Publications
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet Ethiopia
Ethiopia is currently experiencing one of its most severe droughts in decades following four consecutive failed rain seasons. The country has a high dependency on rainfed agriculture, and recent reductions in economic growth rates, rapid population growth, weak institutional capacity and high levels of conflict make it particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. While climatic conditions differ substantially across Ethiopia, the average temperature is projected to increase, and rainfall is expected to become more erratic. Ethiopia´s long history of drought, famine and locust outbreaks all further the need for increased capacity and resilience to cope with the projected impacts of climate change. Political instability and conflict have compounded the humanitarian situation in the country, hampering the ability of the Ethiopian Government to implement its climate adaptation and mitigation policies.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept – Change, Continuity and Implications
• In the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirms its founding purpose by returning to the pre-2010 tradition of presenting collective defense as the key responsibility of the Alliance. The three core tasks set out for NATO are deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has led to a far stronger focus on conventional military forces on the strategic level. This change is well-harmonized with the significant boost to force posture announced at the Madrid Summit. • Russia has gone from being described as a potential “strategic partner” in 2010 to being defined as an aggressive adversary. As a clear message to Russia and Ukraine, the Concept underscores that a strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro- Atlantic area. The balancing act of both communicating firm condemnation of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and presenting a vision for a more resolved relationship in the future is a key challenge for NATO. • The new Concept represents a significant shift in NATO’s official perception of China. The rhetoric on Chinese expansion of power, weaponized interdependence and threats to rules-based international order is firm and direct, but it is combined with an aspiration of constructive engagement. • The Concept includes resolute affirmation of NATO’s view of the EU as a vital strategic partner. At the same time, key countries in Europe continue to disagree about the division of labor between the two organizations. • The Concept has positive implications for Norway and Norwegian security interests. The transatlantic connection and the High North are presented as important, and freedom-of-navigation an essential part of NATO priorities. In addition, the Concept presents a balanced approach to nuclear weapons, both recognizing its vital role in deterrence and the noble goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
Evolving Japan–NATO Relations in the Leadup to the Madrid Summit
In response to growing security concerns in East Asia, Japan has increased its engagement with NATO at both the organisational and individual member-state level.
The African Union’s Civilian Strategic Support Group
Since 2006, the African Union has played an active role in strengthening civilian engagement across its Peace Support Operations (PSOs) through the development of the Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force in 2006 and the subsequent formation of the Civilian Strategic Support Group (CSSG) in 2015. This policy brief examines the development of the CSSG and its efforts to date, and offers an overview on how and why the civilian component should be further enhanced within future AU PSOs.
The Ukraine War and Food Security: Consequences for Norway’s Partner Countries
The war in Ukraine is causing disruptions in global food supplies, with grave consequences for many developing countries. Both Ukraine and Russia are significant food exporters and major producers of fertiliser ingredients. However, the effects of the war will vary significantly between different countries. Some countries rely on supplies from Russia and Ukraine. Others are less dependent on food imports but depend on Russian and Ukrainian import of fertilisers. Yet others will mainly be affected by general global price increases, especially in the long-term perspective (within the next three years). However, most of Norway’s partner countries are largely self-reliant in food. For them, the main problems caused by the war are the following: - Increased prices for fertilizers - Higher energy prices and higher interest rates - Increased risk of political instability and conflict - Cuts in aid In this situation, Norway should do the following: - Avoid cuts in aid to partner countries to fund support to Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees - Increase food support to countries most affected by drought and conflict - Support partner countries’ supply of fertilisers - Consider debt relief to countries negatively affected by price increases on energy and higher interest rates. Research for this report was funded by NORAD.
Krig i en verden av fremmed intelligens
This chapter investigates a number of issues related to the ongoing debates around artificial intelligence and its impact on the future of geopolitics and warfare. Through insights from science and technology studies (STS), the chapter seeks to question common assumptions in political science about the relationship between technology, war and politics. It will be argued that political science's treatment of these as independent elements and the subsequent simplified notions of technological and socio-political change must be altered in favor of a more inclusive way of thinking about socio-technical practices. This will improve our understanding of the war-technology relationship while providing a more fertile ground for discussing changes in the wake of the development of artificial intelligence.
The unsolicited rocket: a story of science, technology, and future wars
This article investigates the puzzling case of the unsolicited rocket: a Norwegian research establishment successfully developed a weapon system that no one wanted or had asked for that was later widely adopted. We argue that the ‘Terne’ weapon existed not because it was needed based on rational calculations about efficiency, but because of the narratives, coalitions, and competitive dynamics that surrounded it and made it useful. Conventionally, war and technology are often considered distinct ‘things’ with immutable essences, used as variables to explain other phenomena, rather than being examined on their own terms. In this case, we focus empirically on the configuration of sociotechnical imaginaries, and the capacities for action that arise out of it. In foregrounding sociotechnical systems, this is not a case of the ‘militarization’ of civilian society and research in peacetime. Rather, agency lay in competitive networks of narratives and coalitions between technologies, individuals, professions, technological communities, military organizations, and funding bodies, together shaping how ideas and technologies become authoritative and dominant.
Europeisk helsesamarbeid etter covid-19 pandemien
Covid-19 pandemien er en av de største krisene i verden etter 1945. I Europa ble nasjonale myndigheter og EU-systemet utfordret med tanke på hvordan krisen skulle håndteres. Særlig i de første fasene av pandemien var det stor variasjon i valgene av virkemidler. Landene innførte en rekke inngripende tiltak som fikk negative konsekvenser på tvers av landegrensene, blant annet for familiebesøk mellom land, arbeidsmobilitet, vareflyt, og forsyningssikkerhet. EU responderte i 2020 på krisen med å foreslå en styrking av helsesamarbeidet generelt, og beredskaps- og krisehåndteringskapasiteten spesielt. I dette notatet ser vi nærmere på EUs helsesamarbeid og mulige implikasjoner for Norge av arbeidet med å styrke dette samarbeidet i kjølvannet av pandemien.
Den norske Atlanterhavskomité: Spranget inn i fremtiden
Europe is at war. Putin's attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022 marks a turning point in European security. The war is also a preliminary climax in Russian revisionism, which dates back to 1990 and became more marked from 2007 and 2014. Some saw the war coming. From October 2021, insightful analysts and actors in intelligence and decision-making circles in the United States, NATO Belgium and some circles in Norway became increasingly confident that war was on the way. The inner circles had access to very good intelligence. People in positions with deep insight into Russian history watched with growing concern as Russia's bloodthirsty imperial tradition resurfaced, brutal and unadorned - this unpleasant habit of Romanovs and communists to devour neighbors. People in positions with broad knowledge of both literature and governance saw that the authoritarian Russian regime moved in a totalitarian direction and isolated itself, something we recognize from other totalitarian regimes. Experts in the public sphere did not see war as likely, with some exceptions. It was not rational, sort of. Nor had they imagined that the Soviet empire would fall apart. We see what we have seen before: That experts are best at explaining in retrospect why things went the way they did. And that they blame the politicians for not reacting in time. No one knows how long the war will last and how long Putin's Russia will remain a pariah. It is noted that a number of European leaders are working to create peace, several of them in such a way that they themselves can shine. Here we will look beyond the war itself and have a special eye on traditional power and interest politics: What are the long-term challenges and threats of significance to Norway? How should we organize our security policy and our defense? This is a time of great challenges, but also many opportunities. Crises create opportunities. There is an opportunity to make Norway better equipped to handle major changes in geopolitics and technology. We will dwell on the surroundings, especially Russia and the north. We will discuss the Nordic region in NATO as a security policy project. We will discuss the Armed Forces' design, especially the ability to think consistently from thought to action. And we will finally present five bold postulates, which transcend conventional thinking, about what Norway will be able to prioritize in the years ahead.
Revisiting nuclear hedging: ballistic missiles and the Iranian example
Technological shifts have made nascent nuclear arsenals more vulnerable. In this article, Henrik Stålhane Hiim argues that this provides “nuclear hedgers” – states that deliberately seeking to develop the ability to go nuclear – with strong incentives to acquiring ballistic missiles. The article illustrates this tendency through a case-study of the Iranian missile and rocket programs. It finds that missile acquisition has indeed been an integral part of Iran's hedging strategy, and that several of the systems it has acquired indicate an interest in nuclear weapons delivery.