Europa ruster opp
"Vi lever i et tidsskille", sa Tysklands forbundskansler Olaf Scholz da han annonserte at Tyskland skulle ruste opp sitt forsvar med 100 milliarde...
Collective defence in Europe: What place for the EU?
Collective defence is the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, anchored in NATO’s Article 5 stating that an attack against one ally is an attack against all. With the deteriorating security environment in Europe, questions have been asked about whether, and if so how, the EU’s clause on mutual defence – article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union – could be operationalized and perhaps be a supplement to NATO’s article 5 as a guarantor of collective defence in Europe. The debate is driven by perceived limits in NATO’s ability to deal with hybrid threats, the broader implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the necessity for European states to take more responsibility for their security. For EU member states to succeed with its collective defence obligations within the union, political will, legal interoperability with NATO and capability development should be addressed further.
Algorethics: Responsible governance of artificial intelligence
How can we develop artificial intelligence ethically?
Adapting to turbulent waters: EU maritime security and implications for Norway
Maritime security has become a top priority for the EU, as evident in its Strategic Compass for security and defence (2022) where it was identified as a strategic domain. The intensification of geopolitical tensions has further extended strategic competition to the seas. At the same time, a proliferation of threats has emerged at sea, including the security of migration routes, human rights at sea, implications of climate change and global warming, and the pressing challenges posed by organised crime and marine terrorism. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines have heightened the urgency for safeguarding critical infrastructure at sea, for surveillance, and coastal and offshore patrolling. Governance of the high seas invites further challenges. They are considered part of the Global Commons that, as with outer space, the atmosphere and the poles, are largely beyond the jurisdiction of nation states. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and decline in international cooperation, enhancing the EU’s maritime presence has been recognised not only as a paramount security imperative, but also as an economic interest of the Member States: The EU has the largest maritime territory in the world (counting exclusive economic zones), is home to 329 key seaports and most goods to and from Europe travel via the sea (90% of trade exports). In addition, up to 99% of global dataflows travel via subsea cables, and the EU’s energy dependence on oil and gas, which largely travels to the EU via the sea, remains high. Maritime security is thus among the fastest-growing EU policy areas. In addition to the threats listed above, Russia and China's increasing assertiveness at sea has intensified longer term processes towards an increasingly robust and multifaceted EU maritime foreign and security policy.
Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions
Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.
Digitalisering og internasjonal politikk
Hvilke sikkerhetspolitiske valg og dilemmaer representerer den nye digitale hverdagen for Norge og resten av verden? Kampen for å påvirke hvordan internett skal fungere er godt i gang. Utbyggingen av 5G-nettverk har blitt en global dragkamp der land presser hverandre til å velge bort bestemte leverandører, og private selskaper i den digitale sektoren får stadig større økonomisk og politisk makt. Internasjonale aktører som FN og NATO strever med å finne sin plass i det nye landskapet. I FN pågår det en intens strid om hvilke internasjonale normer som skal gjelde i det digitale rom, og NATO har definert cyber som et eget domene på linje med land, luft og sjø. Alt dette tilsier at digitalisering vil være med på å definere internasjonale konfliktlinjer i lang tid fremover. Men hvordan? I denne boken samler Håkon Bergsjø og Karsten Friis ulike perspektiver fra ledende fagmiljøer på hvordan digitalisering påvirker internasjonal politikk og konfliktdynamikk.
Introduction. Focus: War and Research
Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24 came as a surprise to many observers. This triggered several debates in the media, where analysts and academics criticized each other for not having seen what was emerging; for showing too much understanding for the Putin regime positions; and to let their political attitudes colour their analyses. In this Fokus column we will try to elevate these discussions to an academic level. Not to allocate blame, but to learn professional lessons. In this introductory text I will, inter alia, point to the need for more analytical breadth, to focus on both language and materiality, and to be extra aware of your own attitudes when one moves into a normative political debate.
NATO and Transatlantic Security Relations
NATO is considered the most important institution in the transatlantic security relationship. Its history is marked by continuity, resilience, and deliberate adaptation to an ever-changing and more complex security environment. This chapter seeks to assess some of the key historical turning points to shed light on how NATO has managed to remain relevant throughout all these years, and in particular how have the recent turbulent years in Washington D.C. and the renewed tensions with Russia have impacted the organisation. We will argue that a combination of strong US engagement and leadership with a broadly shared threat perception among Allies (primarily towards Russia) is the combination that continues to make NATO a significant embodiment of transatlantic security relations.
Working paper on EU’s policies and instruments for PVE
This working paper maps and analyses the toolbox of the EU and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It lists the institutional set-up, the decisionmaking processes and coordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of counter-terrorism and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) is analysed because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism.
Working paper on the implementation of the EU’s policies
This working paper builds on earlier research in which we mapped and analysed the toolbox of the European Union (EU) and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It listed the institutional setup, the decision-making processes, and co-ordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of CT and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) was unpacked because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism. Overall, our research found that the PVE agenda is quite a recent phenomenon in most member states and principally aims at preventing violent Islamist extremism through community engagement. The UK has been a pioneer in developing a ‘prevent’ pillar as part of its 2003 CT strategy and has since then actively contributed to the development of an EUlevel PVE framework. This EU framework has in turn pushed other member states, such as Ireland and Spain, to develop their own national PVE strategies in recent years. While Germany has also over the past decade made significant strides in preventing involvement in extremism and has brought its national practices to the EU level, France has generally favoured a more securitized than preventive approach. The present working paper takes the research one step further by looking more closely at the implementation of adopted PVE measures and practices in the EU and the abovementioned key states, both domestically as well as vis-à-vis the Western Balkans and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As such, we present a more evaluative overview geared towards identifying best practices and lessons learned in this field. The paper not only focuses on how policy is implemented and followed up, but also assesses the EU’s experiences in co-operating with member states and vice versa. In doing so, the research tries to take on board key recent developments, in particular in France and at the EU level, in response to a new series of terrorist attacks that took place in Paris, Nice, and Vienna between the end of October and mid-November 2020. The research builds on a set of in-depth interviews with PVE officials and practitioners within the EU and national administrations.