Publications
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Colombia
Colombia’s decades-long conflict culminated in the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which included aims to achieve peace through rural reform, reintegration of former combatants, addressing illicit crop cultivation, and ensuring land restitution and voluntary return for displaced individuals. However, the combination of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), entrenched violence, social inequality and environmental challenges continues to hinder progress, particularly in rural areas. Since 2022, the current government has pursued a policy of ‘Total Peace’, alongside implementing the peace agreement. This includes peace talks with armed groups and addressing structural violence, racial discrimination, gender inequality, social inequalities and environmental concerns. This fact sheet focuses on how climate-related peace and security risks interact with specific provisions of the peace agreement, and provides an update on the situation since 2022.
Changing transatlantic relations – and what it means for Europe
In a more uncertain world and with war in Europe, securing a strong relationship with their traditional partner and ally, the United States (US), is more important than ever for Europeans. Yet, Europe is facing a reality where there is a real possibility that transatlantic relations may be severely weakening. This European policy analysis explores ongoing changes in the transatlantic relationship, what this tells us about its future direction, and what this implies for Europe. It discusses what a second Trump, or a Harris, presidency might imply, the challenges facing European security and defence, and what must be done to address them. The analysis finds that extensive networks, trade relations, and interdependencies continue to make the transatlantic relationship the strongest interregional relationship in the world. However, domestic changes in the US and a changing geopolitical reality with the US prioritizing China over Europe mean that the transatlantic relationship is weaker than before. The future of European security and defence depends on its ability to increase its support for Ukraine, to strengthen its own security in NATO – in the EU and in closer cooperation between them – and to keep the US as close as possible.
The Grammar of Status Competition: International Hierarchies and Domestic Politics
States do not only strive for wealth and security, but international status too. A burgeoning body of research has documented that states of all sizes spend considerable time, energy, and even blood and treasure when seeking status on the world stage. Yet, for all scholars' success in identifying instances of status seeking, they lack agreement on the nature of the international hierarchies that states are said to compete within. Making sense of this status ambiguity remains the key methodological and theoretical challenge facing status research in international relations scholarship. In The Grammar of Status Competition, Paul David Beaumont tackles this puzzle head on by making a strength out of status' widely acknowledged slipperiness. Given that states, statesmen, and citizens care about and pursue status despite its difficulty to assess, Beaumont argues that we can study international status hierarchies through these actors' attempts to grapple with this same status ambiguity. The book thus redirects inquiry toward the theories of international status (TIS) that governments and citizens themselves produce and use to make sense of their state's position in the world. Advancing a new framework for studying such TIS, the book illuminates how specific theories of international status emerge, solidify, and become contested, and how these processes influence domestic and foreign policy. Showcasing the value of a TIS approach via multiple historical case studies—from nuclear arms control to Norwegian education policy—Beaumont thereby addresses three major puzzles in IR status research: why states compete for status when the international rewards seem ephemeral; how states can escape the zero-sum game associated with quests for positional status; and how status scholars can overcome the methodological problem of disentangling status from other motivations
The Construction of Status in Security Politics: Rules, Comparisons and Second-Guessing Collective Beliefs
Tapping into international relations status’ research’s extended lineage, this chapter makes the case for a thick constructivist account of international status dynamics that makes the construction of rules and comparisons central to analysis. Drawing upon the work of Robert Gilpin and Nicholas Onuf, the chapter’s approach enables the exploration of how the rules governing status competitions emerge, why some rules become agreed upon and others contested, and the consequences of these processes of rule formation. While this framework requires a gestalt switch for conventional status research, this chapter argues that it is possible to do so while remaining consistent with status research’s core definition of status. The value of the framework is illustrated via a case study of how the rules of the nuclear status competition emerged and solidified over the course of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and United States (1969–79).
The future of the US nuclear guarantee
The war in Ukraine has the potential to fundamentally reshape Europe’s security landscape. This challenge is compounded by the deepening security cooperation between China and Russia. At the same time, political dysfunction in the United States raises concerns, and significant shifts in US security policy could diminish its commitment to Europe. Nuclear weapons play a pivotal role in great power politics. The modernization of US strategic nuclear forces presents a major challenge. These developments may erode the credibility of the US extended deterrence and nuclear guarantee to Europe. Given this context, it is crucial for European allies to strengthen their conventional defense capabilities, reducing reliance on nuclear forces. In addition, Europe should actively advocate for a robust nuclear deterrent. Although US tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe represent only a small portion of America’s overall nuclear arsenal, they remain important. European nations should also pursue greater operational cooperation with US strategic forces, including hosting US strategic aircraft operations in their airspace and participating in joint training and exercises.
US and UK Elections: Implications for NATO and Northern European Security
How will the outcome of the US election impact security policy in the UK and Northern Europe? The report discusses potential consequences of a victory for Harris and Trump respectively, as well as the new British government's security policy orientation. What does this mean for Norway and Northern Europe?
Respons - Norsk utenrikspolitikk for en ny tid. Sluttrapport
I 2023 og 2024 arrangerte UD, i samarbeid med lokale aktører, til sammen sju konferanser i RESPONS-serien. Åpningskonferansen fant sted i Oslo i mars 2023, med NUPI som arrangør. Deretter fulgte et møte med NATOs generalsekretær, også i Oslo, og arrangementer i Arendal, Lillehammer, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger og Tromsø. Den tematiske innretningen på arrangementene har variert fra det brede til det smale, fra sikkerhetspolitikk og utvikling, via teknologi til handelspolitikk og grønn omstilling. En rekke fagfolk fra hele landet og fra ulike profesjoner og fagdisipliner, har innledet og deltatt i paneler. Utenriksministrene Anniken Huitfeldt (2022-2023) og Espen Barth Eide (2023-) har deltatt på alle arrangementene med unntak av ett – under Arendalsuka – hvor utviklingsminister Anne Beathe Tvinnereim (2021-) representerte departementet. NUPI har rapportert fra alle sju konferanser. Dette er i tillegg seriens sluttrapport, der de foregående delrapportene er inkludert.
Localization and developmentality: Policy pragmatism in pandemic times
Motivation: Localization is increasingly invoked in debates about how to reform international aid: to improve aid effectiveness and address ethical concerns by turning hierarchical aid relations on their head. This has proved to be easier said than done. The COVID-19 pandemic produced logistical impediments to aid practitioners, which translated into a renewed, if temporary, interest in localization. Purpose: The initial scope of the research engaged with the notion of partnership during COVID-19, but almost all informants drew attention to the concept of localization. The article maps and analyses the challenges and advantages of localization, as seen from the practitioners' perspective. Approach and methods: The article draws on 24 interviews conducted in Oslo with representatives of various Norwegian development and humanitarian non-governmental organizations and government agencies, in addition to policy and grey literature review. Findings: The article shows that the re-emergence of the localization debate during COVID-19 occurred not because of any ambition to reform aid, but as a pragmatic and temporary response to the logistical impediments caused by the pandemic. Reflections from the interviewees on the pros and cons offer more substantial insights into why localization fails to change practice, while at the same time localization enables a form of indirect governance related to accountability regimes. This is analysed as developmentality, reflecting the logic that localization takes place when recipients do as donors want, but they do so voluntarily, which suggests that localization counterintuitively may reinforce existing power structures. Policy implications: Localization is poorly conceptualized. While a definition could be helpful in practice, one that is too rigid could undermine the diversity of actors and knowledge that localization aims to advance. At the operational level, localization requires greater flexibility and slack throughout the aid chain, especially in the audit and accountability regimes of donor and funding authorities, which permeate and uphold lopsided aid relations.
Norske interesser og multilateralt samarbeid. Multimeldingen – fem år etter
The White Paper 'Norway’s role and interests in multilateral cooperation' (Report to the Storting No. 27 – 2018-2019) – hereafter called 'the Multilateral Report' – contains a thorough analysis of multilateral cooperation and Norwegian interests. It describes the various functions of multilateral cooperation, how disagreements between major powers affect such cooperation, and how this impacts Norwegian interests. The White Paper was submitted to the Storting in June 2019. By that time, Russia had already annexed Crimea, the U.S., under President Trump, had shown a more negative attitude towards multilateral cooperation, and China’s desire to influence multilateral cooperation was evident. At the same time, the report preceded the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent criticism from low- and middle-income countries of how Western nations handled the pandemic, as these countries did not have the same access to vaccines. And, not least: the report came before Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine, Hamas’ attack on Israel, and the ensuing war in Gaza. Although the rivalry between the U.S. and China was already increasing in 2019, five years later, it has a more defining character for international politics. The developments in recent years show even more clearly than before that the norm that international problems are best solved through multilateral cooperation has weakened. The Multilateral Report pointed to several causes for this, primarily increased rivalry and the preference of major powers for bilateral solutions, and how, for example, China has succeeded in influencing the interpretation of human rights in multilateral forums. In this report, we discuss how the analysis and conclusions of the White Paper hold up five years later. The short version is that they hold up well: the analysis of increased rivalry and the growing 'bilateralization' of international cooperation has proven to align more with the reality than one might wish. At the same time, we paint a somewhat more complex picture than what was described in the Multilateral Report, focusing on fragmentation and the emergence of a significant ecosystem of informal governance initiatives that supplement but also alter the nature of the multilateral system. We also discuss in some detail the importance of analyzing how the various functions of the multilateral system are affected by rivalry, bilateralization, and fragmentation. Such a discussion is relevant in order to assess which multilateral functions are most important for safeguarding Norwegian interests. For example, it is not a given that support for a multilateral organization is an effective measure to promote a 'rules-based' order. We conclude with a discussion on how Norway should relate to the fact that our interest in a rules-based order will not be the same if the content of the rules reflects less of the values they do today. The report focuses on changes in the multilateral system and does not analyze specific multilateral organizations. Rather, we use examples from various multilateral organizations to try to illustrate more general trends. For example, we do not have a specific analysis of NATO or the EU as multilateral organizations. Both can be characterized as multilateral since both have three or more members, but the distinctive nature of the EU and NATO reflects less the developments in multilateral organizations more generally.
Introduction to the Special Issue on Under Communism’s Shadow The Memory of the Violent Past in Present-Day Russia
Perhaps no topic could be more crucial to the concept of “post-communism” than how the Soviet past is commemorated, challenged, or forgotten. The study of historical memory is often correctly tied to identity politics and nation-building. While the usable past framework is broadly applicable to all modern states, in the Russian case a degree of alarmism and negativity surrounds interpretations of how the country has managed its communist past, particularly its violent parts. A significant element to this is a teleological view of progress and the salience of the transition paradigm. In memory studies, this is manifested in the dominance of the cosmopolitan memory mode as the correct way the violent past should be commemorated. The introduction reviews the existing literature on Russia’s memory politics and highlights three limitations: (1) overemphasis on the political center and the failure to capture the diversity of regions, (2) too much focus on the supply side of memory politics, and (3) one-sided presentations of the role the Great Patriotic War plays in Russian memory politics. The introduction reviews how the special issue contributions address these limitations in the literature and shows how, taken together, they offer ideas for new research on memory studies. A case is made for how this new research agenda can better understand memory processes and how they relate to broader ideological, cultural, social, and political change in Russia.