Thailand: Improving the Business Climate for Renewable Energy Investment
Thailand is among ASEAN’s renewable energy leaders. It attracted more than USD 10.7 billion of investment in renewable energy from 2006 to 2018. The country’s total installed capacity of renewable energy represented over 60% of the total capacity of ASEAN in 2019. Renewables accounted for 15% of its energy mix in 2018, and a target of 30% in 2036 was set. Despite this, during 2018–2019, Thailand experienced relative stagnation in terms of attracted investment. We propose five actions that can improve the attractiveness of Thailand’s investment climate for renewable energy in both the short and long term: set up a dedicated ministry for governing renewables; expand and improve the regulatory framework; capitalise on its peer-to-peer energy trading experience; simplify market entry for foreign investors; build capacity for renewable energy governance.
In the shadow of the virus Varieties of power in the COVID-19 crisis in Venezuela
While all states face massive challenges when responding to COVID-19, some are in a more precarious position than others. In Venezuela, the pandemic arrived at the worst possible time for its citizens. Facing one of the deepest economic crises outside of wartime in recent years, its consequences have spilled over to all aspect of social life.1 However, the timing seems to have suited the leaders of the Venezuelan regime well. Rather than constituting a threat to the stability of a regime that has lost both democratic legitimacy and the capacity to provide services and security, the government of Nicolas Maduro (2013-present) has seemingly managed to consolidate itself after several years of instability. The starting point of the discussion is an apparent paradox: how can a regime with neither legitimacy nor capacity, two commonly invoked criteria for effective crisis management, strengthen itself during a crisis such as that spurred by COVID-19? The brief presents an overview of how the Venezuelan regime has responded to COVID-19, and how the government of Nicolás Maduro has applied different strategies to consolidate a favorable political status quo. It takes as its starting point three concepts, namely “state capacity,” “legitimacy,” and “power,” all of which are frequently upheld as fundamental for understanding the varying ways in which states have responded to the pandemic. It highlights how relative power relations have shifted in recent years, and how the pandemic has contributed to skewing the balance of power further in favor of the Maduro government.
Strategic dimension of Russian energy policy
This lecture was given on invitation from Statkraft that organised a seminar on various aspects of energy policy to members of its staff. The main topic was the connection between Russia's national strategy and energy resources.
The High North, Between Shipping Routes and Militarization Security Challenges to the Arctic - the Norwegian perspective
Short presentation of Russian objectives in the Arctic as seen from the Norwegian perspective made at the secnd panel of a webinar organized jointly by LSE Ideas, NUPI and New Strategy Center as a par of FLANKS project
What does Russia want in the High North?
Brief presentation of Russia's strategic objectives in the Arctic for partners in the FLANKS project
Digitale trusler blir kinkig for Norge i Sikkerhetsrådet
(Op-ed in Norwegian): De fleste land rangerer trusler via det digitale rom som en av de største utfordringene for det 21. århundret. På tross av dette har tematikken knapt vært nevnt i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Hva kommer det av? Og kan Norge gjøre noe med det? spør Niels Nagelhus Schia og Erik Kursetgjerde i denne DN-kronikken.
Russia’s view of Georgia: a NATO proxy yet again?
After the crises in Ukraine, and despite the Georgian government’s allegedly more pragmatic attitude towards Russia, official statements from Moscow increasingly project Georgia as hostile. This may be the result of the Kremlin stepping up a propaganda campaign to put pressure on Georgia, but it is also linked to growing perceptions of Georgia as becoming an agent of NATO. Moreover, Russia’s increasingly insistent rhetorical and practical support for the independent status of the two Georgian breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is still framed with reference to Kosovo as a tit-for-tat in a conflict with the West. In parallel with this hardening in Russian views, there is hardly any diplomatic contact between Russia and Georgia. The regional multilateral frameworks have become dysfunctional, obstructed by polarization. Further Georgian NATO integration could entail an increasing risk of war, unless frank discussions and engagement with Russia can be promoted.
Podcast: Hva skjer med det sikkerhetspolitiske samarbeidet i Norden?
Hvordan har de nordiske landene samarbeidet om sikkerhetspolitikk i etterkrigstiden? Hvilke utfordringer og muligheter finnes for nordisk samarbeid fremover? Hvordan vil det nordiske samarbeidet endres i den kommende Forsvarskommisjonen?. Lytt til samtalen mellom: Kristin Haugevik, seniorforsker, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt Håkon Lunde Saxi, førsteamanuensis, Forsvarets høgskole Hedda Langemyr, daglig leder, UTSYN Mette Vågnes Eriksen, generalsekretær, Polyteknisk Forening