Children in Violent Extremist Organizations
Terrorist organizations, like ISIS, Hamas and the Taliban have exploited children for years. This seminar takes a closer look at the different ways in which these groups recruit and deploy children.
Analyzing Security Subregions: Forces of Push, Pull, and Resistance in Nordic Defense Cooperation
How can we best analyze security subregions? The most commonly used theory of regional security in the discipline of international relations, the regional security complex theory, focuses on large regions, such as Europe, Asia, or the Middle East. It pays less attention to smaller regions within these. This is unfortunate, because the security dynamics of these subregions often are a result of more than their place in the larger region. At the same time, the security of subregions cannot be reduced to a function of the policies of the states comprising them either. In short, security subregions are a level of analysis in their own right, with their own material, ideational, economic, and political dynamics. To capture and understand this, we need an analytical framework that can be applied to security regions irrespective of where and when in time they occur. The aim of this article is to offer such an analytical framework that helps us theorize the forces forging regional security cooperation, by combining external push and pull forces with internal forces of pull and resistance. The utility of the framework is illustrated through the case of Nordic security cooperation. It allows for a systematic mapping of the driving forces behind it and the negative forces resisting it. The Nordic region thus becomes a meeting point between global and national forces, pushing and pulling in different directions, with Nordic Defense Cooperation being formed in the squeeze between them.
A Governance and Risk Inventory for a Changing Arctic
In this chapter, Elana Wilson Rowe, Ulf Sverdrup, Karsten Friis, Geir Hønneland, and Mike Sfraga caution against viewing trends of conflict and cooperation in the Arctic in binary terms. While the US and Europe are determined to confront malign activity in the region, all sides continue to “demonstrate a commitment to cooperation and joint solutions to common challenges.” After reviewing the key factors and drivers supporting and challenging stability in the Arctic, the authors remind us that “cooperation in conflict” has long been the norm in the region, allowing cooperative governance to progress despite the enduring NATO-Russia military rivalry. Ongoing dialogue in the region – essential for addressing the regional and global implications of climate change – is poorly served by focussing on “narratives or practices of strategic competition alone.” To avoid “political tipping points” beyond which cooperation will become too difficult, the authors call on policymakers to be more proactive in how they address emerging governance challenges related to security and economic development.
Norsk eierskapskontroll kan avskrekke utenlandske investorer
Som et relativt lite og åpent land mottar Norge mange utenlandske investeringer. Noen av disse kan skape sikkerhetsutfordinger. «Vi anser dette som en avtale om salg mellom to kommersielle aktører, noe departementet ikke skal eller bør blande seg i», uttalte Næringsdepartementet om at et russisk selskap ville kjøpe den norske bedriften Bergen Engines. Forsvarsdepartementet sa først at sikkerhetsloven ikke var gjeldende, men så snudde de. Nå jobber flere departementer med saken. Dette viser hvor krevende det er å balansere sikkerhetsinteresser og gevinstene av en åpen økonomi.
Resilience in the age of crises
This research paper examines the concept 'resilience' as a response to the constantly changing environments and turbulence of the world. While resilience is used by several international organisations and nation states, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what the concept really means – it denotes both resisting change and being willing to adapt at the same time. This paper offers some clarity and argues that a temporal dimension is needed when applying the concept of resilience.
The weakest link? Digital technology and cyber security capacity building in Developing Countries
The world gets more interconnected, and the dependency of cyberspace and its infrastructure is now evident in most sectors. Join this seminar to learn more about the need for security standards across countries.
Leangkollen Security Conference 2021 | DAY 2 – “Building Resilience to Foreign Interference”
Debate about digital security and foreign influence
The EU's comprehensive response to out of area crises: Plugging the capability-expectations gap
Since adopting a “comprehensive approach” to crisis management in 2013, the EU has spent considerable time and energy on streamlining its approach. Recently, we have also seen a terminological shift from “comprehensive” to “integrated”, indicating an expansion of the approach beyond the development–security nexus to encompass the commitment to the synergistic use of all tools available at all stages of the conflict cycle. It also recognises the need to overcome the EU’s own legal, institutional and budgetary internal/external dichotomies that have troubled a truly joined-up approach in the past. But has this change improved the Union’s capacity to act? Drawing on institutional theory, this article analyses whether the EU has the administrative capacities needed in order to be an effective actor in this area.
Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
A new report by the Center for Climate and Security (CCS), an Institute of the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR), together with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), assesses the security risks posed by a warming climate in the Artcic. The analysis looks at two future warming scenarios (curbed and uncurbed) to project security threats alongside potential environmental changes deemed likely in the High North by 2030. The analysis identifies a number of key climate security risks across both warming scenarios, but notes that the risks are more severe and more likely in an “uncurbed” warming scenario. In a “curbed” scenario in which the world takes rapid action to curb climate change, including by transforming energy use, decarbonizing the global economy, and building international institutions to manage climate risks, the Arctic is likely to see fewer opportunities for severe security risks. The report recommends integrating this climate risk analysis into Arctic planning strategies into the coming years, and avoiding the uncurbed warming scenario. Specifically, the analysis highlights five key findings: 1) A warmer and increasingly navigable Arctic will lead to more commercial, civilian, and military activity, rendering the region more prone to accidents and misunderstandings between major players. 2) Increased commercial activity significantly expands the likelihood of states like Russia and China using civilian and commercial actors as vehicles for strategic positioning, dual-use data collection, and for gray zone operations which may escalate to direct confrontation. 3) The institutions that have helped depoliticize and produce stability in the Arctic for several decades may not have sufficient mandates and authorities, or be resilient enough to withstand new demands resulting from climate change. 4) To manage a more complex operating environment in the Arctic, with ever more state and non-state actors, governments will need an integrated toolbox that includes legal, economic, diplomatic, and military instruments. Robust mechanisms for cooperation and communication with civilian and commercial actors will be particularly useful. 5) States are likely to place higher demands on their military forces in the Arctic, particularly as regards to monitoring, assertions of sovereignty, search and rescue, and other Coast Guard duties given higher levels of overall activity in the region. New climatic realities may also reduce the constraints for force projection in the region. At the same time, over-reliance on military approaches in the region could risk escalating conflicts. To build resilience to the above threats, the report recommends that allied Arctic nations begin to advance the elaboration of a “Military Code of Conduct for Arctic Forces,” or other form of renewed dialogue among regional security actors, to address joint security risks.