What can a coalition of the willing do for Ukraine?

“We’re gathered here today, cause this is a once in a generation moment for the security in Europe,” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said during a Ukraine summit in London on 2 March 2025.

Together with French President Emmanuel Macron, he convened European leaders to discuss Ukraine’s security. The outcome was the declaration of a so-called “coalition of the willing” to help safeguard Ukraine.

A coalition of the willing refers to an ad hoc group of states that voluntarily participate in a military operation outside established frameworks such as the UN or NATO. Each country decides independently whether and how it will contribute.

In September, France announced that 26 countries had committed to providing military capabilities on land, at sea or in the air following a ceasefire or peace agreement. The planned force was dubbed the Multinational Force Ukraine.

What would such a force do?

“A coalition of the willing has been the talk of the town,” says John Karlsrud, a senior researcher at NUPI. “But there has been very little public information about what the force is meant to do, what countries are willing and able to contribute, or how realistic a deployment would be.”

Together with Yf Reykers from Maastricht University, Karlsrud leads the research project Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine Tracker, which maps political willingness and relevant military capabilities among states in the coalition to provide military support in and around Ukraine.

“We wanted to fill this knowledge gap,” Karlsrud says. “We brought together 16 experts from allied countries and asked what their governments are willing and able to contribute militarily in and around Ukraine. Their assessments are published in two-page policy briefs.”

The project also includes contributions from the United States and Ukraine.

“The United States is not part of the coalition, but it is a crucial factor,” Karlsrud explains. “Washington is expected to provide security guarantees and act as a backstop. And Ukraine is the most important actor of all: the key question is what kind of support actually meets Ukraine’s needs.”

Watch the recording of the launch webinar on the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine.

Strong political will, limited military capacity

The main finding is clear, according to Karlsrud.

“There is strong political will, but much more limited military capacity.”

Across much of Europe, there remains broad political support for assisting Ukraine, particularly in the Nordic and Baltic countries. At the same time, decades of underinvestment have weakened European armed forces. As a result, deploying large ground forces in Ukraine appears unrealistic for most countries.

“France and the United Kingdom clearly stand out,” Karlsrud says. “They are, in practice, the only European countries that combine political will with the military capacity needed to deploy a significant number of troops on the ground.”

Too much focus on the post-war phase

At the same time, both the United States and Ukraine warn against devoting too much attention to what might happen after a potential ceasefire. From their perspective, Ukraine needs military and financial support now.

“There is a risk that a coalition of the willing draws focus away from the most urgent priority: supporting Ukraine now,” Karlsrud says.

From Kyiv’s point of view, the most urgent needs are air defence systems, ammunition, technological assistance and funding, not foreign combat troops on Ukrainian soil. From Ukraine’s perspective, the most realistic contributions from the coalition are therefore financial support and rear-area, non-combat functions.

A political forum in a time of crisis

Even so, Karlsrud argues that coalitions of the willing have significant value in today’s security environment.

“They provide a political arena where states can talk and find solutions when established institutions are paralysed by internal disagreements.”

In principle, such coalitions could also become relevant in other security contexts beyond Ukraine, for example in the High North and around Greenland.

A shift in language

All plans for a multinational force rest on one crucial assumption: that the fighting in Ukraine comes to a halt.

“Previously, the discussion centred on a peace agreement,” Karlsrud says. “Now the language has shifted.”

In recent statements, coalition members increasingly refer to the need for a “credible cessation of hostilities.”

In January, the Norwegian government also signalled that Norway could contribute troops to a security force in Ukraine following a credible ceasefire.

What qualifies as “credible,” who determines it, and how long such a ceasefire would need to hold before troops could be deployed remain unresolved political questions. This uncertainty complicates planning and leads many countries to attach significant caveats to their commitments.

“It may sound technical,” Karlsrud says, “but the difference is substantial. A ceasefire might be achievable. A peace agreement can take a long time, and may never materialise. The devil is in the details.”

As a result, both the planning and expectations surrounding a future multinational force remain highly uncertain.