to which the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is achieving its current strategic objectives, and the impact the Mission has had on the political and security situation in Mali. Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.
Norms and Practices in UN Peacekeeping: Evolution and Contestation
The four articles in this special section focus on norms in UN peacekeeping (gender, impartiality, human rights, and environmentalism) and how they are implemented in practice. They look at the evolution of these norms over time; take an explicit theoretical perspective (feminist institutionalism, norm contestation, and securitization); and report the results of original field research in Rwanda, South Sudan, and New York UN headquarters. The articles present a coherent narrative because they all look at practices either explicitly or implicitly, often at the mundane everyday level among troops or UN staff. But the focus on everyday experiences should not betray their theoretical importance: each of the articles uses this empirical material to better understand and theorize international relations. Georgina Holmes provides us with micro-study of norm implementation on the individual level with her bottom-up study of training of female military peacekeepers. Marion Laurence reveals how legitimating practices are changing in tandem with the changing understanding of the impartiality norm. Emily Paddon Rhoads analyzes impartiality as a composite norm and unpacks its procedural and substantive dimensions to reveal how human rights and protection are being privileged to the detriment of a more political understanding of impartiality. Lucile Maertens is forcing us to examine the causal chain of securitization theory by showing how security is shaped by environmentalization.
For the greater good?: “Good states” turning UN peacekeeping towards counterterrorism
The usual suspects of middle power internationalism—small and middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden—have all contributed to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This article argues that while these and other Western countries’ contributions to MINUSMA may still be characterized as investments into UN peacekeeping reform and a rule-governed world order, the liberal underpinnings of that commitment are withering. Instead, these countries seek to enhance their own status. This is done by gaining appreciation for their contributions, primarily from the US; strengthening their bids for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and self-interested contributions to reformUNpeacekeeping by efforts to enable it to confront violent extremism and terrorism. Paradoxically, the article concludes, when moving the UN towards counterterrorism and weakening the legitimacy of the organization, Western states undermine a cornerstone of their own security.
Predictive Peacekeeping: Strengthening Predictive Analysis in UN Peace Operations
The UN is becoming increasingly data-driven. Until recently, data-driven initiatives have mainly been led by individual UN field missions, but with António Guterres, the new Secretary-General, a more centralized approach is being embarked on. With a trend towards the use of data to support the work of UN staff, the UN is likely to soon rely on systematic data analysis to draw patterns from the information that is gathered in and across UN field missions. This paper is based on UN peacekeeping data from the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) in Darfur, and draws on interviews conducted in New York, Mali and Sudan. It will explore the practical and ethical implications of systematic data analysis in UN field missions. Systematic data analysis can help the leadership of field missions to decide where to deploy troops to protect civilians, guide conflict prevention efforts and help preempt threats to the mission itself. However, predictive analysis in UN peace operations will only be beneficial if it also leads to early action. Finally, predictive peacekeeping will not only be demanding of resources, it will also include ethical challenges on issues such as data privacy and the risk of reidentification of informants or other potentially vulnerable people.
Conclusion: Military rapid response—from institutional investment to ad hoc solutions
The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.
Tangled up in glue: Multilateral crisis responses in Mali
The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.
Introduction: Rapid response mechanisms—strengthening defense cooperation and saving strangers?
The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.