Naturalisation through mainstreaming Counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation in UN and EU discourse
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, counter-terrorism was initially pursued throughout the world as a matter of exceptional ‘hard security’. International and national authorities generally position terrorism as a uniquely threatening phenomenon warranting delineated budgets, systems, and structures within the law enforcement and defence realms. However, with the growing focus on radicalisation as assumedly essential in leading to terrorism and counter-radicalisation as an ever more central part of counter-terrorism, its scope was expanded far beyond the ‘hard security’ field; counter-radicalisation enabled the growth and integration of counter-terrorism into ‘softer’ societal sectors. This chapter argues that this shift from a hard security framing of counter-terrorism to a broadening of its scope through a foregrounding of counter-radicalisation should be conceptualised as a process of ‘mainstreaming’. After explaining the concept of mainstreaming and how it captures this development, the chapter offers a brief discourse analysis of such mainstreaming through the lens of key official UN and EU counter-terrorism documents. On the basis of this investigation, the chapter finds that the discursive mainstreaming of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation suggests their ‘naturalisation’.
Why Terrorism Researchers Should Care about Criminal Responsibility
Criminal responsibility is a basic principle in holding individuals to account for criminal actions. Making exemptions to criminal responsibility when individuals cannot be held responsible for their actions is equally central, and most countries have frameworks allowing for such exemptions for reasons of serious mental health problems. However, despite the recent years’ enormous interests in the possible links between individual ‘mental health’ and involvement in terrorism, the issue of criminal responsibility has apparently so far not been the subject of much interest in the field of terrorism research. This Research Note makes the simple point that criminal responsibility should be of particular interest to terrorism researchers, for two main reasons: the centrality of (political, religious, ideological) motivations for defining a crime as terrorism-related and the sometimes-difficult boundary-setting between such motivations and (psychotic) delusions; and the political nature of terrorism-related crimes.
How can the EU promote democracy in Eastern Europe and Western Balkans in a time of war?
PODCAST: Guardians of the Algorithm
A Shared Commitment: African-Nordic Peace and Security Cooperation
Over the past decade, the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – have strengthened their relationship with African states and societies by supporting the African Peace and Security Archi- tecture and promoting African involvement in conflict prevention, media- tion, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts. This report offers an over- view of the partnership between African and Nordic countries in peace and security from 2012 to 2021. It features original case studies on Nordic country cooperation with African actors and institutions, across an array of efforts, including support to peace processes, building capacity and training for inclusive conflict management, contributing to peace opera- tions, and advancing gender equality, climate adaptation and resilience. It also includes perspectives on cross-cutting themes such as women, peace and security, youth, countering violent extremism, and partnership with the African Union. The report aims to be a resource for the policy commu- nity, mapping African-Nordic cooperation, in pursuit of peace and security in Africa.
African-Nordic Peace and Security Cooperation
Northern European Security: The role of the UK
Launching The UK contribution to security in Northern Europe report as part of RUSI’s transatlantic trilateral security dialogue with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Climate Change and Arctic Security, Multi-Actor, Diverse and Distributed Assets and Modalities
Climate and Environmental Change (CEC) is driving highly variable operational environments for Allies and adversaries alike. While technology is often touted as the determinant for strategic advantage, this is not necessarily true in the Arctic where whoever has the most knowledge possesses more strategic options and can apply the knowledge to achieve strategic dominance short of open conflict. Rapidly acquiring precise knowledge while limiting our adversaries acquisition requires that we understand their patterns of obtaining information and comprehension. Failure to understand their patterns results in an inability to detect or mitigate adversarial activity. Futures planning attempts to do this, in part, but lacks the precision and rigor to provide concrete outputs that can be used tactically. By adding a framework that looks at multiple actors, distributed assets, and modalities, this lack can be overcome.
The quest for a foreign policy ‘home turf’ after Brexit