Research project
Strategic Initiative for Defending Critical Maritime Infrastructure (SIDMI)
The SIDMI project, conducted jointly by the leading Romanian think tank the New Strategy Center and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation on the protection of critical maritime infrastructure between Romania and Norway, with a particular focus on offshore energy infrastructure. It is also to enhance cooperation and knowledge exchange between Romania and Norway in the field of critical maritime infrastructure protection. The initiative focuses on sharing experiences, threat perceptions, and best practices while conducting research to develop policy-relevant insights on the challenges facing offshore energy infrastructure. It also includes examining hybrid threats, gray zone operations, and effective methods for safeguarding critical infrastructure in the maritime domain, fostering bilateral relationships among experts and public institutions from both countries.
Concerns for the vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure have been voiced publicly by experts, think tanks and NATO starting with the second half of the 2010s. The discussion was mostly confined to a strategic and technical level, framed more as a precautionary necessity than a mandatory requirement to deter, protect and defend against hybrid threats and grey zone operations in the face of a depreciating security environment at sea and beyond.
The NordStream and Balticonnector incidents and Russian attacks on elements of critical infrastructure during the war in Ukraine have fundamentally altered our understanding of the challenge because by targeting critical infrastructure, the very functioning of our societies is put under question. Knowledge of how to protect such infrastructure and a profound understanding of hybrid threats and grey zone operations targeting such infrastructure are a prerequisite for designing and implementing effective policies to tackle this crucial challenge.
The project seeks to facilitate the exchange of best practices between Norway, the largest producer of gas in Europe, and Romania, the soon-to-be largest producer of gas in the EU. Norway has vast experience in protecting and managing its offshore energy assets, while Romanian stakeholders have gained invaluable insights on the maritime hybrid tactics, which became a regular occurrence after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the widespread use of lawfare tactics starting with 2017 and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The project is funded through the Romania-Norway Bilateral Relations Fund 2014-2021.
Project Manager
External
George Scutaru, New Strategy Center, Romania
Sergiu Mitrescu, New Strategy Center, Romania
New publications
Hybrid Frontlines: Russian Threats and the Future of Maritime Infrastructure in the Black Sea and the North Sea
This study analyzes the risks facing critical maritime infrastructure in two regions essential to European energy security: the Black Sea and the North Sea. The study highlights how the Russian Federation employs hybrid tactics — ranging from sabotage and cyberattacks to influence operations — to advance its geopolitical interests, undermining the stability and security of undersea energy and communication infrastructure. This comparative research examines the responses of Romania and Norway — two NATO member states on the frontlines of this strategic competition — and offers concrete policy recommendations for strengthening the resilience of critical maritime infrastructure. The study is part of the Strategic Initiative for Defending Critical Maritime Infrastructure (SIDMI) project conducted jointly by the New Strategy Center and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
Securing the Frontlines: Experimentalist Governance for Critical Maritime Infrastructure in the Black Sea and North Sea
The proliferation of hybrid threats challenges both national security and the institutional foundations of governance. Nowhere is this tension more acute than in the maritime domain, where critical infrastructure such as undersea cables, offshore energy platforms, and subsea pipelines have become both economic lifelines and geopolitical fault lines. These infrastructures are increasingly exposed to hybrid operations designed to exploit legal ambiguity, attribution challenges, and the seams between civil, military, and private actors. Traditional security governance models premised on clear jurisdictional boundaries, centralized command structures, and rigid doctrinal templates, struggle to account for weaponized ambiguity and threats operating below thresholds of open conflicts. As sub-threshold threats continue to evolve and be refined, they reveal deep structural limitations in existing institutional responses, including sectoral silos, information-sharing deficits, and accountability systems illsuited for dynamic crisis environments. This paper explores the need for more adaptive governance frameworks capable of managing the uncertainty, complexity, and cross-sectoral interdependence that define today’s hybrid threat landscape. Specifically, it examines how experimentalist governance (EG) offers a promising architecture for coordinating the defense of critical maritime infrastructure (CMI) in the face of hybrid aggression. The paper analyzes two distinct cases: Norway, with its mature institutional capacity, dense subsea infrastructure, and strong integration with NATO and EU partners; and Romania, situated at the Black Sea frontier, where emerging offshore energy projects intersect with a fluid and contested security environment.
Project Manager
External
George Scutaru, New Strategy Center, Romania
Sergiu Mitrescu, New Strategy Center, Romania